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Abstract 
Organisations are often faced with many challenges when they attempt to 
implement an entire workforce to a technologically advanced and complex platform that 
will alter the skill-set requirements for performance. Training can be ä very effective 
intervention strategy to implement this organisational change. However, theorists have 
proposed that training can also enhance organisational effectiveness, and it is believed 
that individual outcomes from training that emerge upward to achieve organisational 
objectives -vertical transfer- would strengthen the link between training effectiveness and 
organisational effectiveness. Using these theories as a foundation, this case study 
examined the effectiveness of an organisation's training to achieve performance 
objectives. Expansion from these theories was possible as this case study presented the 
multiple influences involved during successive interdependent team training to support 
the performance of safety-critical operations for a new working platform. 
In achieving interdependent team vertical transfer in emergency management 
during this training, results have revealed that training must first focus on individual level 
skill proficiency and collective enabling process skills - horizontal transfer- as they are a 
critical antecedent to ensure cohesion in interdependent team performance. Findings have 
further identified that the training content and methods must both support and determine 
the achievement of individual required skills. While simulation training that reflected the 
working platform benefits both learning and performance. Conclusions can also be drawn 
from this exploratory case study that the efforts by individuals upward through to teams 
and across teams has enhanced training performance outcomes. 
This empirical case study has shown that a multitude of factors and cumulative 
events that occurred prior to training and during training influenced the effectiveness of 
team training from multiple levels. Thus, this case study has been able to verify and 
expand current postulated models to provide foundation support for the design and 
delivery of interdependent training. 
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Vertical Transfer, Organisational Effectiveness. 
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Introduction 
Setting the Scene 
Advances in technology and rapid changes and instabilities in the world have 
placed increasingly difficult and demanding challenges on large, complex 
organisations such as the military. These challenges are further compounded by the 
ever-increasing requirement to economise and `buy off-the-shelf' rather than design 
commercial systems to meet all expectations. As this economising trend is not likely 
to reverse itself, rather than accept the status quo, one practical and critical method to 
ensure effective utilisation of a commercial system is an effective training package 
that meets the needs of the organisation. For an organisation such as the Armed 
Forces effective training is critical, as military readiness, safety and performance 
depend largely on the extent to which training systems provide crucial knowledge and 
skills (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, Tannenbaum, & Mathieu, 1995; Tannenbaum, 1993). 
Although to gain the utmost from the investment of training, attention should also be 
directed at examining training effectiveness to identify what internal and external 
influences could impact the intended outcomes from training. 
A great deal of money is spent on training and it has been estimated that only 
10% of training expenditures transfer to the job (Georgenson, 1982) and, even today, 
statistics suggest further examination of training effectiveness is still necessary to 
gain a better return on investment from training (Cromwell & Kolb, 2002). The goal 
in training is to achieve the desired knowledge and skill level in the most cost 
effective manner in the shortest timeframe for optimum performance in the 
workplace. In practise, organisations tend to evaluate the success of training 
development by measuring the successful achievement of performance outcomes, but 
rarely is the approach of training effectiveness applied to understand why training did 
or did not achieve the desired outcomes or what factors influenced those outcomes. 
This inconsistency suggests there is a necessity to reciprocally improve the 
understanding between training effectiveness research and real-world applications to 
improve training and transfer outcomes. 
As early as 1980 Goldstein identified, "we must consider training as a system 
within work organisations rather than simply treating instruction as a separate 
technology" (Goldstein, 1980). Even so, until the 1990's training design and 
effectiveness research focused primarily on variables within the training platform 
itself, such as training method, content, equipment and media (Cannon-Bowers et al., 
1995; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). While training research has historically 
supported the importance of training design as a way of improving training 
effectiveness (Baldwin & Ford, 1988), it is only over the past 15 years that training 
researchers have moved beyond the focus of organisational objectives and training 
design to identify other factors that can influence training effectiveness to more fully 
explain why training does or does not work. 
Training effectiveness research has now evolved to look at training intervention 
from a systems, macro perspective (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001), where the 
success of training can be attributed to individual, organisational and training-related 
factors (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & 
Converse, 1991; Kozlowski, Brown, Weissbein, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 2000; 
Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001; Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993, p. 312; Salas & Cannon- 
Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Research has established that individual 
influences can influence training and transfer through their attitudes, behaviours and 
abilities; organisations can influence through their culture, history, policies, and 
attitudes; and, the training platform can influence training effectiveness through the 
methods, content, principles and support provided during training (Cannon-Bowers et 
äl., 1995). 
The success of training and its implementation to the workplace requires 
individual training for specific tasks, but in many work environments, such as the 
nuclear power industry, emergency response teams and the military, seldom are those 
activities isolated to individuals themselves. Work efforts often require individuals to 
interact as a team, and teams interact with systems to meet organisational goals. 
Training becomes even more complex when activities depend upon coordinated 
efforts of a team. Thus, one can consider the factors that can influence the success of 
training and transfer of divergent team members, particularly those that require 
interdependent collaborative and effective safety and emergency management to 
prevent catastrophic losses (e. g., human lives and property), as complex and 
multifactorial. Influencing factors from the trainee, the team, the training design and 
the organisation come together to influence individual learning, which can influence 
the transfer of that trained. Although there has been a great expansion of the breadth 
and depth of knowledge of the factors that can influence the success of training and 
transfer, training effectiveness research has for the most part placed its primary focus 
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and effort on the influences on individual outcomes. This concept is referred to as 
horizontal transfer. 
Beyond the uni-dimensional, horizontal influences of factors that impact 
individuals successful learning and transfer to the workplace, more recent research 
theories have proposed that individuals within an organisation are a dynamic entity 
and therefore the influence on training outcomes is also multi-dimensional, affecting 
more than the individual being trained (Kozlowski et al., 2000). Distinct variables 
such as individual characteristics can impact a team through to the organisation, while 
an organisation can also impact the individual and the outcome from training, which 
in turn can influence the training design. Together, complex and different factors 
across individuals, through different levels contribute or deter intended learning and 
transfer to the workplace. 
Research has shown that this complex multi-factorial interaction of individual, 
organisational and training factors influences individual learning and outcomes on the 
horizontal, individual platform (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001; 
Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Research and modelling 
have also sufficiently established the knowledge that group and organisational factors 
have direct and moderating effects on individual learning and transfer (Cannon- 
Bowers et al., 1995; Ford, Quinones, Sego, & Sorra, 1992). What has largely been 
neglected in training theory and research are the factors and processes by which 
individual-level outcomes can combine and emerge, from the bottom-up, to influence 
organisational objectives (Kozlowski et al., 2000). This concept is known as vertical 
transfer. 
Although formal research and training models have so far only assumed an 
upward linkage of individuals through to an organisation, it has been proposed that it 
is likely implicitly considered in practical training applications (Kozlowski & Salas, 
1997). This assumption can be presumed that while training effectiveness efforts have 
almost exclusively been applied at the individual level, understanding the impact of 
factors will result in the design and delivery of effective training that contributes to 
the achievement of organisational objectives. Therefore, if training is based upon the 
achievement of organisational objectives then an individual must then have an 
influence on those objectives. One can then also infer that if the objective of training 
is to improve an organisation's capability to meet objectives, then training could also 
influence an organisation's effectiveness (Goldstein, 1993 cited in Kozlowski et al., 
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2000). However, although it has been assumed that training with an aim to meet 
organisational objectives contributes to organisational effectiveness, to date this is 
only a theory. The linkage between vertical effects of individuals on organisational 
effectiveness has also not been well articulated, and as such it has received little 
research attention to date. 
Thus, even though current research has elucidated the specific individual 
factors (or categories such as those from an individual, training or an organisation) 
that can influence training and outcomes, from an application point of view an 
organisation is more interested in the process to achieve a successful outcome from 
training. So how can research effectively support organisations' desired outcome of 
successful training and transfer to the workplace? 
To aid organisations to achieve more effective outcomes from training it is 
important for research to explore and study the complex multilevel interactions of 
influences within an actual training environment, to identify the link between factors, 
limitations that impede success, and the formal and informal interventions and 
adaptations implemented to achieve successful outcomes. Research has established 
that influences and interventions do not impart their effects just uni-dimensionally; 
rather individuals, organisations and the training platform can impart effects both 
horizontally on an individual, and organisations can have a top-down effect. 
Accordingly, one can presume an even broader impact, that training effectiveness is a 
complex multi-dimensional, multi-directional interaction whereby individuals 
contribute to organisational goals, an organisation impacts an individual, both can 
affect the training design, and together they can influence the broader intended 
outcomes of achieving organisational objectives. Therefore, all factors that could 
impact the degree of success of training are important to determine their combined 
influence to achieve organisational objectives and thus trainings' impact to 
organisational effectiveness. Vertical transfer has been considered the key untapped 
leverage point to strengthening the link between training effectiveness and 
organisational effectiveness (Kozlowski et al., 2000). Therefore, confirming and 
delineating this linkage would aid to derive the most from training opportunities. 
Gaining the foundation knowledge and explanations for multilevel approaches 
and influences to training and organisational effectiveness would be almost 
impossible to create in a laboratory setting, as this would require the development of 
a study that included all of the potential influencing factors from the individual, 
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organisation and the training platform. To truly identify the foundation for the theory 
of vertical transfer and multilevel approaches to training effectiveness, and thus 
provide evidence of its existence and application, empirical research needs to be 
performed in a setting where an organisation performs actual training. Even the best 
attempts to create a study of a complex training platform scenario in a laboratory 
could not possibly recreate all of the attitudes, beliefs, capabilities and interactions 
across and between levels, as this combined interaction has yet to be fully explored. 
Attempting to do so in a laboratory would provoke considerable risk of artificial, 
incomplete and perhaps erroneous findings. There is also an added benefit to 
performing research within a training environment, in that there is an opportunity to 
improve the integration and reciprocation of training research and training practice. 
An ideal platform to provide evidence for the theory of vertical transfer and 
identify and assess the multi-dimensions and directions of training effectiveness in a 
complex environment would be to study military training. A unique opportunity was 
offered to study the Canadian Naval training programme to integrate the entire 
Canadian Navy's' submarine workforce to a new class of submarines, the Upholder 
class purchased from the United Kingdom's Royal Navy (RN). Specifically, training 
effectiveness research was performed as complete crews, of various experiences and 
occupations, were trained to learn the performance of safety-critical operations. 
Training an entire crew simultaneously is complex, but the multi-dimensional 
influences expand as the RN agreed contractually to provide four operationally 
certified submarines concurrently with four trained and sea-tested crews in succession 
after six years of inactivity with this class of submarine within very strict timelines. 
Within this training platform it is likely that the potential impact of an 
individual on an organisation would likely be seen, as in any complex man-machine 
system such as a submarine, human actions can have a significant impact on safe and 
reliable operations. Therefore, individuals tend to be much more motivated to achieve 
successful performance, as the correct outcome is critical. Additionally, in an 
I In 1968, the Canadian Forces Reorganisation Act dissolved the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian 
Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force. In their stead, the Act created a single armed Service called the 
"Canadian Armed Forces. " Henceforth, the former army, navy and air force were referred to as the 
"land, sea and air elements. " The descriptor "Armed" was dropped later from the Service's title; it is 
now referred to as the "Canadian Forces. " Over time, the land, sea and air elements reintroduced, 
unofficially, the terms army, navy and air force. For simplicity in this thesis, the sea element of the 
Canadian Forces will be referred to as the "Canadian Navy. " 
5 
environment where collaborative work is essential the interactions expand beyond 
individuals to the co-ordination of activities within the team, the system, and their 
reactions, interactions, and adjustment to changing circumstances. This training 
process is further complicated as the training was provided by another military 
organisation with different norms, culture and training standards. The training 
therefore moves beyond the boundaries of training discrete individuals to achieve 
desired learning outcomes; the training further encompasses and is affected by the 
integration of individuals and their actions, social and organisational contributions, 
within and between two nations. 
This training provided an ideal platform to lay the empirical foundation for the 
theory that combined influences from the organisation, individual, training 
programme and situational variables from pre-training through to training contribute 
and impact training effectiveness across multilevels to achieve organisational 
objectives. As well, that training effectiveness is reflected by horizontal, vertical and 
top-down influences that can impact organisational effectiveness, especially in the 
field of emergency management. 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
The thesis puts forward that performing research while an organisation provides 
interdependent team training is an ideal platform to provide the empirical evidence to 
support the theory of vertical transfer. Further, as the intent of training was to provide 
outcomes that support organisational goals and strategies, proof that individual 
outcomes emerge upward from training to achieve higher level organisational 
outcomes will also provide evidence for the assumed link between training 
contributions, training outcomes and organisational effectiveness. 
In monitoring an ongoing complex, team training programme there is also an 
opportunity to support the theory of multilevel approaches to training effectiveness by 
identifying the broad spectrum of factors and interventions that influence training and 
outcomes from, to and within an organisation. 
The applied aim for this thesis is to provide insight to organisations that are 
responsible for safety-critical management of the range and interaction of factors that 
can influence the learning and application of safety-critical operations within a 
training programme. The cursory identification of individual upward linking 
influences can then be considered and applied in needs assessment and on-going 
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evaluations of a programme so that they may improve the likelihood of successful 
training and transfer, and thus improve organisational effectiveness. 
Objectives 
The objective of this research was to follow the progress of successive training 
of team-oriented crews in learning the performance of safety-critical operations in a 
new system to identify and measure individual expectations, perceptions and 
satisfaction from within the training platform and the resulting influence on training 
success. Specifically, the objective is comprised of three components: 1) to provide 
empirical evidence to support the theory of interdependent team vertical transfer; 2) 
to identify the links and influences of training effectiveness factors from pre-training 
and training, organisational, situational and individual variables, with a focus on the 
training design, to broaden the scope of multilevel training effectiveness on vertical 
transfer; and, 3) to provide foundation evidence to support the theory linking training 
effectiveness to organisational effectiveness. 
1.3 Scope of Thesis 
As the scope of evaluating training effectiveness of the Canadian Navy's entire 
fleet of submariners to learn to operate a sea-going sailing vessel would be extremely 
time-consuming and intrusive (beyond the limits of a thesis), the research performed 
for this thesis has been limited to assessing training effectiveness in the performance 
of safety-critical elements of operation - the goal of effectively performing 
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). In order to achieve the research objectives 
the scope of the work involved identifying all training related stakeholders at all 
stages in the process to clearly establish who was involved, the training rationale and 
process, and how adjustments to the training programme were put into practice. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Given that the Canadian Navy allowed research to be performed only on the 
condition that the study would not interfere with training, it is acknowledged that the 
limits of this case study could not provide a comprehensive detailing and review of all 
influencing factors identified in effectiveness research. The training programme was 
not simple; the RN was contracted to train the Canadian submariners within very 
restrictive timelines: the availability of trainees, trainers and access to the training 
platform was very limited. Moreover, pre-post assessments were not possible, and 
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conditions of the contract identified the training programme, documentation, 
submarines and the simulator trainers were the property of the RN until the 
completion of training. Thus, within the realm of what was possible, the research 
focused on the key identifiers within the training programme that influence training 
success as it applies to the performance of safety-critical elements, identifying the 
perceptions, reactions and expectations of trainees, trainers and training management 
during the training process. It was also recognised that a military training 
environment may have unique conditions that might not be observed in all 
organisations or training programme. However, a very complex training environment 
provides ideal conditions to advance the knowledge of multilevel training 
effectiveness, as there is an opportunity to study training as it naturally proceeds to 
achieve required performance outcomes so that military objectives are accomplished 
and are effective. Successful training of interdependent teams is critical to achieve 
organisational objectives, and therefore this training platform provides ideal 
conditions to identify and explore the links of vertical transfer. 
Within this training platform there is an opportunity to identify and assess 
combined influencing factors, their impact, link, and the interventions and adaptations 
implemented to achieve successful outcomes. Although unique, the scope of the 
work described in this thesis intends to provide empirical evidence to support the 
theory of interdependent team vertical transfer, and thus expand the framework of 
training effectiveness to identify the multi-faceted, multi-directional and continuum 
influence (prior, during and after training) of factors to training and outcomes. It is 
also the intent of this thesis to expand the understanding and therefore influence of 
training effectiveness factors with the inclusion of vertical transfer to the model, to 
link training effectiveness and the achievement of organisational effectiveness in 
safety-critical management. 
1.5 Research in an Applied Environment 
In this unique training environment that required international collaboration to 
create and implement a training programme for an entire workforce, there was an 
opportunity to observe successive `conversion' training as it formally and informally 
adjusted and evolved to achieve intended organisational objectives. That is, the 
training platform intended to add to the knowledge and skill set of pre-qualified 
submariners to allow crews to operate a newly purchased class of submarines, that 
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although similar to that previous owned required further training for successful 
operation. This can be considered a real-world, complicated training platform that 
allows the identification of individual, situational, organisational and training design 
factors identified within the training platform that could impact learning and ultimate 
transfer to the workplace. 
9 
2. Literature Review 
The objectives for this thesis was to provide the empirical evidence to support 
the theory of interdependent team vertical transfer and the links and influences from 
the organisation, individual, training programme and situational variables that 
contribute and impact training effectiveness across multilevels to achieve 
organisational objectives. Further, these findings will provide exploratory empirical 
evidence to support the theory linking training effectiveness with organisational 
effectiveness. This chapter develops the background to these theories by laying the 
foundation upon which research in the thesis will be developed. The elements that are 
central to the thesis are the models of training effectiveness and training transfer. 
For discussion purposes of what is already known in the literature this chapter 
reviews the overall theories and approaches of training effectiveness and training 
transfer, examines the influences that are central to these models (training design, 
work context, and individual and organisational inputs and outputs) both from within 
and outside this research domain (as they directly apply to topics), and summarises 
the collective findings and considerations to outline where the research forming this 
thesis can make a contribution. 
2.1 Training Effectiveness and Training Transfer 
This Section provides the background to training effectiveness and training 
transfer, identifying the origins, delineations, growth and similarities of the two 
models. This overview of similarities between training effectiveness and training 
transfer research will also identify from the literature the rationale to consider and 
apply training effectiveness in a broader context that extends the understanding and 
impact of training prior to, during and post-training. 
2.1.1 Origins of Training Effectiveness and Training Transfer 
Training research and the theories of training effectiveness and training transfer 
have formed on psychological foundations of instructional design (Tennyson & 
Schott, 1997; B. G. Wilson & Myers, 2000), which in its origins in the early 1900s 
linked the theories of learning with practical application (Tennyson & Schott, 1997). 
Integrating psychology and instruction emerged during World War II to aid the 
military in producing reliable training outcomes. Thus began the focus of research to 
develop approaches to analyse performance and design instruction to achieve specific 
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learning outcomes. The popular model of Instructional System Design (ISD) 
introduced in the 1960s has been widely used for teaching job-skills and providing 
technical training (Torraco, 1999). This still used model of instruction is based upon 
the concept of linking needs assessment (analysis), training design and delivery, and 
evaluation. Training researchers have criticised ISD as being too narrowly training 
programme focused (Kozlowski et al., 2000), prescriptive (Tennyson & Schott, 
1997), linear, and insensitive to the context of practice (Torraco, 1999), as the model 
focuses on training design and learning and does not take into account the many 
factors that can influence training outcomes. However, this training model can be 
given credit for initiating the growth of the field of training research. 
The roots and delineation of both training effectiveness and transfer research 
emerged and expanded from Kirkpatrick's 1967 training evaluation typology 
(Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Cheing & Ho, 2001; Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Kirkpatrick's popular and still 
prevalent framework for categorising training criteria includes four-levels of 
evaluation taxonomy: trainee reactions; learning; behaviour; and, organisational 
results with an eye toward predicting learning and retention (Baldwin & Ford, 1988; 
Bryant & Angel, 2000; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). This classification scheme by 
Kirkpatrick allowed trainers to measure, albeit roughly, the characteristics of the 
training course to determine the extent to which learners would benefit from the 
training (Bryant & Angel, 2000). 
However, researchers have argued that the lack of clarity of Kirkpatrick's 
evaluation model (i. e., what had been learned and why) (Kraiger et al., 1993; Salas, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997) has resulted in researchers to refer, use and 
misuse, and expand Kirkpatrick's typology as concepts of training effectiveness 
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Kozlowski et al., 2000; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). 
Training effectiveness is not as simple as to categorise training criteria as suggested 
by Kirkpatrick (1976) into the outcomes of reactions, learning, behaviour and 
organisational results (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Kozlowski et al., 2000; 
Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Even Kirkpatrick identified, " there are however so 
many complicating factors that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate 
certain kinds of programmes in terms of their results". 
Baldwin and Ford (1988) in their extensive review of the training transfer 
literature expanded upon Kirkpatrick's intended evaluation typology to provide a 
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clearer understanding of what was meant by training transfer. They defined training 
transfer as the extent to which trainees effectively apply the knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes (KSAs) gained in the training context back to the job (generalisation) and 
subsequently the maintenance of that learning over time in the job (Ford & 
Weissbein, 1997; Richman-Hirsch, 2001; Smith-Jentsch, Salas, & Brannick, 2001; 
Yamnill & McLean, 2001). From their extensive review and critique of the literature, 
Baldwin and Ford (1988) can also be given credit for the development of the still 
referred and expanded model that describes the transfer process, linkages and factors 
among training inputs, training outputs, and the conditions of transfer (Figure 1). 
Their categories of trainee characteristics, training design and work environment 
input factors, defined from past research, was based upon the indirect effect on 
transfer through their impact on training outcomes (learning and retention). 
In the past, training evaluation and training effectiveness were used 
interchangeably and there appeared to be confusion and controversy of how training 
evaluation plays a part in training effectiveness and workplace transfer and 
application. It was Kraiger (1993) who clarified that training evaluation and training 
effectiveness are not the same and pose two different research questions. Training 
evaluation examines what works in training, examining what KSAs were learned at 
different levels, whereas the study of training transfer follows through from training 
evaluation to examine application; the extent to which the KSAs acquired in a 
training programme are applied back to the job (generalisation) and maintained over 
time in the job. Training effectiveness research examines why training did or did not 
achieve the direct outcomes of learning and retention, and what factors influence 
those outcomes. 
As a result of Baldwin and Ford's extensive review of the empirical training 
transfer literature and discussions of the research gaps (1988), training research has 
made tremendous progress in the form of greater sensitivity of criterion measures of 
transfer beyond self-reports; the use of more complex learning tasks that more closely 
mirror tasks in the work setting; development of more sophisticated key 
environment/workplace factors, such as transfer climate; and, more theoretical 
frameworks to drive the choice of trainee characteristics. However, in Ford's (1997) 
updated review of transfer he identified that a lack of attention to the 
multidimensional nature of transfer in past research has impacted the interpretation of 
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results, which then can be incorrectly generalised to other samples, organisations and 
training. 
There have been improvements to training and transfer research with more 
rigorous approaches to measuring transfer, including self-reporting measures using 
anchored behaviour ranking scales and expansion from self-rating to include 
supervisory and peers (Ford & Weissbein, 1997). Also, training effectiveness and 
transfer research have begun to focus on more complex tasks that are reflective of the 
work environment (Blanchard, Thacker, & Way, 2000; Ford et al., 1992; Ford & 
Weissbein, 1997; Kontoghiorghes, 2001,2002; Noe & Schmitt, 1986) with more 
sophisticated theoretical and operational measures of key work environmental factors 
(Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Ford & Weissbein, 
1997; Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; Kozlowski, Toney et al., 
2001; Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
Although researchers have criticised the use of Kirkpatrick's typology in 
training effectiveness research, it has provided a foundation for research into the 
factors that influence training to grow further and become more defined to now 
include: training contexts (training methods, content, climate, media, equipment and 
artefacts) (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1991; Salas, 
Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992); 
organisational inputs (culture, history, policies, attitude); and, individual inputs 
(attitudes and behaviour) (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1991; 
Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001; Kraiger et al., 1993; Salas et al., 
1992). Thus, more recent research has provided a greater understanding that many 
factors can hinder or facilitate individual training outcomes of both learning and 
transfer, but also that training can be affected by a complex integration of influences. 
This complex integration of influences has been primarily focused on the individual 
and individual outcomes, and will be discussed in detail throughout the thesis. 
2.1.2 Considerations in Training Effectiveness and Training Transfer 
When a decision is made by an organisation to perform training, the training 
should support the strategic direction of the organisation and training objectives 
should align with organisational goals (Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Accumulating 
evidence in the literature has shown that these prior training considerations can 
impact the effectiveness of training (Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Pre-training 
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impacts fall into three general categories: 1) what characteristics an individual brings 
to training; 2) variables that engage trainees to learn and participate in developmental 
activities; and, 3) how training can be prepared to maximise the learning experience 
(Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). These factors need to be considered in a needs 
assessment. 
The roots and credit can be given to McGehee and Thayer (as cited in Salas, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992) who in 1961 
identified organisational analysis to aid organisations where and when training was 
needed. Thirty years later, McGehee and Thayer's framework for pre-training needs 
assessment (organisational, task and person analysis) remains prevalent but was 
expanded to suggest examination of system-wide components (Tannenbaum & Yukl, 
1992), and further suggestions followed that organisational goals and objectives drive 
the training content and thus the success of training and transfer outcomes 
(Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). 
Achieving the link between training and organisational strategy relies on the 
performance of a detailed training needs analysis that meets the objective of an 
organisation. Training courses should support the strategic direction of an 
organisation for future growth and success, and training objectives should align with 
organisational goals. To achieve the desired outcomes from training the needs 
assessment steps of organisational analysis, task analysis and person analysis should 
not be considered in isolation (Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997; 
Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). This approach should further include a detailed person 
analysis to assess the specific needs of the individual to meet organisational 
objectives. When a person analysis is inadequate and details of who should be 
trained, why, and what should be trained are not sufficiently completed, individual 
strengths and weaknesses are not identified and the result may be the provision of 
training at a level that results in sub-optimised training effectiveness (Feldman (1989) 
as cited in Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). 
Organisational analysis in which the goals, strategies, resources and determination as 
to whether training is the appropriate intervention to accomplish objectives should 
drive the determination of training objectives (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Tannenbaum 
& Yukl, 1992). Further, in order to determine the success of a training programme 
through the evaluation process, the outcomes must be related to the objectives of the 
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training programme (Kraiger et al., 1993; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 
1997). 
Contemporary models of training effectiveness are different from their 
traditional counterparts in that they now explicitly conceptualise training in an 
organisational context (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Kozlowski et al., 2000; 
Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992), and they have expanded the 
focus to identify the effect of organisational higher-level factors influence on training 
effectiveness along the individual-horizontal platform of the training process 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). 
In addition, the level (s) at which organisational objectives are targeted and 
delivered in training require consideration as they can influence the intended training 
intervention and have a profound impact on the effectiveness of transfer (Kozlowski 
& Salas, 1997). Needs assessment requires a method to link higher-level objectives, 
goals, or outcomes with the individual training needs, considering each level within 
the organisation (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). Ideally, a needs 
assessment should identify and incorporate those training effectiveness factors that 
will influence the outcome from training. The deficiencies of the needs assessment 
process to consider multilevel linkages with training outcomes have been noted 
previously (Ostroff & Ford, 1989), including linkages to training outcomes at 
different levels (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). 
Traditionally, needs assessment focused on improving individual KSAs to 
consequently improving individual performance outcomes. With interdependent 
teams, the traditional form of needs assessment does not take into account that 
individual and higher-level outcomes are not the same (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
Further higher level analysis is required such a team-task analysis (Bowers, Baker, & 
Salas, 1995). Training needs for teams has been approached to understand crews' 
tasks and the processes that have led to performance outcomes (e. g., Crew Resource 
Management) (Bowers et al., 1995; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). However, the 
current knowledge of team and higher-level task analysis is limited and much is still 
to be learned about the effectiveness of different approaches (Cannon-Bowers & 
Salas, 1997a). 
Without a validated method for needs assessment for higher-level task analysis 
(individual upward through a team), identification of all of the factors that contribute 
to intended organisational objectives should be undertaken. This may affect the 
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intended outcomes from training, thus impeding the contributions vertically from 
individual through to team outcomes, which could further reduce the impact that 
training could have on organisational effectiveness. Thus, there is a necessity to 
empirically identify and consider the relationship among and between factors and 
levels for vertical transfer in a complex team-training platform to further delineate the 
training effectiveness factors and their links. There is a further need to identify the 
pre-training categories that can impact effectiveness, further clarifying what an 
individual brings to training and how and what variables and techniques combine and 
emerge in interdependent teams to learn and how training can. maximise learning. 
2.1.3 Similarities of Training Effectiveness and Training Transfer 
Past research has tended to separate training and desired training outcomes from 
the application and maintenance of training in the workplace, and this may have been 
due to the confusion of the definitions of training effectiveness, transfer and 
evaluation. With the clarity provided by Kraiger (1993) it can be seen that transfer of 
training and training effectiveness are broader than training evaluation. But also, as 
training outcomes of learning and retention have a direct effect on the successful 
application to the workplace (Baldwin & Ford, 1988), then one can say that factors 
that influence training, influence outcomes, can therefore be an influence in the 
application back to the job (Figure 1). 
The literature has shown what appears to be a more focused research effort on 
training transfer, but it can be seen that results found in transfer are also applicable in 
training, and therefore training effectiveness. The literature on training effectiveness 
has shown the variables that affect training and training outcomes include the 
categories of training contexts (including methods; content, principles and support); 
organisational inputs (including culture, history, policies, attitude); and, individual 
inputs (including the attitudes, behaviours and abilities of an individual) (Cannon- 
Bowers et at, 1995). 
It can be seen that training transfer has actually expanded the influencing factors 
in training effectiveness to include trainee characteristics that include ability, skill, 
personality, and motivation (Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Ford et al., 1992; Ford & 
Weissbein, 1997; Hagman, 1983; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001; Yamnill & McLean, 
2001; Yelon & Ford, 1999), locus of control, self-efficacy (Cheng & Ho, 2001) and 
experience (Ford & Weissbein, 1997). Training design has grown to include factors 
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such as principles of learning, sequencing and training content (Baldwin & Ford, 
1988; Ford & Weissbein, 1997; Hagman, 1983; Yamnill & McLean, 2001). While 
work environment factors have expanded to include, support to transfer climate, 
opportunity to use (Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Ford et al., 1992; Ford & Weissbein, 
1997; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001; 
Yamnill & McLean, 2001), and constraints and learning culture (Cheng & Ho, 2001; 
Ford & Weissbein, 1997; Richman-Hirsch, 2001). 
Figure 1. A Model of the Transfer Process 
Training Inputs Training Outputs Conditions of Transfer 
(Outcomes) 
Trainee 
Characteristics ..................................................... 
" Ability 
" Personality .................... 
" Motivation 
Training Design 
+V 
" Principles of Learning 
.......... , 
Generalization Learning 
.......... 10. 
" Sequencing 
" Training 
Retention Maintenance 
Content 
Work 
"""""""""" Environment 
" Support 
" Opportunity to .......................................................: 
use 
Taken from Baldwin and Ford (1988) Transfer of Training: A Review and Directions for Future Research 
The literature on training transfer also shows that the factors that impact has on 
training outcomes (training effectiveness) are also seen in conditions of transfer, and 
although applicable to training, the impacting characteristics identified in training 
transfer are even more expansive. There is also an overlap of the typical factors 
identified in training effectiveness and training transfer factors. The common 
elements of the individual inputs found in training effectiveness is also found in 
trainee characteristics in transfer, training context elements are seen in training 
design, and organisational characteristics are covered within the category of work 
environment. What is unique in the transfer model that is not seen in the training 
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effectiveness model is the extension beyond training-to address opportunity to use 
what is learned and of course, the conditions of transfer. 
2.1.4 Summary 
Although research has typically separated the impact of factors that influence 
training and transfer it can be seen that there is a commonality of impacting elements 
(Figure 1) that have both a direct or indirect effect on training and transfer. In review 
of the influencing characteristics examined in training and transfer it can be seen that 
the commonality of factors that has been identified as affecting training and transfer 
are in fact not separate issues at all but rather impacting factors in a longitudinal 
continuum; factors that affect learning will impact transfer to the workplace. 
Regardless whether the influences have been identified under training or transfer, the 
approach in effectiveness research has been to assure transfer of individual outcomes 
from training to performance in the job context to achieve organisational objectives. 
With this mindset training effectiveness can be viewed in a much broader 
context. The value in viewing the approach as a continuum is that organisational 
objectives remain the prime focus, and achievement of the aim can be assessed prior 
to, throughout training and post training. For instance, a training programme may lead 
to learning and achievement of performance objectives, but if constraints are present 
in transfer, that learned may fail to completely transfer to the workplace. If one 
assessed training in isolation the conclusion would be that the training was effective, 
but if the training does not transfer then training was truly not completely effective. 
To achieve organisational objectives interventions must extend to facilitate effective 
transfer, and therefore the application of training effectiveness needs to address both 
training with the aim of learning, and successful and appropriate application to the 
workplace. Thus, to assure effective training and application, consideration and 
amalgamation of the factors that could influence training and transfer must be taken 
into account prior to, during and after training. 
2.2 Broad Spectrum Influences for Training and Transfer 
The historical basis and intent of training and development research over the 
last thirty years, as seen in the reviews by Baldwin and Ford (1988), Tannenbaum and 
Yukl (1992), and Salas and Cannon-Bowers (2001), has been to characterise and 
understand the factors and processes that training intervention have on an 
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organisation, assuming that training has been developed to meet organisational 
objectives. However, in the traditional analysis approach there has always been an 
assumption that the individual level is the source of organisational change 
(Kozlowski & Salas, 1997), based on the premise that a needs assessment would 
identify organisational objectives and thus training of individual KSAs would meet 
the needs of the organisation. 
Based on this assumption research in training effectiveness has made much 
progress, but the research has typically dealt with training effectiveness as a relatively 
simple, uni-dimensional (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995) and unidirectional individual- 
based construct, focusing on individual learning, enhancement and or improvement of 
performance, and successful transfer to the workplace. This limit in focus can be 
largely attributed to the continued dominance of instructional theory in training, 
which is based on individual-level changes (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). 
Evaluation of the definition of training effectiveness reveals that the focus has 
not been inappropriate or misplaced. Training effectiveness examines why training 
did or did not achieve the direct training outcomes of learning and retention, and the 
intended effective application of the desired KSAs to the workplace. Thus, as learning 
must first occur at the individual level, training and instructional design should first 
focus on the individual to achieve the desired organisational objectives. 
However, research has traditionally assumed that a needs assessment would 
identify organisational goals and objectives (Kozlowski et al., 2000) and learning 
outcomes at the individual level would emerge to influence the higher-level outcomes 
of an organisation (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). This premise also relates back to 
Kirkpatrick's 1976 evaluation typology, in which it has been assumed that if training 
is designed to support and attain results for an organisation and the results are 
important to organisational objectives, then improvement in organisational-level 
variables (within the training context) can be expected (Tannenbaum, 1993). Thus, 
within this frame of understanding and assuming the completion of a detailed needs 
assessment prior to training, appropriate training courses should support the direction 
and strategy of the organisation, and training objectives and individual outcomes 
should then align with organisational goals (Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Although 
training is predicated on meeting organisational goals and objectives, the classic 
training models infer the development of training interventions will satisfy the goals 
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through individual training, although they do not have the tendency to link the 
process directly to transfer (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). 
Although implied in past work, a fairly new emerging intervention theory has 
been put forward, although mostly assumed (Kozlowski et al., 2000), that individual- 
level learning and transfer emerge upward through the group, unit, to yield effects at 
the organisational level over and above achieving organisational objectives. The 
theory, referred to as Vertical transfer (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Salas & Cannon- 
Bowers, 2001), moves beyond the expectation that organisational objectives are met 
by individual outcomes, rather emerging outcomes from individuals can in fact 
enhance organisational effectiveness (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
This proposition requires an expansion of the traditional approach to identify 
and assess training effectiveness beyond the uni-dimensional, horizontal construct. To 
aid organisations to improve and adapt with the dynamic technological, economic, 
political and social changes and demands, a greater emphasis is needed to understand 
the factors, processes and links between training outcomes and organisational 
objectives so that organisational effectiveness can be achieved. To bridge this gap in 
understanding, a multilevel approach to training effectiveness has been proposed by 
Kozlowski and colleagues (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) that 
expands beyond the traditional approach. 
Research has shown that this complex multi-factorial interaction of individual, 
organisational and training factors influences individual learning and outcomes on the 
horizontal platform (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001; Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Research and modelling has also 
sufficiently established the knowledge that group and organisational factors have 
direct and moderating effects on individual learning and transfer (Cannon-Bowers et 
al., 1995; Ford et al., 1992). What have largely been neglected in training theory and 
research are the factors and processes by which individual-level outcomes combine 
and emerge, from the bottom up, to influence organisational objectives. This 
theoretical assertion of vertical transfer has yet to be empirically confirmed. 
Although formal research and training models have so far only assumed an 
upward linkage of individuals through to an organisation, it has been proposed that it 
is likely implicitly considered in practical training applications (Kozlowski et al., 
2000), and therefore likely to be present. The assumption can be made that while 
training effectiveness efforts have almost exclusively been applied at the individual 
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level, achievement of effective training is ultimately determined by the degree to 
which training contributed to the achievement of organisational objectives. Therefore, 
if training is based upon the achievement of organisational objectives then an 
individual must have an influence on those objectives. One can then also infer that if 
the objective of training is to improve an organisation's capability to meet objectives, 
then training could also influence an organisation's effectiveness (Goldstein (1993) 
cited in Kozlowski et al., 2000; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997). 
However, although it has been assumed that training with an aim to meet 
organisational objectives contributes to organisational effectiveness, to date this is 
only a theory. The linkage between vertical effects of individuals on organisational 
effectiveness has also not been well articulated and as such empirical evidence is 
needed to support the theory. 
2.2.1 Multilevel Approaches to Training Effectiveness 
Tannenbaum and Yukl's (1992) review of training and development within an 
organisation identified a recurring theme from practitioners, and one that should be 
present; the need to link training and organisational strategy to achieve desired 
outcomes. Achieving desired outcomes relies on the performance of a detailed 
training needs analysis that meets the objective of an organisation. Training courses 
should support the strategic direction of an organisation for future growth and 
success, and training objectives should align with organisational goals. This approach 
should further include a detailed person analysis to assess the specific needs of the 
individual to meet organisational objectives. When a person analysis is inadequate 
and details of who should be trained, why, and what should be trained are not 
sufficiently completed, individual strengths and weaknesses are not identified and the 
result may be the provision of training at a level that results in sub-optimised training 
effectiveness (Feldman (1989) as cited in Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997; 
Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). This weakness in training effectiveness identified a 
recurring theme from practitioners, and one that should be present, the need to link 
training and organisational strategy so as to achieve desired outcomes. Organisations 
may believe training is appropriately placed at the lowest common denominator, the 
individual, when in fact successful achievement of the tasks to achieve organisational 
objectives, requires collaboration from the team. 
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Kozlowski and Salas (1997), drawing from organisational theory, developed a 
theoretical framework to expand training and transfer research from an individual- 
level orientation focus to emphasis on an organisational systems perspective for 
training research. They were the first to propose a theoretical framework of vertical 
transfer to address the potential upward aggregate affect of the individual on the 
effectiveness of an organisation (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). They considered 
their approach consistent with the traditional training effectiveness perspective, but 
expanded considerations to more fully elaborate the linkages to an organisational 
context point of view, which they found needed to be modelled. 
The importance of the individual was not discounted. Kozlowski and Salas' 
(1997) model recognises that training is generally delivered to individuals but often 
targets higher-level outcomes, and thus their model addresses the extent to which 
lower-level training (individual up through a team) can contribute to higher-level 
objectives, and vice versa. Their conceptualisation of training effectiveness identified 
an approach that recognises the multilevel factors and links that are present in the 
workplace. The model recognises these factors and requirements are then 
implemented and transferred across horizontal links (within the individual, team and 
organisation), both down and upward in the training platform to enhance the impact 
of training interventions on organisational objectives (Figure 2). 
Specifically, Kozlowski and Salas (1997) state that the level at which training is 
delivered and the training content needs to be appropriate (e. g., individual, team or 
organisational level). But as well, there needs to be an alignment or agreement of the 
training content within the level of training and between levels (identified as 
congruence). For example, if the workplace requires improving team performance 
then the training might necessitate training at the level of intact teams rather than 
training individuals across different teams (Figure 2) (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 
1997b). 
To better achieve the desired outcomes from training, Kozlowski and Salas 
(1997) differentiated training content for each level into two components (Figure 2). 
They noted the components as either: 1) technostructural factors, which includes the 
knowledge and skills needed to fill the job, and as you move upward in levels content 
expands in scope for the level (i. e., team interdependence, task structure, and upwards 
to organisational goals, strategy and structure); and, 2) enabling factors involves the 
human informal, social and interaction processes, from the social and interpersonal 
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skills at the individual through to teamwork, coordination and leadership, to 
understanding at the organisational level the vision, culture, climate and leadership. 
Figure 2. A Multilevel Model for Training Implementation and Transfer 
Technostructural 
Factors 
" Goals 
" Strategy 
" Resources 
" Technology 
" Structure 
Transfer Congruence: Transfer 
Organisational to Team Level 
Congruence 
Organisational Level 
Enabling Process 
Factors 
" Vision 
" Rewards 
" Leadership 
" Organisational 
Culture and climate 
" Task Interdependence 
" Task Technology 
" Task Structure 
/I I\ 
Congruence 
Team or Unit Level 
" Team work and Leadership 
" Consensual Team Climate 
" Team Coordination 
Transfer Congruence: Transfer 
Team to Individual Level 
" Technical Skills Congruence " Human Process Skills 
" Technological Knowledge " Human Process Knowledge 
Individual Level 
" Individual Differences 
Taken from Kozlowski and Salas (1997) A Multilevel Organisational Systems Approach for the Implementation 
and Transfer of Training 
The model suggests that all of these factors need to be supportive of each other 
for successful performance in the workplace, and thus training needs to be provided at 
the appropriate level, across levels, and in alignment with the different levels for 
enhancement of training interventions on organisational objectives (Kozlowski & 
Salas, 1997). The intent of the framework is to ensure training is effective, and so 
they have proposed within their multilevel framework that training must be driven to 
link lower-level individual targets of training with higher-level outcomes (Kozlowski 
et al., 2000). 
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Kozlowski and Salas'(1997) model is the first to identify and clarify the factors 
and processes of vertical transfer focused on achieving organisational objectives in 
training. However, the vertical transfer process has been posited as being much more 
complicated than linking individual and higher level outcomes; workflow 
interdependencies link the individual to the team through to the organisation, but it 
has been proposed that this can be achieved through two very different streams 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
Past research has identified that training of the individual through the team to 
achieve organisational objectives can progress upward as either: 
1). Independent, equivalent individual actions that aggregate to form teams in a 
linear additive fashion with no coordination required within the team; or, 
2). Highly interdependent individual actions combine to form synchronous, 
coordinated team performance in a non-linear fashion (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 
1997b; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; Salas et al., 1992; A. M. Schaafstal, Johnston, 
& Oser, 2001). 
But it was Kozlowski et al (2000) who proposed a detailed framework and 
developed the model that elaborates the implications of these different vertical 
transfer processes. Kozlowski et al (2000) further elaborated on their own multilevel 
approach to training effectiveness from an organisational context point of view 
(Kozlowski & Salas, 1997), proposing a framework to enhance both concepts of 
horizontal and vertical transfer that recognises and elaborates the different 
implications of training independent and interdependent teams. Kozlowski et al. 
(2000) identified their initial multilevel framework (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997) was a 
good foundation to address how individual learning and transfer yield upward effects, 
however, further elaboration and expansion of the framework was needed to 
distinguish and conceptualise the two types of team emergent vertical effects beyond 
the original single model. 
Kozlowski et al. (2000)'identified the two processes as composition and 
compilation. Composition refers to independent individual actions that aggregate in a 
linear additive fashion with no coordination within the team. An example of this 
would be a typing pool, where individuals form a pooled coordination that may vary 
in their amounts of contribution, but the contribution content is the same. 
This has been considered the primary and almost exclusive focus found in the 
literature of team training and performance (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
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Team performance that is based upon interdependent individual actions where 
each individual contributes different content to the team product has been referred to 
by Kozlowski et al. (2000) as compilation. Basically, there is a multidimensional and 
unique performance input from individuals who make up the team. For example, in a 
surgical team the individual performance of the nurse, surgeon, and anaesthesiologist 
are all different, comprising of different KSAs and different performance. Failure on 
the part of any one individual will jeopardise the team's performance, the well being 
of the patient and the successful outcome. Thus, in compilation the overall 
performance objective is similar across individuals, but the content that constitutes the 
individual contribution is diverse and unique, and the higher-level linkage of the 
individual contributions is different (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
The vertical transfer models of team composition and compilation of Kozlowski 
et al. (2000) have theorised that there are different paths along which organisational 
objectives will be achieved, and if training is to contribute to organisational 
effectiveness it must have a higher-level impact (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). 
Kozlowski et al. (2000) further posit that training results will be ineffective if the 
training process has not addressed the required combination of differing KSA content 
of the individuals in a team seen in the compilation model. For training to have the 
desired effectiveness on organisational objectives and to strengthen the opportunities 
for training to effect organisational effectiveness, the horizontal and vertical 
contributions from individuals need to be collectively identified and addressed 
together. 
Kozlowski's two models (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997) 
have identified and clarified the multilevel and direction individual, team and 
organisation factors and processes influence the outcomes from training to achieve 
organisational objectives, with an aim to achieve organisational effectiveness. The 
implications of these models broaden the approach to training effectiveness. 
However, to achieve the utmost from training empirical evidence is still needed to 
validate the multilevel framework. Performing research in a field setting will also aid 
in identifying the training effectiveness factors and links between levels. To further 
amplify the multilevel model, the two different vertical transfer pathways also need to 
be clarified and elaborated as two distinct and separate entities. Specifically, more 
research is needed for the proposed compilation model to clarify the linkages between 
interdependent teams and the individual and team training components required to 
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assure achievement of organisational objectives. Failure to consider this type of 
vertical transfer in the training process could result in training that targets the wrong 
KSAs, the wrong individuals, or the wrong level, which will reduce the influence that 
training can have on higher-level objectives. 
2.2.1.1 Organisational Influences and Effects 
Kozlowski et al. (2000) expand on their multilevel model (Kozlowski & Salas, 
1997) to suggest that even if individuals learn the trained knowledge and skills there 
are often many misaligned organisational contextual factors in the job setting that are 
not addressed as part of the developmental and training process. As such, 
organisational contextual factors such as leadership, structure, job-design, rewards 
and climate (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; Clarke, 2002; Kraiger & Aguinis, 
2001; Rouiller & Goldstein, 1993; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 
1992), can negatively impact horizontal transfer outcomes, and likely vertical transfer 
outcomes, when they are not aligned with the training content. Kozlowski et al. 
(2000) do however assert that the theory and research findings are sufficiently well 
developed such that top down contextual effects (from organisations, units and teams) 
should be incorporated in research and practised. 
In their review of previous research Kozlowski et al. (2000) identified three 
types of higher-level organisational contextual factors that influence training 
effectiveness. These include pre-training influences, training and immediate post- 
training influences, and direct effects that facilitate retention and maintenance on-the- 
job. Although it is agreed that all contextual factors influence or impact training 
effectiveness, as the data for this thesis was collected while an organisation 
performed training, the thesis only addresses pre-training and training effects. Thus, 
contextual effects on retention and maintenance, which are outside the scope of the 
thesis, will not be discussed. The two types of higher-level contextual factors that 
influence training effectiveness prior and during training within the horizontal 
transfer plane are: 
1) Contextual factors can affect pre-training motivation so that learning is 
enhanced or inhibited. In the longitudinal continuum, pre-training motivation is a 
critical precursor of learning and transfer as failure of the trainee to learn the 
required KSAs precludes training effectiveness (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; 
Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992); and, 
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2) Contextual factors can moderate the extent to which learning during training 
is translated into new job behaviour and performance outcomes. Learning in the 
absence of transfer also precludes training effectiveness (Ford et al., 1992; 
Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992; Yelon & Ford, 1999). 
From the perspective of higher-level contextual factors and their effects, 
Kozlowski et al. (2000) have suggested that theory and research have sufficiently 
established and supported the incorporation of contextual factors as a likely influence 
on motivation constructs and facilitates post-training transfer, and thus principles for 
research and practical application need to be put into place. 
Kozlowski et al. (2000) have put forward that contextual effects have generally 
been conceptualised as either situational constraints that affect motivation and 
learning, or as perceptions of organisational features, events and processes that are 
believed of importance and relevance to training, which in turn can influence 
motivation and learning (Kozlowski et al., 2000). The conclusion that individual 
motivation is affected by organisational contextual factors has been observed and 
confirmed prior to Kozlowski et al's (2000) model and since, and research has 
identified that organisational contexts or the environment surrounding a team cannot 
be ignored (Salas et al., 1992). 
Training research has shown that situational constraints such as insufficient job 
information, equipment, supplies, money and time can hinder motivation to learn 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001; Mathieu & Matineau, 1997; Salas, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997); trainees need an opportunity to perform (Ford 
et al., 1992); heavy workload and time pressure pose significant barriers to 
implementing training (Clarke, 2002); and, mandating training can affect pre-training 
motivation (Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001). These research findings have supported the 
view that situational constructs can directly inhibit individual motivation and learning 
during training, therefore there is an influence on the effectiveness of training and 
application, which could impact organisational effectiveness. 
Other work by researchers has identified that organisational contextual effects 
can also occur through the moderating influence of individual perceptions; that is, 
organisational features and events surrounding training that are perceived and 
interpreted by the trainees can moderate the extent of learning (Kozlowski et al., 
2000). Perceptions that can moderate individual outcomes include organisational 
support for training (e. g. offload work responsibilities), learning culture (Cheng & 
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Ho, 2001) and the policies and practices related to the value placed on training 
(Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001). Also, individuals who had the perception of supportive 
supervisors entered training with stronger beliefs of the value and support of training 
which positively affected motivation and learning, and so supervisory support is 
considered a key environmental factor that can affect the transfer process (Cheng & 
No. 2001; Gumuseli & Ergin, 2002; Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 
1992). Further, when there is a lack of support from one's leaders or peers and a 
climate exists that is inconsistent with the trained skills; horizontal transfer of the 
KSAs is unlikely (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
Supervisors may be a primary influence on trainee expectation and motivation 
through the signals and messages they send (Tannenbaum, 1993). Baldwin and 
Magjuka (1997) in their review of pre-training influences identified that research has 
shown that supervisory support for trainees before or after'training may facilitate 
motivation to transfer. Ford et al. (1992) found that supervisors gave some 
employees more opportunities to perform newly trained skills than they gave to 
others, based on preconceived notions of the employees (Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001). 
However, when employees have been socialised to mistrust management and change, 
they create a negative climate that can be a strong barrier to formal training (Chao, 
1997). In one of the few studies looking at the combined effects of trainee 
characteristics, team leader support and team climate, Smith-Jentsch et al. (2001) 
found in their flight simulation study with 80 pilots, that team leader support can 
moderate maximum and typical post training performance, and perceptions of team 
transfer climate were found to mediate the team leaders' impact on trainees. 
Research on transfer climate suggests climate matters (Kraiger & Aguinis, 
2001); facilitating climate increases trainee focus, motivation and intention to transfer 
(Rouiller & Goldstein, 1993). A study conducted by Rouiller and Goldstein (1993) in 
a chain of fast food restaurants, demonstrated organisational climate (situational cues 
and consequences) was a powerful predictor of whether trainees transferred learned 
skills. Departmental/manager support was also seen by Clarke (2002) and Gumuseli 
and Ergin (2002) as affecting training transfer. Gumuseli and Ergin (2002) found in 
their study of Coca-Cola sales representatives that managers' support and guidance 
provided prior to and after training (measured at 30 days and 3 months) had a positive 
behavioural effect, a steady increase in efficiency and greater increases in job 
satisfaction than those who did not receive managerial support. In Clarke's research 
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(2002) the effect of perceptions related to in-service training within the social services 
industry suggested the absence of performance feedback mechanisms and 
reinforcement of training were seen as factors that undermined training transfer. 
Organisational climate and culture, and transfer climate have also been 
considered as key components that affect both motivation and learning (Cannon- 
Bowers et al., 1995; Mathieu & Matineau, 1997; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001). As well, 
situational cues and consequences were found to predict the extent to which transfer 
occurs (Rouiller & Goldstein, 1993). Team leaders can shape the degree of transfer 
through informal reinforcement (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; Smith-Jentsch et 
al., 2001); and, peer, subordinate and supervisor support all play a critical role in 
successful team training (Riemersma, 2001), including training interdependent teams 
for emergency management (A. M. Schaafstal et al., 2001). 
Research has found that employee commitment to the organisation is a strong 
predictor of motivation to learn, but also commitment was consistently related to 
expectations and desires (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995) and a predictor for motivation 
to learn and transfer (Kontoghiorghes, 2001,2002). Both Cannon-Bowers (1995) and 
Kontoghiorghes (2001; 2002) findings were based on field research, either using 
Navy recruits (Cannon-Bowers) or health care employees (Kontoghiorghes). 
In relation to assuring organisational objectives are met, trainees with a high 
level of organisational commitment were more optimistic albeit the likelihood of 
change (Cheng & Ho, 2001). Further, organisational policies may impact an 
individual's beliefs that developmental activities are worth the time and effort (Noe, 
Wilk, Mullen, & Wanek, 1997), and the willingness to try and apply newly learned 
knowledge and skills have been suggested by Noe and Schmitt (1986) as based upon 
the values trainees attach to training, their expectancy that the transfer will be 
successful, and their perception of the transfer climate. 
Most research affecting transfer has focused on supervisor support as the critical 
environmental factor affecting training transfer (Baldwin & Ford, 1988), but positive 
findings have been found for the influence of goal-setting freedom and support (Ford 
et al., 1992), and varied management styles, including 360 feedback (Noe et al., 
1997) and mentoring (Kraiger et al., 1993). Recent research also suggests that the 
manner in which the organisation frames training, such as advanced or remedial 
training, influences both training motivation and learning (Quinones (1995,1997) as 
cited in Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997). 
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Recent models (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001) and 
supportive research (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995, Mathieu, 1997 #343; Clarke, 2002; 
Ford et al., 1992; Rouiller & Goldstein, 1993; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001) have 
considered and identified the direct and moderating influence of organisational 
contextual factors, both situational and perceptional, on individual-level outcomes of 
learning and transfer. Research has thus established that the theoretical and research 
foundation on the effects of contextual factors on horizontal transfer is sufficiently 
well developed to specify principles to guide theory, research and practice 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000), but application is the key. 
Much more attention has been given to integrating training as a system within 
an organisational context (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001) and this progression to view training within a system forces 
consideration of the multilevel links (individual through to'teams and organisation) in 
all levels of needs analysis (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997) to include organisational 
analysis. Ostroff and Ford (1989) have suggested that organisational analysis cannot 
be considered in isolation. However, organisational contextual factors can easily 
overwhelm the effects of the best planned and delivered training if the social 
environment and organisational context are not addressed (Baldwin & Magjuka, 
1997). 
2.2.1.1.1 Summary 
Although research has expanded and improved the identification of the 
multidimensional, complex nature of key environmental constructs and the interaction 
on the individual, most studies reviewed by Ford (1997) looked only at one set of 
factors (trainee characteristics, design, work environment) or examined the impact of 
multiple sets of factors as if they were independent of each other. Organisational 
factors have tended to be researched in isolation, and further research is still needed 
to explicitly explore how organisational factors interact with training design elements 
and how they help or hinder learning (Baldwin & Magjuka, 1997) and the 
consequences to transfer (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). Individual level factors can 
interact with the training context or situation and thus individual, training and 
organisational factors can impact both training and transfer. 
Further research is still obviously necessary to identify and define 
organisational factors within the multilevel context. As a minimum, Kozlowski et al. 
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(2000) suggest research should incorporate organisational context factors that are 
likely to influence pre-training motivation (e. g., training attitudes and expectations) 
and facilitate post-training transfer. Including organisational contextual factors will 
help the development of a more complete model of training effectiveness that will 
address both horizontal and vertical transfer. Although there are many principles of 
research identified by Kozlowski et al. (2000) that require consideration, within the 
context of this thesis further research needs to be performed to identify the direct pre- 
training motivation effects and the moderating effects on the vertical training-transfer 
linkage, from the organisational and unit level. 
2.2.1.2 Individual Horizontal Transfer Influences 
Within the context of horizontal transfer, Kozlowski et al. (2000) have proposed 
that both group and organisational factors have direct and moderating effects that can 
facilitate or inhibit individual learning and transfer. This premise is based on the fact 
that many, if not most organisations achieve quality (and thus objectives) through 
complex contributions across individuals and different levels within an organisation. 
This notion is in line with their multilevel model (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997) in which 
they specified that appropriate training to level and content, and alignment between 
levels is required to achieve effective training (Figure 2). 
The framework proposed by Kozlowski and Salas (1997) identifies that at its 
basic level training induced change is ultimately rooted within the individual, but the 
influencing factors and processes to learn and be able to perform what is needed in 
the workplace is more complex than training at the individual level. From this 
horizontal platform the framework suggests that for training to have a positive effect 
on organisational objectives, issues beyond the individual need to be considered and 
applied prior to, during and after training for successful transfer to occur. Specifically, 
they identified that the level at which training is delivered and the training content 
needs to be appropriate (i. e., individual, team or organisational level). But as well, 
there needs to be an alignment or agreement of the training content within the level of 
training and between levels. Knowledge and skills training, identified as technical 
structure, and social and interpersonal skills, identified as enabling factors, need to be 
supportive of each other for successful performance in the workplace, and the training 
needs to be provided at the appropriate level and in alignment with the different 
levels. 
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The training literature has suggested that an individual's ability is often related 
to the amount learned in training (Baldwin & Ford, 1988). However, Tannenbaum 
and Yukl (1992) suggest that trainability tests predict short-term training success 
better than long-term training success or subsequent job-performance. Research is 
well documented that general cognitive abilities have demonstrated predictive validity 
for training performance (Kozlowski, Toney et al., 2001; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Kozlowski, 1997), and trainees with greater ability will demonstrate better training 
performance and higher scores on learning measures (Tannenbaum, 1993). Thereföre, 
it is safe to conclude, based on the body of evidence, that general intelligence is good 
- it promotes self-efficacy and performance, helps a great deal with skill acquisition 
(Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001), and cognitive ability is a strong predictor of 
academic performance and of self-rated overall training performance (Cannon- 
Bowers et al., 1995). Thus, those who have high cognitive ability (all other things 
equal) will likely learn more and succeed in training (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001), 
but further research is necessary to look more closely at low- ability trainees and how 
to optimise their learning. It has been said that cognitive ability is a viable predictor of 
training performance (learning), but not necessarily performance on the job (Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001) as many jobs require much more than cognitive ability 
(psychomotor demands) and may depend on motivation for completion. Current 
empirical research has not simultaneously investigated the influence of ability and 
other antecedents on the participation of developmental activities (Noe et al., 1997). 
Thus, cognitive ability can be considered an influencing factor, but other factors can 
and do affect both learning and transfer. 
Specifically, individuals can be considered as either mastery oriented (able to 
adapt responses to novel or challenging situations) or performance oriented (affirm 
their own competence by seeking good performance evaluations) (Kozlowski, Gully 
et al., 2001). Researchers have identified this individual characteristic as a goal 
orientation motive (Kozlowski, Toney et al., 2001; Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
The difference in the two types of individuals is that mastery oriented individuals 
develop competence, but performance oriented individuals are concerned with 
demonstrating competence to themselves or others (Kozlowski, Toney et al., 2001) 
and tend to avoid novel situations where their competence is unknown or 
questionable (Dweck, (1986 and 1989) cited in Kozlowski, Toney et al., 2001; Salas, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997). Getting trainees to focus on learning strategies 
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can create mastery orientation, whereas a performance orientation is created by 
getting individuals to focus on achieving task outcomes (Kozlowski, Gully et al., 
2001). From a training perspective, research has suggested that goal orientation ought 
to be an important individual difference relevant to learning, motivation and 
performance (Kozlowski, Gully et al., 2001), but more research is needed to 
determine if goal orientation is a relatively stable trait or if it can be modified prior to 
training (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001), flexible with situations (Mathieu & 
Matineau, 1997), and a factor on transfer (Kozlowski, Gully et al., 2001). 
Further advancements in trainee characteristics as they relate to subsequent task 
performance relates to the individual variable of self-efficacy (Tannenbaum & Yukl, 
1992); defined as an individual's expectation or confidence that tasks can be 
successfully performed (Ford et al., 1992). Noe (1986) has suggested that an 
individual's self-efficacy will have an impact on his or her motivation to transfer. 
Ford et al. (1992) found individuals high in self-efficacy were more likely to perform 
more of the tasks they were trained for and to perform the more complex and difficult 
tasks. While Cannon-Bowers et al. (1995) found Navy recruit trainees who possessed 
higher levels of physical self-efficacy and commitment had greater performance 
expectations and desires from the training. Noe et al. (1997) found, in their review of 
the theoretical and empirical literature supporting employee development, that 
individuals with high self-efficacy are more likely to participate in new and 
challenging situations than individuals with low levels of self-efficacy. 
In Cheng and Ho's (2001) review of transfer training they noted that 
empirically, self-efficacy has been shown to be positively related to pre-training 
motivation (Noe & Schmitt, 1986), training performance (Ford et al., 1992), transfer 
performance and skill maintenance (Cheng & Ho, 2001; Kozlowski, Gully et al., 
2001). It was also found that self-efficacy made significant contributions to the 
prediction of individual adaptability (Kozlowski, Gully et al., 2001). Kozlowski et 
al. 's (2001) conclusions in their computer-based model research on the effects of 
training goals and goal orientation in university participants found when task 
characteristics are static, self-efficacy does not add much to the prediction of 
performance beyond previous skill levels. However, when transfer necessitates the 
adaptation of knowledge and skills to meet new demands, self-efficacy becomes 
important. Advancements in research have shown that self-efficacy enhances learning 
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outcomes and performance, but research into self-efficacy of teams still needs to be 
further explored (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
An individual behaviour that has received a great deal of research attention is 
motivation; conceptualised as the direction, effort, intensity and persistence that 
trainees apply to learning-oriented activities before, during and after training 
(Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Early research identified, and it has been widely 
accepted, that learning and transfer will only occur when trainees have both the 
ability ("can do") and volition ("will do") to acquire and apply new skills (Noe & 
Schmitt, 1986). Several studies have found that trainees' motivation to learn and 
attend training has an affect on skill acquisition (Nease, 2000), and retention and 
willingness to apply newly acquired KSAs on the job (Milner, 2002; Tannenbaum & 
Yukl, 1992; Weissbein, 2000). 
Recent work by Milner (2002) with university students found that motivation to 
learn strategies prior to training related only to the number of negotiations people 
reported during the week following training. Motivation to learn was not found to be 
related to the number or variety of skills people attempted in any of their negotiations, 
and even when individuals reported they were motivated to learn they were not likely 
to try and use the intervention strategies. 
An individual's belief in and acceptance of the organisational goals and values, 
willingness to exert the effort and desire to belong within an organisation were seen 
to affect, in a training situation, their views on the usefulness of training, both to 
themselves and the organisation (Cheng & Ho, 2001). 
Self-efficacy could potentially impact motivation to learn, motivation to 
transfer, and, subsequently development growth (Noe et al., 1997), and motivation to 
learn has been proven to be a strong predictor of motivation to transfer 
(Kontoghiorghes, 2002). When transfer necessitates the adaptation of knowledge and 
skills to meet new demands, self-efficacy can be expected to influence motivational 
and self-control processes, which are seen to be important for effective transfer 
(Kozlowski, Gully et al., 2001). 
2.2.1.2.1 Summary 
We see that individual characteristics interact with each other and their 
combined influence affect both training and transfer, however, further empirical 
research is still needed to identify the interactive influences of factors for learning (as 
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it directly applies to individuals and teams) as it has a direct impact on the design and 
delivery of training, and thus could influence vertical transfer outcomes. As well, 
future work should consider the influence of training motivation on-the-job for 
situations where workers are required to acquire new skills through informal 
mechanisms (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
It can be seen that current research has still focused on selective trainee 
characteristics to identify their impact on either training or transfer, with few 
addressing the longitudinal continuum (of training through to effective transfer) let 
alone the vertical potential effect. Further empirical and longitudinal studies are 
necessary to identify the multidimensional influences of trainee characteristics. Only 
then can more detailed multilevel frameworks and methodologies be proposed and 
developed. 
This case study was not able to directly assess the influences of motivation, self- 
efficacy or goal orientation, however, exploratory inferences should be possible in the 
exploration of perceptions, expectations and satisfaction with the training design and 
organisational influences. 
2.2.1.3 Vertical Transfer- Team Compilation Influences 
Virtually all current models of training assume organisational goals and 
objectives achieved through training are critical aspect of training effectiveness 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000). This traditional presumption is based on the fact that: 1) a 
needs assessment would identify organisational goals and objectives; 2) the training 
platform would support this, and individual learning occurs; 3) horizontal (individual) 
transfer of the KSAs are transferred to the workplace; and, 4) the effects of individual 
on-the-job behaviours emerge to influence outcomes at a higher level (Kozlowski et 
al., 2000). It is not disputed that appropriate training courses developed from a needs 
assessment should support the direction and strategy of the organisation, and training 
objectives and individual outcomes will align with organisational goals *(Tannenbaum 
& Yukl, 1992). That is not the case for the multilevel approach to training 
effectiveness as organisational, personnel and task factors are considered for the 
completion of a needs assessment. However, in the absence of theoretical 
underpinnings with empirical evidence, the extended assumption that individual-level 
outcomes transcend to emerge to team and organisational outcomes and impact 
35 
effectiveness is unsubstantiated (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; 
Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997). 
Kozlowski et al's (2000) multilevel approach suggests that training results will 
be ineffective, as will organisational effectiveness, if the training process does not 
address the combination of differing KSA content of individuals in an interdependent 
team seen in the compilation model, and therefore the horizontal and vertical 
contributions from individuals through to the team need to be collectively identified 
and addressed together. The multilevel model proposed by Kozlowski and Salas 
(1997) discussed earlier in the chapter (Figure 2) poses a framework that can aid in 
identifying the factors that need to be considered in a needs assessment for 
interdependent team tasks. Even though they have noted that the theoretical principles 
inherent in their framework are abstract, generic and not specific, the proposed model 
can have practical applications for training effectiveness as the framework offers 
general team-based task requirements and team-work tasks that should be considered 
(as defined in Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b). 
Although specifics are not identified in the Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) 
multilevel framework, the basis of the framework is sound as it is based upon the 
requirement to meet organisational objectives, considers the link between levels, and 
provides the framework (albeit very broadly) to consider the key questions in training 
effectiveness - how, where and when to deliver different forms of training to enhance 
transfer (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995). Also, the identified general categories of task- 
work (knowledge, skill based training) and team-work (attitude, expectation and 
perception based training) are consistent with prior team training reviews and 
research (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; Dyer, 1984; Salas et al., 1992; 
Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992; van Berlo, 1996), favourable to practical applications 
(Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Blickensderfer, 1997) as well as, agree with prevailing 
views on transfer (as seen in the reviews by Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Ford & 
Weissbein, 1997; Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Kozlowski, 1997). 
As noted by Dyer (1984), Tannenbaum and Yukl (1992) and Frieling et al 
(1997) teams are heavily used by the military, governments and industry and 
therefore, to aid in the prevention of accidents and errors, resources and time have 
focused on emergencies, information transfer, team-training and communication 
(Donderi & Ostry, 1985). Yet, traditional training methods have been criticised for 
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focusing on individual learning, development and change (Kozlowski et al., 2000), 
and in the past an obstacle to developing an effective team-training programme has 
been the lack of methods for analysing team tasks, behaviours and skills. 
(Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992; van Berlo, 1996). 
Although methods may not exist for analysing team-tasks, researchers have 
come to agree on a common definition of a team in that a team consists of two or 
more individuals, who interact, dynamically, interdependently and adaptively to work 
towards a common goal/objective/mission (Dyer, 1984; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Blickensderfer, 1997; Salas et al., 1992; van Berlo, 1996) which happens to fit with 
the vertical transfer compilation model. Researchers are in agreement that individual 
skills are founded on, required and important for team success (Kozlowski, Toney et 
al., 2001; Salas et al., 1992; van Berlo, 1996), but to assure achievement of higher 
level objectives with interdependent teams both traditional"individual-level analysis 
and higher level analysis such as team-task analysis are both necessary (Kozlowski et 
al., 2000) in a combined integrative process. 
Much of the early work by researchers on teams has been performance based 
(Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Blickensderfer, 1997; 
Salas et al., 1992), which identified two critical skill components to the development 
of a team; those related to the technical aspects of the task (labelled taskwork), and 
those associated with the team aspects of the task (labelled teamwork) (Morgan et al 
(1986) as cited in Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Kozlowski, 1997). In the 1990s researchers turned their efforts towards the 
refinement of performance-based models to develop models of team effectiveness. 
Although still performance-based, Salas et al (1992) developed an integrative input, 
through put, out-put model, based on previous research and theory, that identified a 
link between organisational and situational contexts, task characteristics, work 
structure, individual characteristics, team characteristics and team processes. The 
model suggests that team performance is complex and affected by a host of internal 
and external factors (Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Blickensderfer, 1997). This model 
could also be seen as an early version of the currently accepted model for training 
effectiveness, or could have been the basis thereof, whereby organisational, 
situational, individual and work factors influence the effectiveness of training, and it 
also uniquely deals with the characteristics required of a team. However, the 
shortcomings in this model is that it is performance based and not analysis or 
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assessment based, the factors are unidirectional in their influence, and training is 
identified as a throughput rather than an affecting factor. 
Although past research in team-training has been performance based, it was 
recognised at the time that beyond understanding the factors that influence tasks in 
teamwork, one must also have a clear understanding of how teams interact, 
coordinate, communicate and adapt (Salas et al., 1992; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). 
However, these skills have proven difficult to identify and explain (Salas, Cannon- 
Bowers, & Blickensderfer, 1997). Of late intervention team-training strategies have 
emerged that although performance, outcome based, the focus is on workflow 
interdependencies that rely upon effective coordination, cooperation and 
communication based upon the shared mental model theory (Cannon-Bowers & 
Salas, 1998). 
These theoretical-driven team-driven strategies have grown to include: cross- 
training (Blickensderfer, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998); team self-correction 
(Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, 1998); cross training and self correction (A. M. 
Schaafstal et al., 2001); team leadership training (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001; 
Tannenbaum, Smith-Jentsch, & Behson, 1998); distributed team training (Garbis & 
Waern, 1999); and, adaptive team coordination training (Entin & Serfaty, 1995). All 
of these intervention forms have been tested and evaluated with positive results 
(Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). They have a common theme in that a shared mental 
model approach in which there is a shared or common knowledge about the task 
and/or team, by at least two members (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b). Further, the 
mental model approach serves to help people describe, explain and predict system 
behaviour (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998), and information that is compatible with 
existing mental models will be easier to learn (Wickens & Hollands, 1999). Thus, 
although outcome based, these factors are appropriate and applicable to training 
effectiveness and should be considered in training effectiveness application. 
Theorists have hypothesised that training that fosters accurate mental models of 
systems will improve performance (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). The team cross- 
training research performed by Blickensderfer et al (1998) is an instructional strategy 
in which each team member is trained in the duties of his or her team-mates (Volpe, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1996), a method of training that is heavily used in safety- 
critical training of submariners. The body of research gives strong support to building 
a team-shared understanding, identified as implicit coordination, where team-mates 
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coordinate without overt communication (Blickensderfer et al., 1998; Volpe et al., 
1996). When team members' task roles are highly differentiated and interdependent, 
coordination is a key focus for training in dealing with emergency management (A. 
M. Schaafstal et al., 2001), requiring both team (coordination and communication) 
and task competencies to mitigate the risk of errors (Dobson et al., 2001). 
Other team training research has focused on developing strategies to train for 
specific competencies in stress management to aid performance for both individual 
and team tasks in high demand, high threat situations (Driskell, Salas, & Johnston, 
2001). Driskell et al (2001) contend that team tasks require attention to both task 
related activities and interpersonal or teamwork activities, such as communication and 
coordination, and stress training can prepare individuals and teams to maintain 
effective performance in high demand, high stress situations. They do strongly 
suggest in their guidelines for stress training that careful needs analysis is required to 
develop appropriate training content. 
Team performance research can be applied to the general team level categories 
of the multilevel framework of Kozlowski and Salas (1997), but they can also be 
applied to the compilation team framework identified by Kozlowski et al (2000). The 
skill component of taskwork reflects Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) general 
technostructure factors (task interdependencies, technology and structure) and 
teamwork reflects their enabling process factors (teamwork and leadership, 
consensual team climate, and. team coordination). Although most of the recent team 
research has focused specifically on intervention strategies to improve performance, 
the intervention strategy of Crew Resource Management (CRM) is based on 
interdependent teams used by the aviator and military communities for over 20 years 
(Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001) as a tool to improve cockpit team training. More 
importantly, it was designed to reduce human-error, mishaps and accidents (Salas et 
al., 1999). 
Salas et al's (1999) recent efforts at developing a methodology for design and 
delivery of a CRM programme for the US Navy was approached by integrating 
theoretical models of teamwork and human learning with training needs-analysis 
tools. The result was a family of instructional strategies identified through a rigorous 
coordination demands analysis, a set of coordination tasks, and appropriate training 
methods targeted at teamwork KSAs. CRM training seems to work by changing the 
crew's attitudes toward teamwork and by imparting the relevant team competencies 
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(Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001), which has advocated and resulted in effective, 
assertive crews who voiced concerns, as well as, pilots who accepted or even 
encouraged such communication (Kozlowski et al., 2000). Even with all of these 
intervention strategies it is noteworthy that the current knowledge of front-end team 
task analysis and other forms of higher-level task assessments is limited and leaves a 
great deal to be learned about the effectiveness of different approaches (Cannon- 
Bowers & Salas, 1997b). 
In follow on work by Kozlowski (1998) utilising his multilevel model for 
training implementation he indicates that team vertical transfer for pooled aggregate 
coordination (later referred to as compilation (Kozlowski et al., 2000)), "transfer can 
compose vertically even when there is considerable variation in individual 
effectiveness following training because individual contributions to group 
performance are compensatory. " However, when team coordination is 
interdependent (compilation) and each member has unique contributions that are 
critical to the outcome, training must focus not only on the individual but also on the 
fit and distinctive contributions of that individual to the higher-level outcome 
(Kozlowski el al., 2000). In Kozlowski's (1998) work in developing adaptive teams 
he suggests that teams that are low on task interdependence can benefit from 
individually orientated training and generic training, and the absence of coordination 
allows traditional individual models to be useful for training design. However, teams 
with high interdependence demands require differential individual- and team-specific 
training (Cannon-Bowers ei al., 1995). 
The question then arises that if there are degrees of dependence in a team, then 
what competencies are required for cooperative functioning within the team and are 
they effective? Cannon-Bowers and Salas (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; Cannon- 
Bowers et al., 1995) assert that depending on the characteristics of the task and team, 
several types of competencies can be distinguished. They suggest that teams 
competencies could be delineated into two platforms: a) whether they are task 
specific or task generic, and b) whether they are team specific or team generic. 
According to the authors this delineation is important because it determines how best 
to train and assess performance, and to be an effective team member specific KSAs 
vary depending on the four categories. Task-specific competencies are KSAs 
executed in a manner particular to the task, and task-generic KSAs are more 
generalised and can be transported across tasks (i. e communication and interpersonal 
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skills). Team-specific competencies are KSAs particular to a set of team members 
(e. g., shared knowledge), and team-generic KSAs can generalise to settings with 
different team-mates (e. g., attitude toward teamwork, assertiveness). 
These factors were then combined to produce four categories of a mix of team 
and team specific and generic competencies that identified specific team KSAs 
deemed appropriate for each of the conditions (for more details see Cannon-Bowers 
et al., 1995; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997). Cannon-Bowers and Salas 
(Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997) then 
further delineated the KSAs to identify those that are shared amongst the team and 
those that should be compatible, intending to allow team members to execute 
coordinated sequences. They concluded that for team performance to be optimised, it 
is imperative that there is a detailed understanding of the team's competencies to 
achieve the status of an effective team member and a relationship amongst team 
members (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b). 
Cannon-Bowers (1995; 1997b) and Salas (1997b; 1995; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, 
& Kozlowski, 1997) suggest that their framework of team competencies is 
differentially applicable depending on the nature of the task and environment in 
which the teams perform, and for greater understanding and application they have 
provided a series of proposed links to categories and selected tasks and environments. 
They do not however suggest in their framework that any of the KSAs as identified in 
each of the categories should be expanded to include those from other categories for 
training if the task and environment deem appropriate, suggest potential cross-linkage 
between categories, or identify that certain tasks or environments may not fit into 
their framework. 
Herein the framework poses some difficulties, as within the military most 
operational teams and team tasks are characterised as high task interdependence, low 
membership in multiple teams, possible member turnover and low variety (van Berlo, 
1996). This combination would fall under the context driven, team-contingent and 
task-contingent competencies, which is not addressed well by their categorisations. 
van Berlo (1996) further disputes the categorisation as too absolute, as in combat, 
stress factors (voluntary or not) can influence the rate of membership turnover, thus 
the task/environment stability is low (team-contingent) and team membership 
turnover is high (task-contingent). This is not captured in the categorisation. Cannon- 
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Bonvers and Salas (1997b) do indicate in their summary of this body of work that they 
have attempted to decompose competencies and relate them to training and 
management, but validation of the framework and competencies is needed, as well as, 
testing of propositions stemming from it. 
2.2.1.3.1 Summary 
Defining, refining and potentially expanding the varied KSAs for generic and 
specific task and team competencies to include more varied roles and tasks for teams 
is thus needed to better understand and train teams to ensure effective performance. 
Further research is also needed to gain a greater understanding of team relationships 
and the impacting variables (physical, task, environment) to expand the knowledge of 
factors that will affect training, and therefore the influence of training on 
organisational effectiveness. A field case study can help to define and understand the 
team and task competencies for complex varied tasks. This baseline research should 
be performed in the field to assure real-world training conditions, interactive factors 
and interventions can be identified. 
The literature has begun to show that team training works, whether it is 
theoretically driven, focused on the delivery of required (and known and relevant) 
competencies (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001) or designed to provide trainees with 
realistic opportunities for practice (as in Crew Resource Management) (Heimreich, 
Merritt, & Willhelm, 1999; Salas et al., 1999), and feedback opportunities (Smith- 
Jentsch et al., 2001). However, in order to better deliver effective training, from the 
individual through to the team to meet organisational objectives, it can be seen that 
although not identified, training objectives must be set towards organisational goals. 
Current knowledge of team-task analysis and other forms of higher level assessments 
are limited and leave a great deal to be learned about the effectiveness of different 
approaches (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b) that focus on the team rather than the 
individual level. There is significant literature addressing improving team 
performance and workflow interdependencies, and opportunities should be taken to 
use and expand the workflow models to make a workable compilation-based model 
for vertical transfer (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
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2.2.1.4 Training Design Influences 
Although the multilevel model from Kozlowski and Salas (1997) does not 
address or include training design in their model, as factors within training are known 
to influence training effectiveness it is appropriate to discuss and review the literature 
as training design could impact vertical transfer outcomes and thus potentially 
influence the impact training could have on organisational effectiveness. 
Instructional strategies used for training have been defined as a set of tools (e. g. 
task analysis), methods (e. g. simulation training) and content (required competencies) 
that, when combined, *create an instructional approach (Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Blickensderfer, 1997). In the earlier work performed in the area of training transfer, 
Baldwin and Ford's (1988) review identified that a large proportion of the empirical 
research on transfer concentrated on improving the design of training programmes 
through the incorporation of learning principles such as identical elements (as in 
identical training as that of the workplace (Smith, Ford, & Kozlowski, 1997)); 
teaching of general principles; stimulus variability; and, various conditions of 
practice. They identified that the limitations of the majority of training design studies 
used simple motor and memory skills in laboratory settings (Tannenbaum & Yukl, 
1992) with college students (Ford & Weissbein, 1997). Thus, short-term retention 
was the criterion (Ford & Weissbein, 1997), and thus the results are not truly 
reflective of the various work environments, which may improve acquisition and 
immediate retention but have a detrimental effect on long range transfer (Ford & 
Weissbein, 1997). 
Because there is no single `perfect' method to deliver training, researchers 
continue to address how to best target and deliver information to trainees (Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001). Traditional methods of designing training systems use a 
behaviourist approach that emphasises correct performance (Kozlowski, 1998), and 
traditionally researchers investigated approaches on how to optimise learning and 
retention by manipulating feedback, practice intervals, reinforcement schedules, and 
other conditions within the learning environment itself (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 
2001). The traditional instructional-based method using behaviour-modelling 
approaches teaching primarily through lectures following a deductive learning, task- 
focused model, where learners proceed from general rules to specific examples. 
(Chou, 2001). In Chou's (2001) field computer training study with students he found 
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the behaviour-modelling training method superior with respect to learning 
performance and computer self-efficacy. 
Some researchers have identified this approach as too narrow an approach as it 
emphasises correct performance (Kozlowski, 1998), and training that produces 
observable improvements in behaviour has led to a too narrow framework of learning 
and training outcomes (Kraiger et al., 1993). Kraiger et al (1993) posit there are 
differences between learning- and performance oriented training outcomes such as 
retention and adaptation. Further research in the area of organisational and 
educational psychology has emphasised the distinction between learning goals (where 
trainees seek to improve their knowledge and skills) and performance goals (where 
trainees are concerned with demonstrating their competence) (Kozlowski, 1998). 
But emerging research that shows promise for improving training design for 
more adaptive and effective training transfer uses an inductive approach to learning 
(Ford & Weissbein, 1997), and includes guided discovery learning, error-based 
instruction and the training of metacognitive skills (Smith et al., 1997). 
Metacognition is considered an advanced form of learning, that is, knowledge about 
one's own information processing, problem solving, feeling and acting during 
learning (Seel, 1997). The traditional deductive approach explicitly instructs trainees 
on the complete task to be learned in terms of concepts, rules and task strategies (Ford 
& Weissbein, 1997); but with advances in technology and the demand for more 
complex cognitive requirements and the ability to adapt to changing circumstance and 
problem-solve (Smith et al., 1997), it has been suggested that technology will 
influence the design and delivery of training and a deeper understanding is needed on 
how to build expertise and adaptability through training (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 
2001). 
This revelation of potential technological impact could be seen as a controversy 
of appropriate training methods, when in fact, as Smith et al (1997) have identified, 
training research and practise have traditionally focused on a narrow range of learning 
outcomes to evaluate training effectiveness, and have in the past not trained 
specifically for adaptive expertise. The need to broaden training methods and style to 
adjust to learning outcomes can also be seen in the theoretical proposal of vertical 
transfer effect to organisational effectiveness, in that compilation teams 
(interdependent integration of unique skills) require practice of the intact unit to be 
beneficial (Kozlowski, 1998). Effective compilation team training requires both 
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individual (for task-specific skills) and intact unit training for integration (Kozlowski 
& Klein, 2000). The field research discussed later in this thesis will demonstrate this 
assertion. 
Within the vertical transfer framework, Kozlowski et al (2000) propose that 
transfer will be enhanced when individual-level technical skills are trained to 
proficiency prior to the delivery of training at the team level. The growth and 
significant evolution of training design has been given credit from the influence of 
cognitive theory (Kozlowski et al., 2000). Different types of knowledge acquisition 
require different types of training (Rogers, Maurer, Salas, & Fisk, 1997). Anderson 
(1982) (cited in Rogers et al., 1997; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997; 
Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992) made a distinction between declarative knowledge, or 
fact knowledge (i. e., knowing what) and procedural knowledge (i. e., knowing how), 
and each differs in the training process to acquire knowledge (Rogers et al., 1997). 
Kraiger et al (1993) further defined the direct outcomes from training as 
declarative, procedural and strategic, whereby learning begins with declarative 
(what), which is then organised and compiled into procedural (how) and then with 
greater experience becomes strategic (which, when and why). Procedural knowledge 
is often considered to be directly reflected in successful performance outcomes, but 
Kozlowski et al (2001) caution methods used to assess whether key portions of the 
task have been successfully learned may not be reflective of the ability to actually 
perform the task. Task analysis should address these issues prior to training design to 
determine if the task requires declarative knowledge, which encourages memorisation 
(Rogers et al., 1997), or whether procedural or problem solving, or strategic 
knowledge is required. 
Pokorny et al (1996) found using their model of skilled troubleshooting to 
evaluate tutor effectiveness and trouble shooting performance, that declarative, 
procedural and strategic knowledge were hierarchical and that declarative and 
procedural knowledge were the first to develop. They found that only after a certain 
amount of declarative knowledge and use of the procedures is the technician aware, 
and able to troubleshoot, as they then have developed a strategic capability. This 
observation refers directly back to Salas and Cannon-Bowers' (2001) identification 
that the most effective training strategies are created around four basic principles, of 
which presenting relevant information or concepts to be learned and demonstrating 
the KSAs to be learned are critical. 
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Effective team performance also requires the knowledge of cognitive processes, 
as the behaviour of the individual and the team must be known for reliable design of 
team training (Bowers et al., 1995). Individual training is not sufficient to guarantee 
collective work coordination during team handling of an emergency (Dowell, 1995). 
Dowell (1995) found that a distributed cognition framework can provide effective co- 
ordination of training for a team. 
Methods for delivering, obtaining and assessing domain-specific knowledge and 
the methods to assess the achievement of the different levels of knowledge have 
resulted, in part, from research in expert-novice group differences (Goldsmith & 
Kraiger, 1997). Research has shown there are fundamental differences in the ways in 
which experts and novices solve problems (Abernethy, 2001; Coovert & Craiger, 
1997), and experts and novices have been shown to differ in the organisation and 
content of their structure knowledge (Smith et al., 1997) but interestingly, a student's 
cognitive structure becomes more similar to an expert's with instruction (Goldsmith 
& Kraiger, 1997). Experts are typically faster at problem solving (Pokorny et al., 
1996), display superior short-term and long-term memory for material, have superior 
knowledge of relevant facts and procedures, and spend less time analysing problems 
(Abernethy, 2001). However, the expert's advantage is almost always confined to 
their domain of expertise and is not generalisable to other domains expertise 
(Abernethy, 2001). When experts are presented with a novel situation, expert's 
behaviour appears to resemble that of a novice (Coovert & Craiger, 1997). 
Consequently, a trainee's background knowledge is an important factor to 
consider in the learning process (Smith et al., 1997), to ensure effective training that 
supports successful transfer. This aspect of a pre-existing knowledge base has been 
identified in the earlier work by Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) who in their study of 
over 1000 US Air Force trainees found evidence to support the realisation that 
interrelationships exist between cognitive resource demands imposed by tasks and 
motivational processing and attention to task effort. They found that interventions 
designed to engage motivation might impede task learning when presented prior to 
the understanding of the task. They also proposed that their results suggest methods 
for optimal tailored training programmes for trainees of differing ability, and that 
further intervening measures. may directly moderate ability-performance. 
The incorporation of guided discovery learning, error-based instruction and the 
training of metacognitive skills has shown promise to improve training design and 
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effective transfer (Ford & Weissbein, 1997; Smith et al., 1997). In guided discovery 
trainees explore and experiment with the training tasks to infer and learn the rules, 
principles and strategies for effective performance, learning through the process of 
providing leading questions and prompts without providing the solutions (Ford & 
Weissbein, 1997). This form of training can be achieved formally or informally, and 
informal peer-to peer training as seen by Wu and Rocheleau (2001) in their survey of 
informal efforts of computer training found no difference between the private and 
public sector, but peer-to-peer training appeared to play an important role in the 
acquisition of knowledge in the workplace. Smith et al (1997) identified that research 
in discovery learning leads to greater transfer of training to novel transfer tasks 
compared to procedural' instruction, and there is greater integration of trained material 
to the trainees' previous experience (Ford & Weissbein, 1997). 
Closely related to discovery learning is error-based learning which approaches 
training seeking minimal incorrect responses (Ford & Weissbein, 1997), and research 
has argued that learning environments designed to be filled with error-filled 
experiences can be quite effective for learning and transfer (Smith et al., 1997). Both 
discovery learning and error-based learning suggest that allowing individuals latitude 
to explore the content and develop their own understanding can lead to the 
development of higher quality knowledge structures (Smith et al., 1997). It is 
proposed that errors get the learners' attention and alert them to incorrect assumptions 
(Ford & Weissbein, 1997), but the distinction between the two methods of training is 
that error-training contains error management elements (Smith et al., 1997). As such, 
error-based training identifies errors likely to be committed, providing examples of 
what should not be done, and it has been suggested this approach would benefit both 
novices, who don't know what to do, and intermediate experts who do not know what 
not to do (Smith et al., 1997). Smith et al (1997) also suggest that if problem-solving 
skills are required this method may not be ideal and may not lead to effective transfer. 
Therefore, distinction of the level of expertise of task and knowledge and skill level 
of individuals must be identified in the needs assessment prior to initiating training. 
The third inductive design strategy is to train metacognitive skills (Ford & 
Weissbein, 1997); intended to develop one's knowledge to monitor individual 
thought processes (self-regulation) and using strategies for learning and remembering 
information (learning strategies) (Kozlowski, Toney et al., 2001) to monitor and 
regulate mental activities (Smith et al., 1997). It has been argued that self-regulation 
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and metacognition are two distinct processes operating at different levels of goal 
specificity, where self-regulation is a micro process involving planning and 
monitoring of both cognitive and behavioural strategies to achieve goals (Kozlowski, 
1998). Research has identified that experts possess superior metacognitive 
capabilities compared to novices (Smith et al., 1997). Both metacognition and self- 
regulation are relevant to learning and performance of complex activities and have 
been seen as the foundation for individual adaptability (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997; 
Smith et al., 1997). It has been said that experts pay particular attention to failures, 
modifying their strategies when appropriate, as individuals who possess superior 
metacognitive skills are able to adapt and learn as needed (Smith et al., 1997). 
Training to support and develop metacognitive skills can be seen to be 
appropriate for compilation teams to aid in the ability to identify skill integration 
problems, requirements and preferences within and between team members, as 
development and expansion of metacognition develop a common mental 
understanding, which in turn can lead to appropriate anticipation of activities 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000). Metacognition has also been argued as crucial in stressful 
decision-making situations (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). 
Most training for team-based tasks is still designed for delivery at the individual 
level with faith that the individual skills will combine to yield effective teams 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000; Salas et al., 1992). It has been said that where technical skills 
comprise the differentiated task of team members, individual delivery is appropriate 
initially (Kozlowski et al., 2000) as individuals must develop some proficiency on 
their task before they can devote attention and skill in team-based activities 
(Kozlowski, Gully, McHugh, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1996; Salas et al., 1992). 
There is some corroboration to this proposition, but research incorporating the upward 
vertical transfer framework is still required (Baker & Salas, 1992; Kozlowski et al., 
2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). Training methods have also focused on developing 
collaborative training protocols different from team training in that collaborative 
learning refers to training in groups but not necessarily to perform a team task (Salas 
& Cannon-Bowers, 2001). There is a benefit to collaborative learning in that it has 
been shown to reduce required instructor time and resources by half (Shebilske et al 
(1998) cited in Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
Advanced technologies require advanced cognitive requirements which in turn 
require changes to how we propose to train (Smith et al., 1997), but advanced 
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technologies can also be used to advance and improve instructional methods and 
capabilities to enhance learning and human performance. Early work by Schaafstal 
(1993) and Mumaw and Roth (1995) supported the theory that explicit training in 
theories, fundamentals and principles failed to enhance performance, and was in some 
cases found to degrade performance. However, they found when skill integration 
using simulator training was incorporated, complex skills such as component skills, 
metacognitive skills, complex decision making, and problem solving were best 
brought together in a simulator. 
Simulation training continues to be the popular method for delivery of training 
(Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001), creation of a learning environment that closely 
resembles a real-world situation supports effective training (Hitt II, Kass, Wils, & 
Salas, 2001). as Simulation systems (including simulators and virtual environments) 
have the capability to mimic detailed terrains, equipment failures, motion, vibration 
and visual cues of a situation (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
Early work done by Allen (1985) to identify simulator fidelity and training 
effectiveness to see the effects of physical and functional computer fidelity effects 
with college students found both were interdependent to performance effect, and 
fidelity effects must be interpreted in the context of both task and trainee 
characteristics. In Carver's (1992) review and assessment of flight accidents and 
prevention, he suggests that full flight simulators are proving invaluable in their 
ability to provide flight management training and full mission handling. He also 
suggests that the weaker the fidelity of the simulator, the stronger the training 
programme should be. Why simulation and simulators work is not well known (Salas 
& Cannon-Bowers, 2001), but Salas et al (1998) state that most evaluations rely on 
trainee reaction data and not on performance or learning. 
Review of a nuclear plant operation by Macris et al, (1986) with a focus to 
optimise performance considered a training curriculum from a multifaceted system- 
based framework, effect of procedures, control room design, and simulator training. 
They propose that all components affect performance in total, and simulators must be 
considered as an integral part of the overall training scheme. Further work within the 
nuclear power industry by Toquam et al (1997) used rating data from team experts to 
assess effective crew performance and to identify factors that contribute to crew 
performance variability during a week long formal training course. Their findings 
suggest that trainers should not trade validity of the environment for assessment and 
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ease, and team performance assessment should be reserved for procedural and 
problem-solving tasks to assure adherence to routine procedures, and to diagnose and 
correct plant problems and malfunctions. 
2.2.1.4.1 Summary 
Although simulators have begun to be widely used in medicine, maintenance, 
emergency management, and military settings, Salas and Cannon-Bowers (2001; 
1997) ascertain that more systematic and rigorous evaluations of large-scale 
simulations and simulators are needed. Some researchers have noted (Salas el al., 
1998) that simulation and simulators are being used without much consideration of 
what has been learned about cognition, training design, or effectiveness. As such, the 
advances in training research need to be applied to simulation design and practice. 
Proposals have been made to suggest that an event-based approach to simulations 
would suffice (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). Future research must also be 
cognisant of the intent of simulation training, whether the primary purpose is to 
estimate the on-the-job performance improvement or to test the impact of 
manipulation (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001) or problem solving. Smith-Jentsch et al's 
(2001) flight simulation study findings suggest training considerations should include 
identification of team makeup and consistency thereof, and when team crews are 
consistent, low-skill performance in a simulator could help organisations identify 
teams that are more likely to have transfer problems. 
The multilevel model has not incorporated training design components as 
factors that could influence vertical transfer and organisational effectiveness. 
However, components within the training design can affect outcomes, and thus they 
should be examined. Identifying these components within a complex team training 
field study setting would provide further evidence to expand the model to include 
training design factors and provide additional training effectiveness factors of 
importance to achieve organisational effectiveness from training. 
2.2.2 Multilevel Approach Summary and Future Research Needs 
The expanded theory of multilevel approach to training effectiveness intends to 
approach training effectiveness from a more holistic human-system interactive 
approach, and therefore a multilevel phenomenon. Although the root of organisational 
effectiveness will stem from the individual, implications to an organisation and its 
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effectiveness can cross over multiple levels (Kozlowski et al., 2000). If training 
design can affect training outcomes horizontally to affect individual transfer, and an 
organisation can affect training and individual outcomes (top-down approach), then 
one could presume that individual outcomes can affect a team through to 
organisational outcomes vertically. The research has shown that training effectiveness 
also extends within a time continuum; training success is affected by the environment 
(Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992), organisational and individual (Kraiger & Aguinis, 
2001) factors, before, during and after training. It has been proposed by Kozlowski et 
al (2000) that the basis of training effectiveness is to understand and model the 
combined individual and team contributions and develop a training system that will 
influence organisational effectiveness. 
Although the framework to lay the conceptual foundation to link individual 
level skills, behaviours and performance with higher-level örganisational outcomes 
(Vertical transfer) has been identified, to date this is really only a theory. To extend 
and expand training effectiveness in organisations, a. multilevel model is needed if 
training is to contribute to organisational effectiveness (Kozlowski et al., 2000). For 
effective application of training to achieve organisational objectives the literature 
suggests that the factors that influence the individual upward through to the 
organisation need to be further identified, considered and modelled so as to 
strengthen the link between training and organisational effectiveness. But as well, the 
review of the literature on teams has shown that most of the research has focused on 
improving performance, and so further work is needed to identify the effectiveness of 
the approaches. Following that, those competencies can then be used to identify the 
factors that influence training effectiveness. 
Training effectiveness is not a micro-phenomenon based on individual-level 
transfer, rather training effectiveness involves the link between individual and team 
outcomes (not jobs) with the higher-level organisational objectives that emerge and 
transcend both vertically across levels and horizontally. The multilevel model 
proposed by Kozlowski et al (2000) also identified two fundamentally different 
emergence forms of vertical transfer, composition and compilation. Composition is 
based upon the combination of similar contributions across trained individuals, and 
research has identified that the traditional assessment and effectiveness models have 
considered these contextual influences to achieve outcomes. Therefore, if vertical 
transfer occurs through a composition process then successful outcomes should be 
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achieved. However, the compilation vertical transfer framework has not been 
modelled previously, and thus much work is needed in the area of training needs 
assessment, design, delivery and evaluation. One of the primary concerns to 
formulate a model for compilation is to identify the linkages between individuals, 
team and higher-level outcomes across levels (Kozlowski et al., 2000), which then 
requires further efforts to develop techniques and methods to complete process. 
Within design and delivery, vertical transfer compilation requires the integration of 
individual and team level training, what KSAs are required at each level, what 
sequence is required, and where and what training should be performed (classroom, 
simulator, unit driven). Multilevel training effectiveness still requires foundation for 
the theory, empirical validation, and applications to support the enhanced role of 
training in achieving organisational effectiveness. 
2.2.3 Training Outputs 
According to the model of the transfer process proposed by Baldwin and Ford 
(1988) (Figure 1) training outcomes of learning and retention are directly affected by 
training input factors, and are seen to have a direct effect on conditions of transfer. At 
that time the model was developed as a framework for describing the transfer process, 
but as Baldwin and. Ford (1988) specified in their review of the transfer literature, 
future research must take into account a variety of factors and linkages that to date 
have not been adequately or thoroughly examined. 
To ensure successful transfer to the workplace, training development needs to 
consider, and analyse, where training is needed, what needs to be taught and who 
needs to be trained (Ostroff & Ford, 1989), and as discussed earlier in the chapter 
many factors have been shown to affect both learning and transfer (singly, and 
although limited in the scope of research in combination, or theoretically assumed). 
However, it has been noted that focusing on a correct performance outcome to 
training has led to a too narrow conceptualisation of learning and training outcomes 
(Ford, Smith, Sego, & Quinones, 1993), and a multi-dimensional perspective 
identifying the differences between learning and performance-oriented outcomes 
would better ensure the expected training outcomes. Kozlowski et al (2001) have 
delineated outcomes identified in Baldwin and Ford's (1988) transfer model as either 
proximal or distal. Proximal outcomes are exhibited as either learning or performance 
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oriented immediately on completion of training. Distal outcomes or retention refers to 
the maintenance of learning outcomes over time, which is a prerequisite to transfer. 
Learning outcomes include the distinction between declarative (what should be 
learned), and procedural (how), and with greater experience strategic knowledge 
(which, when and why) (Kozlowski, Toney et al., 2001; Kraiger et al., 1993; Yelon & 
Ford, 1999), which are a prerequisite for skilled performance (Kozlowski, Toney et 
al., 2001) and considered relevant to most job performances (Yelon & Ford, 1999). 
Performance outcome has been considered as the ability to successfully 
complete the behavioural requirements outlined by training objectives (Yelon & Ford, 
1999). Theorists have posited that there are three stages of skill level: initial skill 
acquisition (novice rudimentary skills); skill composition (advanced skill); and, skill 
automaticity or mastery (Yelon & Ford, 1999) that encompasses situational 
awareness, prioritisation and implementation of task strategies (Kozlowski, Toney et 
al., 2001). 
Much of what we have learned of how knowledge and skill are obtained 
(Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997), how knowledge is structured (Smith et al., 1997), 
memory for material (Abernethy, 2001), problem-solving capabilities (Abernethy, 
2001; Coovert & Craiger, 1997; Pokorny. et al., 1996), and the limits of domain 
expertise (Abernethy, 2001) have resulted, in part, from research in expert-novice 
group differences. Although much has been learned of the characteristics and 
capabilities of novice and experts, knowledge of how to facilitate the transition is still 
largely based on inference (Abernethy, 2001). Genter et al (2003) do caution that the 
intervention strategy whereby learners compare examples cannot be counted on to 
spontaneously draw appropriate conclusions, even when the cases are presented 
closely together. Thus, further understanding is still necessary to define the 
differences between individual experiences (and thus the varied KSAs) and how they 
learn and transfer. 
Distal outcomes have been identified by Kozlowski et al (2001) as retention, 
and the maintenance of learned outcomes over time, which has also been considered 
an output from training (Baldwin & Ford, 1988). The course of retention is 
predictable, and is well established; typically performance decreases rapidly soon 
after training and continues to drop, although at a slower rate, as the retention interval 
increases (Schendel & Hagman, 1991). It has been said that the growth of training 
research has increased due to the involvement and cross-pollination with other 
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disciplines, most notably cognitive, instructional and social psychology (Tannenbaum 
& Yukl, 1992). This is the case for most studies in the realm of retention that has in a 
large part used military platforms, but also has been guided within the organisational 
management platform. Early work on sustaining procedural skills using military 
soldiers and tasks found the intervention strategy of over training eliminates task 
degradation and task time over those with refresher training, and both were much 
better than with no additional training (Schendel & Hagman, 1982). Thus, it can be 
said with army individual tasks that repetition during training improves (relative short 
term, eight-weeks) retention, is better when repetition is spaced over-training, but 
repetition testing was not effective when tasks are job-aided (Hagman, 1983). 
These findings were not those of Goldberg and O'Roarke (1989), who found in 
their study using computer games (heavy and light workload) that performance at 
retention and retraining is more dependent on individual performance differences at 
the completion of training than on duration of skill-retention, training workload or 
duration of training. Sehendel and Hagman's (1991) review of the literature on long- 
term retention found, that in general, retention decreases over time but the decay is 
dependent on a host of variables, of which original learning is key, repetition is 
important to learning and retention (including over training), that they are facilitated 
by quality and quantity feedback, and learners may depend on augmented cues, and 
therefore decay may result from removal of the cues. 
Of concern in past retention research is the design of protocols and paradigms to 
enhance skill retention (factors are not related to training), the lack of attention given 
to skill acquisition, the lack of consensus criteria for the end of acquisition and the 
beginning of the retention interval, the failure to assess level of previous skill or 
knowledge, the role of motivation and individual differences, skill decay in team 
tasks and skills, and, the lack of complete reporting findings in preliminary studies 
(Winfred, Winston, Stanush, & McNelly, 1998). 
Research, although limited in its specificity to direct outcomes of learning and 
retention from training, has had an impact in identifying the factors that affect 
training effectiveness and assurance of affective transfer. However, an outcome of 
training that has only recently been theorised as a potential training outcome, is the 
extent to which training may affect the range of organisational processes and . 
characteristics (Klein & Ralls, 1997), and the impact of individuals within a training 
platform to influence organisational effectiveness - vertical transfer (Kozlowski et 
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al., 2000). Progress has been made to understand and refine the intended outcomes of 
training, but there is much to learn. Proposals have been made that researchers should 
approach training from a multilevel approach (Klein & Ralls, 1997; Kozlowski et al., 
2000; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) but for vertical transfer-compilation, individual- 
level and higher-level measures are needed to aid in the development and validation 
of specified models linking individual-level outcomes to higher-level outcomes 
(Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
2.3 Supportive Theoretical Frameworks 
To support and advance the validity of training effectiveness and transfer 
research, and to help guide research choices for this thesis, it is of value to identify 
the theoretical frameworks on which training effectiveness has been tested and 
validated. Basing the research on sound theoretical frameworks will identify relevant 
theories that will further support and advance the understanding of training and 
transfer. 
2.3.1 Trainee Characteristics 
In Baldwin and Ford's (1988) review of the literature they found a substantial 
lack of theoretical frameworks for guiding trainee characteristic factors that can affect 
training outcomes. They did highlight that the use of Expectancy theory would guide 
the understanding of motivation in transfer. First presented by Vroom in 1964 (see 
Yamnill & McLean, 2001), Vroom defined expectancy as a momentary belief 
concerning the likelihood that a particular act will precede a particular outcome. 
Thus, within the expectancy framework there are numerous factors (locus of control, 
self esteem, past communication and obtaining intrinsic and extrinsic incentives) that 
are relevant to the training transfer process (Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Ford & 
Weissbein, 1997). Although minimal in its application, this theory has been used and 
has been found to be successful in guiding motivation (Kontoghiorghes, 2001,2002; 
Tannenbaum, 1993; Yamnill & McLean, 2001). Further expansion of this theory that 
directly applies to training is the Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy (VIE) theory 
also first presented by Vroom in 1964 (see Mathieu & Matineau, 1997). The theory 
has also been used to guide the understanding of motivation in training, but what is 
unique in this theory that directly supports and guides the understanding of vertical 
transfer is that the theory is linked to training outcomes as is vertical transfer. The 
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theory identifies expectancy as the personal belief that one can acquire a given skill, 
instrumentality concerns the perception that the acquired skill will lead to specific 
outcomes, and valence is the relative desire of those outcomes for each individual. 
Utilising the VIE approach will allow the perceived consequences of not doing well 
in training to be identified, but as well, along with the perceptions and satisfaction 
from training this approach will aid in identifying the lengths to which trainees will 
go to achieve that outcome and the result from those efforts. Thus, this theory can 
also serve as a guide to support and validate the linkage of vertical transfer and 
organisational effectiveness. 
Further suggested theoretical frameworks to guide in the selection of trainee 
characteristics include Equity theory, first identified by Adams (1963) and Vroom 
(1964) (cited in Lim & Johnston, 2002; Milner, 2002; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Kozlowski, 1997; Yamnill & McLean, 2001), which is based on the premise that 
individuals wish to be treated fairly (a motivational factor); and, Goal setting Theory 
(Locke (1968) cited in Richman-Hirsch, 2001; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 
1997; Yamnill & McLean, 2001) which suggests that intentions are viewed as the 
immediate precursors to human action, which will manifest as an acceptance of the 
intention and commitment to the goal. Goal setting is believed to have been shown to 
lead to higher performance because they direct attention, mobilise effort, and 
encourage persistence on a task. This theory is appropriate to guide research in an 
applied environment to assess horizontal and top down transfer from an individual, 
but also, goal commitment is an appropriate theory to use to assess goal commitment 
affects of an individual on an organisation, therefore providing theoretical support to 
the notion of vertical transfer effects and organisational effectiveness. 
Ford et al (1997) also found that concepts of the Social Learning Theory were 
applied to examine the impact of trainee confidence (self-efficacy) in their ability to 
perform tasks on transfer. This theory is also appropriate when assessing vertical 
transfer as an individual's confidence level would be a significant factor in successful 
transfer and maintenance, especially so, when it is expected that the task would be 
performed with no supervision. But as well, self-confidence could influence 
individual initiative to provoke change and thus influence organisational 
effectiveness. 
56 
2.3.2 Work Environment 
Theoretical frameworks that have been used to support and advance 
understanding of the influences of work environment variables such as support of the 
environment and organisational support (climate transfer) include Social Learning 
Theory (Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Ford & Weissbein, 1997; Yamnill & McLean, 2001) 
and Organisational Theory (Yamnill & McLean, 2001). In Ford and Weissbein's 
(1997) review of the training transfer literature they found the use of the Social 
Learning Theory. Rouiller and Goldstein (1993) in their extensive transfer climate 
survey found that situational cues (goal, social, task and self-control cues) remind 
trainees of the opportunities to use what they have learned in the workplace. Further 
consequence cues (positive, negative and no feedback, and punishment) are the 
feedback trainees receive to apply their KSAs (Kozlowski et al., 2000). As social 
learning theory suggests the direct implications of social support from the 
organisation, Organisational Theory enhances the tangible elements that affect the 
work environment by analysing factors that exert an influence on individuals' 
responses such as their perception of the organisation. According to the theory, 
trained KSAs at the individual level are embedded in team and unit level technology, 
coordination process, and social contexts (Yamnill & McLean, 2001), but likely 
improvement of transfer is further affected by the organisational support for training 
(policies, practices and procedures) (Kozlowski et al., 2000). Thus, these theories 
provide frameworks to analyse both the individual horizontal affect to training 
outcomes but also there is an opportunity to assess organisational affects to training 
and transfer, or top-down assessment approach, both appropriate and applicable in 
identifying and assessing training effectiveness in the workplace. 
2.3.3 Training Design 
Theories that provide guidelines to help us understand the influences of training 
design on learning and transfer include both Instructional Design Theory and 
Identical Elements Theozy. Instructional Design Theory is nested within Instructional 
System Design, providing a set of prescriptive instructional strategies to enable 
learners to acquire instructional goals (Merrill, 1997). The theory provides the 
descriptive concepts of how a trainee acquires a particular knowledge and skill, the 
descriptive strategies an instructor must apply to promote this learning, and the 
resulting prescriptive guidelines that relate knowledge and skill and strategy. As 
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revealed previously educational based training (which relies upon ISD) and the 
theories associated are considered limiting in that the theories relate solely to learning 
knowledge and skill and do not incorporate behavioural affects. 
The theory of Identical Elements first proposed by Thorndike and Woodworth 
(1901) (as cited in Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Yamnill & McLean, 2001), proposed 
transfer was enhanced by increasing the degree of identical stimulus and response 
elements in training to that of the transfer setting. The theory was further detailed to 
include near and far transfer by Laker (1990) (as cited in Yamnill & McLean, 2001; 
Yelon & Ford, 1999), where the constructs of the learning environment and its 
similarity and reflection to the workplace (near transfer) was most desired for 
technical/procedural training; while training to situations dissimilar to the workplace 
(far transfer) was more applicable to a workplace where knowledge was abstracted 
and required problem solving with a leeway in job performance. Thus, the theory of 
identical elements and application of near and far transfer refer to not only the 
similarity and fidelity of training programmes and devices (Lintern, 1991), they pose 
the importance of the relevance of training content to the goals and objectives of the 
training - top down affect of the organisation and testing of the training platform for 
successful transfer. 
2.3.4 Summary 
A review of the theories has helped to understand the factors that can both 
hinder and support both learning and transfer. As well, the theories have suggested 
application of these known relevant factors should be applied prior to, during and 
after training to enhance transfer. But, for the theories to have value in an applied 
environment there is a need to combine theories to determine the integrated effect of 
factors on training and transfer, employing a true examination of system wide 
components effect. It is recognised that isolated factors have an impact on training 
and transfer. However, to identify the impact in a real-working-world scenario a 
global effect approach would identify those factors that hinder learning and transfer. 
This approach could also identify those factors that could compensate (directly or 
indirectly) for influences that are beyond control (e. g., individual attitude), both from 
a longitudinal and vertical perspective. Uses of the appropriately fitting theoretical 
underpinnings will also support the validity of findings and link of vertical transfer 
and organisational effectiveness. 
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3. Preliminary Background and Research Relevance 
An unique opportunity was offered to the author to study a large organisation, 
the Canadian military, during their conversion training to integrate an entire 
workforce of Canadian Navy submariners to a new class of submarine purchased 
from the United Kingdom's Royal Navy. To have a better understanding of the 
usefulness and significance of performing training effectiveness research within an 
applied environment, it is important to understand the environment under which the 
research was performed. This preliminary effort to identify the background history of 
the CF and RN submarine history, procurement of the RN Upholder class submarines, 
and the subsequent contract to deliver operationally capable crews and submarines 
would also set the baseline and determine the conditions under which the research 
could proceed. Identification of the organisational history, philosophy and 
development of the training programme will also identify some of the pre-training 
factors and training design factors that could impact the effectiveness of training 
interdependent teams. 
To train an entire workforce to a new system requires significant planning, 
organisation, coordination and collaboration, and this case study exemplifies the 
numerous factors that can influence training effectiveness. As noted by Goldstein 
(1980), "we must consider training as a system within work organisations rather than 
simply treating instruction as a separate technology. " Understanding the history, 
complexity and uniqueness of the training, and the complications, restrictions and 
limitations will provide a better understanding of the many factors that may 
contribute to, or detract from training effectiveness. 
Research in this applied environment also provided an opportunity to 
demonstrate the value and validity of performing training effectiveness research 
within the real-world working environment by examining the combined variety and 
links of often overlooked variables and their impact on a training platform's 
capability to achieve an organisation's objectives. The historical background also 
identifies the pre-training factors that could influence the perceptions and 
expectations from. training, and therefore identifies factors that contribute to the 
potential influences of vertical transfer and the preconceived notions that could 
impact organisational effectiveness. 
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3.1 Canadian Navy Submarine History and Procurement Policy 
For many years, Canada's military had expressed the requirement to replace its 
ageing fleet of Oberon class submarines, a fleet that was considered beyond its life 
expectancy and one that had reached the limit of its capacity for future modifications. 
A true need existed to maintain underwater surveillance and patrol of the extensive 
Canadian maritime zones and approaches achieved by a submarine fleet. However, 
with severe defence cuts, further substantive upgrading and competing replacement 
requirements for the entire Canadian military (armoured vehicles, transport aircraft, 
helicopters, patrol frigates) and taking into account an unsupportive public's 
perception of what Canada's military needed, the CF had to prioritise within its 
budget. Submarine replacement was viewed neither as cost-effective nor an urgent 
requirement. However, an opportunity presented itself in the early 1990s when the 
UK offered its conventional submarines to Canada, and the government announced in 
the Canadian 1994 Defence White paper " The United Kingdom is seeking to sell 
four recently constructed conventional submarines of the Upholder class, preferably 
to a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) partner. The government intends to 
explore this option" (Mainguy, 1995). Canada purchased the four diesel-operated 
submarines and negotiations and contracts were initiated for training and delivery. 
3.2 Royal Navy Involvement 
The conventional diesel Upholder class submarine was by no means left over or 
unwanted by the Royal Navy; the British Armed Forces were also the subject of 
defence cuts. With the aim of saving revenue for the Treasury a decision was made in 
1993 to focus on a total nuclear submarine force and the newly built diesel fleet of 
submarines was declared surplus and withdrawn from service. The RN reluctantly 
decided that at a cost of $900 million to build, with two submarines only just entering 
service and two never deployed in operational roles, nuclear submarines would pick 
up the tasks of the Upholder fleet (Hillbeck, 1999; Romanow, 1998) and the diesel- 
electric powered fleet would be placed in dry dock awaiting purchase by another 
nation. 
3.3 Submarine Purchase and Contract Development 
In 1998, after much speculation and negotiation, announcements were made that 
a contract had been signed with the UK, and Canada would purchase the four 
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Upholder class submarines. The package was considered lucrative, with an eight year, 
interest free, lease-to-buy arrangement. With no hard currency payments Canada 
would receive four submarines, associated trainers and simulators, crew training, 
initial spare parts and a technical data package. The acquisition was considered not 
only the `bargain of the century' but a quantum leap in capability for the Canadian 
Navy. With its extensive automation, the Upholder submarine is still considered one 
of the most technologically advanced in the world. As well, with a crew size reduced 
to two thirds, from 69 on the old CF Oberon class to 49 on the Upholder class, the 
smaller crew size was most appealing during a period of personnel cutback as it was 
considered a significant benefit (Romanow, 1998). 
The contract identified Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering (VSEL), now 
part of British Aerospace Engineering (BAE)), with the support of the RN would 
provide classroom, simulator and onboard continuation training for all crew for each 
of the four submarines and supporting personnel. But as well, as all of the submarines 
had been in long term storage for an average of five years, the submarines themselves 
would require servicing and potential replacement of parts prior to reactivation. To 
achieve both requirements within a reasonable and agreed upon finite timeframe of 
four years it was decided to train, test and qualify crews in parallel with the servicing 
schedules of the submarines, so both crew and the submarines would be ready 
simultaneously. 
The contract stipulated that the RN would be responsible for reactivating the 
submarines, putting them through sea-trials and returning them to operational 
readiness before delivering them as `safe-to-dive' certified to Canada. The RN would 
also be responsible for crew training and assurance of capability by: providing 
individual occupational operator and maintainer training and team training; and, 
certification of crewmembers' capability to perform the necessary skills in a sea- 
going setting. The contract stipulated that the RN was responsible for delivery of a 
competent trained crew and an operationally functional and safe submarine (safe-to- 
dive), but until that occurred the RN retained ownership of the submarines and any 
associated technical or training equipment and material. Thus, certification of the 
capability of both the crew and the submarine was the responsibility of the RN 
commander of the submarine fleet, and with that came the responsibility of assuring 
the adequacy of the procedural documents that would be used on the submarine. 
Therefore, the RN would train, assess and qualify according to their policy and 
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procedures, mainly the RN Submarine Sea Training Guide (Royal Navy, 1999a). 
Transfer of ownership would not occur until all components of the contract were met 
to the satisfaction of first the RN and then the CF. 
3.4 Pre-training and Training Requirements and Complications 
3.4.1 Pre-training 
The purchase of the Upholder class submarines from the RN involved a 
complicated collaborative contract that required the delivery of operational 
submarines and trained CF personnel to operate them. To achieve this within the 
defined stringent timeline, very specific pre-training and sequenced training was 
necessary to meet requirements, not only for the Canadians but also for the RN 
submariners identified to perform the training. 
Prior to serving on any submarine in the CF (or the RN for that matter), military 
submariners must as a prerequisite know the basics of a diesel class submarine and 
earn their `dolphins' (comparable to earning pilot wings), typically a yearlong process 
of classroom training (6 weeks) for theory with an in-depth onboard qualification 
regime. The process involves a comprehensive study of the specific class of 
submarine, operations and all systems (air, hydraulic, electrical, mechanical, 
weapons, safety, and escape and rescue), and each portion is tested for both 
knowledge and skill (Sullivan, 1998). As the consequence of error could be 
catastrophic for both the men and the submarine, prior to active service on a 
submarine the trainee must be able to prove his ability to `make the submarine safe' 
and is examined on the entire operation of a submarine, systems requirement, 
function, and operation as a whole. 
Prior to entering continuation training all personnel who were assigned to be 
future crew or support to the Upholder class submarines needed to fully understand 
all safety aspects of the submarine and, therefore, must have obtained their basic 
submarine qualification (dolphins). It may seem that the prerequisite training of the 
Canadian submariner would not apply to the Upholder class of submarine. That is not 
the case, as both classes of submarines are diesel-electric composed of the same 
operating systems, and the basic operating procedures and emergency operating 
procedures (EOPs) were considered almost the same. The only difference from a 
technical operating perspective is that Canada's Oberon class was entirely manually 
operated while the Upholder class is semi-automated with a redundant back up 
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manual system. Although this difference has been considered minor from a technical 
perspective (organisationally), putting aside the potentially ingrained knowledge and 
skill and learning a new operating method could prove to be a challenge. The main 
body of research for this thesis and the performance of a Hierarchical Task Analysis 
and training effectiveness assessment of emergency procedures will determine if this 
is the case. 
Pre-training and upgrading was also necessary for the RN prior to initiating 
training. In January of 1996 the RN was informed of Canada's intended purchase of 
the submarines and preparatory events were set into motion; an Upholder Training 
Team (UTT) was created from Naval technical crew who had once served on the 
Upholder submarines. As training of the Canadian submariners would require an 
overlap of successive crews training (i. e., crew one skill phase, crew two knowledge 
phase) to meet the contract timeline (Section 3.2.2), all available Upholder class 
submarine technical experts were brought together to form the UTT, including those 
who were still in the RN, and those who had retired from the military were contracted 
as VSEL staff. 
Also, with a lapse of over five years since any training or active service had 
been engaged, the training curriculum and procedural documentation needed review 
for the programme to proceed. As well, as the submarines were only in active service 
for about a year prior to decommissioning, not all of the training curriculum or 
procedural documentation had been completed or formally approved. The UTT 
interview revealed, "No true documents were left over, a curriculum was left over 
from original training, (but) no training package was available or made for the `U- 
boats' (Upholder submarines) when they were the property of the RN. " The standards 
for documentation and training had also changed and required significantly more 
details, thus the training team was required to upgrade and complete the 
documentation and training plans where needed prior to initiating training. As in most 
major organisations, including the CF, the late 1990s brought a move toward 
standardisation of format and content in all documentation to ensure quality of 
outcomes (training or otherwise) to meet objectives. 
To effectively teach the Canadian submariners, the UK training personnel also 
needed to be brought up-to-speed and reacquainted with all of the operating details of 
the submarine. Although all team members were selected based upon their detailed 
knowledge and capabilities and were considered very experienced and capable of 
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teaching, they still needed refresher training to bring them to an acceptable level. But 
the challenges were immense, as no one had been involved with diesel submarines, or 
submarines at all in some cases in over five years. They had very little to aid them 
besides memory and determination: no up to date documentation; sketchy training 
outlines; no other experts to seek guidance from; and, access to the submarines was a 
continuing problem and not within their control. As stated by the RN Commanding 
Officer, "It was intense self-training, `learn as you go', they are/were submariners 
first and instructors second, they knew the people and the environment, and knew 
how critical training was. Flagship (contractors) wrote their own lectures but they 
were reviewed and approved by UTT, based upon existing RN documents, although 
the information available was very scant, part broad statements, and very sparse. 
When a decision was made to go nuclear, all training, formulation and production of 
documents was stopped, and was in its infancy. " 
The delivery contract identified re-activation of the submarines would run 
parallel with training, so ideally both the submarine and the CF crew would be ready 
at the same time and would sail to Canada. Significant maintenance and unexpected 
repairs required more time than expected and therefore a very stringent time line was 
needed to meet acceptance dates. Also, for safety reasons only maintenance personnel 
had access to the submarines during reactivation. 
The conundrum faced by the training team was how to assure the 
documentation is complete if knowledge and skill are not current, and how do you 
reacquaint instructors with systems when not have all the necessary resources are 
available? Compounding this dilemma, there are no qualified experts outside the team 
to seek guidance from to ensure correctness or sufficient detail of the documentation 
or the training syllabus, as all previously Upholder qualified submariners had been 
seconded to the training team. 
Thus, although standards for documentation and training had become more 
stringent, the RN department responsible for the quality control, Op Doc, did not have 
the technical expertise for the Upholder class submarine and was only able to review 
the syllabus and documents for style and format. The lack of submarine technical 
expertise by Op Doc would not be considered unusual, as a standard department's 
role is to ensure quality control of style and format in accordance with technical and 
training objectives. As all Upholder qualified submariners had been seconded to the 
training team, unfortunately, there was no one outside the team with the knowledge, 
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skill, or experience with this class of submarine to provide an unbiased and objective 
judgement of accuracy or completeness of the training syllabus or the supporting 
technical documentation. Even if there had been additional Upholder qualified 
personnel available to form a training standards cell, as a period of over 5 years had 
lapsed since there were any dealings with the Upholder class submarine, there was no 
one who had any more knowledge or experience than those who already were 
seconded to the training team. Interviews with the UTT team members revealed, "No 
one in CSST (Captain Sea and Shore Training) has `U-boat' knowledge, UTT act as 
CSST assessors on behalf of CSST. CSST came to assess UTT, against up to date 
standards for style and policy, this has nothing to do with technical content. " As a 
result, the writing and upgrading of documents was completed almost entirely from 
memory by the UTT team. 
Further, the contract did not stipulate the level of knowledge or skill required by 
the training team or the assurance thereof. With an average of over twenty years 
service on submarines and a professionalism that should be commended, the team 
recognised all of these shortfalls and took it upon themselves to try to bring 
themselves up to speed, became reacquainted, and then tested their knowledge against 
the pre-existing USQ specifications, first completed in 1990, before initiating training 
to the Canadians. 
3.4.2 Training Requirements 
It was agreed that the RN would be responsible for providing conversion 
training to 344 basic submarine qualified Canadian personnel, for all occupations and 
all experience levels (both technical and management). This would include personnel, 
who would form the crew on the submarines, and management and support personnel 
who would develop, implement and guide policies, procedures and guidelines, as well 
as those who would perform future CF training. To meet contract requirements to 
supply both a competent crew and an operationally capable and safe submarine, 
training was performed from a systems performance basis. All crew who were needed 
to operate a submarine, with the addition of spare personnel to account for attrition 
were trained simultaneously, receiving individual occupational operator and 
maintainer training; team training; and then as a complete crew, testing on the 
reactivated submarine to certify all crewmembers were capable of performing the 
necessary skills in an operational setting. As Canada would be purchasing four 
65 
submarines, training to achieve a functionally capable crew would be completed in 
four successive waves with training of an entire crew, providing specific occupational 
and general safety conversion training to all personnel, for each successive 
submarine. Upon completion of training and certification of operational capability of 
both the crew and the submarine, each certified crew would then sail its submarine 
back to Canada. 
All individuals from each crew would first be provided system specific training 
for their occupation, lasting from three to four months depending on the occupation. 
During this knowledge acquisition period no team or skill training would occur, and 
the training was not intended at this phase to be operational, tactical or ship-wide 
organisation training (Detachment, 2000). Training was provided at a level to 
understand system functionality, and not intended to be detailed to complete 
maintenance (Detachment, 2000). On completion of individual training personnel 
were expected to have a good theoretical knowledge of this class of submarine and its 
equipment. This phase of training was completed at the RN Submarine Training 
Centres in Farham and Portsmouth2, UK. 
The next phase of training was individual skill acquisition and certification. 
Upon successful completion of individual occupation training, crews then continued 
their individual training in the north of England, at Barrow-in-Furness, where the 
submarines were being reactivated, to complete systems qualification certification - 
Upholder Submarine Qualification. As in training for any class of submarine, 
qualification to becoming a crewmember requires as a pre-requisite the confirmation 
that each member has an in-depth understanding of the class of submarine aboard 
which they will be working. As is standard for most nations and mirrored in the type 
of training previously completed by the Canadian Navy, the process involved a 
comprehensive study of the submarine, operations and all systems (air, hydraulic, 
electrical, mechanical, weapons, safety, and escape and rescue), and individuals were 
tested for both knowledge and skill for each portion. 
This was achieved through six weeks of lectures, walk-through and detailed 
situational simulations onboard the submarine to understand the systems, their 
interaction, and to practise their skills that may be needed. This was also the first time 
.2 HMS Collingwood 
in Farham provided classroom training, while individual and team simulator 
training were provided in Portsmouth, UK. 
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HMS Collingwood in Farham provided classroom training, while individual and 
team simulator training were provided in Portsmouth, UK 
any crewmember would have seen the submarine and spent any time onboard. 
Upon successful completion of examination by board (both oral and written), 
the member would be awarded an Upholder Submarine Qualification (USQ) (Team, 
1999), which is the achievement of a `dolphins' certificate for the Upholder class of 
submarine. Without prior training and knowledge of a submarine this phase would 
normally take about a year to complete. However, as the prerequisite to this training 
required that each CF member must have achieved the basic submarine qualifications, 
in an Oberon class (in which the principles and requirements are the same for any 
class of diesel-electric submarine), the time to achieve the USQ, including the board 
exam was estimated to be three months, with small individual variations. 
Figure 3. Submarine Training Programme Timeline - Intended and Outcome 
A. 
Simulator Sail 
Individual Occupational Skill Acquisition Training Sea-trials Home 
Knowledge Training USQ Certification 4-1 Sea Training 
Phase 1: Portsmouth Phase 2: Barrow-in-Furness Phase 3: 
047 Simulator trg 16 wks before sail 9 
Intended 
Time in Months 
B. Actual Time in Months 
Crew one: completion of phase 3,18 months 
Crew two: completion of phase 2, no sea-trials, 10 months 
Crew three: completion of phase 1, USQ, 7 months 
The sequence of training then would proceed with 2 weeks of individual 
simulator training in the machinery-control and full-motion ship-control trainers, and 
then 1 week of team training in the same simulators would follow. Both simulation 
trainers were built to reflect the display and function of the machinery/engine room 
and control room of the Upholder class submarine. This training also occurred in 
Portsmouth, UK. Ideally, completion of training would follow shortly thereafter with 
sea-trials to provide sequenced formal training time on the submarine to put into 
practice the knowledge and skills, and to test the capability of the entire crew. To 
ensure the crew had the knowledge and skill necessary to complete the required tasks, 
the contract stipulated that crews must be tested and pass identified requirements in 
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the simulators (machinery and control room trainers) 16 weeks prior to sail. 
The entire training programme and expected delivery of each submarine was 
expected to take nine months, and a new crew would begin phase-one, individual 
training, upon completion of the preceding crew. However, very soon after the 
contract was initiated it was realised that these stringent timelines could not be met as 
structural and mechanical problems were identified in the submarines (e. g., defective 
joint welds in three of four submarines, corrosion issues, fuel leaks and battery 
charging problems in HMCS WINDSOR (ex- HMS UNICORN). "Fixing the 
problem meant two-to-three-month delays in delivery of the first submarine, HMCS 
VICTORIA, and similar delays on the next two boats"(Hobson, 2001). This 
anticipated delay turned out to be a very conservative estimate. 
3.4.3 Training Complications 
The contract specified that a trained crew and an operationally serviceable 
submarine would be provided simultaneously. Although there was some flexibility in 
negotiating timeframes to ensure four submarines and four crews were delivered, 
mechanical and structural problems with the submarines were not foreseen and the 
result was a significant delay in reactivating the submarines. This had a significant 
cascade effect on the training programme: training staff and crew were not permitted 
access during the maintenance of the submarines; CF crew USQ training and 
certification times were extended; sea-trials were delayed; and, as a result trainees 
required further simulator training as the 16 week window before sea-trials could not 
be met. 
Even from the very beginning repair to the submarines posed a problem and, 
with very little access to a submarine the UTT staff had to retrain themselves and 
write the technical and training material mostly from memory. Difficulties in access 
thus made learning and practising what was learned a challenge for the trainers and 
the trainees. The submarine control room and machinery room simulators were 
available however, geographical distance of the trainers and the crews from the 
simulator made hands-on training difficult and access infrequent. 
Maintaining the training momentum was a problem that not only influenced the 
first crew the effect cascaded to training all subsequent crews. The delays in 
delivering the first submarine required the first crew to receive retraining on the 
simulators to refresh and regain their knowledge and skills prior to sailing the 
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submarine. Although the training of subsequent crews had been pushed back by six- 
nine months, the crews for the second and third submarine were in various stages of 
the training programme. Even though retraining was necessary, rescheduling became 
a problem; class training had to continue for the next submarine crew, available 
simulator time and staff had to be found to support the additional training, retraining 
was required before the 16-week window to sail, and the amount of time required to 
retrain was not known as the degree of degradation of knowledge and skill was not 
known. This significant adjustment to the training schedule was not anticipated. 
There weren't enough staff to perform the regular training in addition to performing 
the required retraining that was anticipated to last at least one month, and thus further 
delays and interruptions were imposed on the subsequent crews under training. 
Training complications also resulted from the lapse of over five years since any 
training or active service had been engaged, as the training curriculum and procedural 
documentation needed a review of requirements, completion and upgrade for the 
programme to proceed. Interviews with the training team clarified memory served as 
the primary resource, "Even though some things were documented, a lot of things 
were not saved. UTT saved all documents when the submarines were laid up, and 
didn't throw out anything. However, Abbeywood (submarine designers), FOSM (Flag 
Officer Submarines) and the submarine squadrons threw everything out. (We) 
Couldn't remember everything, historical info was not kept or available, and not all 
technical data was (sic) available. " These circumstances created a training 
programme, and procedural and technical documentation to be a living/working 
process, changing as necessary when memories were triggered, questions arose that 
couldn't be answered, or new information was brought to light. 
3.4.3 Summary of Pre-training Influences 
The history of the RN preparation for training, the CF pre-training 
requirements and the contract development, complications and restrictions suggests 
that pre-training individual and organisational factors would likely impact the training 
platform and thus impact the perceptions and expectations of trainers, management 
and CF trainees. These pre-training influences can be categorised into pre-training 
participant characteristics (trainers, management and trainees); training contents and 
principles; formal and informal training aids; and, instructor characteristics. The 
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specific pre-training influence on individual training and training effectiveness are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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c}. Methods 
Through a case study evaluation, the aim of the thesis was to advance the 
understanding of collective, multi-dimensional influences, limitations, interactions 
and adaptations that can influence training and ultimate transfer to a complex 
interdependent team-oriented work environment. However, the scope of evaluating 
training effectiveness of the Canadian Navy's entire training programme would be 
extremely time-consuming and intrusive (beyond the limits of a thesis). Permission 
was thus obtained to assess training effectiveness in the interdependent team 
performance of safety-critical elements of operation - the goal of effectively 
performing Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). 
To aid in the achievement of the objectives for this thesis, the multi-level 
framework proposed by Kozlowski and Salas (1997) was used as a guide in data 
collection. It supported this effort, as the theory was developed to ensure training 
outcomes achieve organisational objectives. The theory also aided data collection in 
that it provides a framework, albeit very broadly, of the factors from the organization, 
team and individual that needs to be supportive of each other for successful 
performance in the workplace (Figure 2). The theory therefore also identifies the 
generic multi-level factors that training interventions need to target at each level, and 
the alignment needed between levels for successful transfer. As well, as Kozlowski 
and Salas' (1997) model further proposes that for training to be effective lower-level 
individual targets must link with higher level outcomes, the multi-level factors 
identified for individuals and teams also provides indicators for assessment of the 
content, delivery and timings of training for interdependent teams. 
Due to the constraints imposed when performing research in a field setting, 
this case study was not able to provide a comprehensive detailing and review of all 
influencing factors identified in effectiveness research. However, to explore the 
breadth of factors that could influence both training and outcomes, background 
individual, situational and organisational influences to this training platform from the 
involved organisations (RN and Canadian Forces (CF)) were identified. As well, to 
identify and link the combined training effectiveness influences that could facilitate 
or hinder successful team transfer of that learned, training influences from the 
organisations, upward link from individuals, and impacts directly from the training 
design and the relationship to the work platform were identified within the framework 
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of the training platform. This thesis thus focused on selective identifiers prior to and 
during training (that could be studied without interference) that influenced training 
success as it applies to the performance of safety-critical elements in a new working 
platform for trainees. 
Data collection was thus exploratory but also qualitative, structured to observe 
training and also to identify the perceptions, reactions, expectations and satisfaction 
of trainees, trainers and management in this complex, team-oriented training 
platform. This data collection, supported by the theoretical framework from 
Kozlowski and Salas (1997) was derived to provide the foundation empirical 
evidence to support the theory of interdependent vertical transfer and thus provide 
evidence to expand training effectiveness outlook as multidirectional and 
multidimensional that can support the achievement of organisational objectives. Data 
collection methods were also derived to aid in determining if the upward linkage of 
individuals through to interdependent teams has the capacity to influence 
organisational effectiveness. 
4.1 In situ Protocol Design 
As the research was performed during the actual training of the Canadian Navy 
to integrate submariners to a new class of submarine, with the condition of non- 
interference, the design and application of the research was restricted to: 1) historical 
review of pre-training influences from both organisations, prior training of the 
trainers and the trainees, and the considerations and development of the training 
platform; 2) Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) of workplace emergency procedures 
to identify conditions which are necessary to undertake the operations and achieve 
system and organisational goals; 3) review of the training process, methods and 
training aids (technical documentation, procedures, simulators, and walk-through 
training); 4) observation and monitoring of the successive crews training process; 
and, 5) administration of interviews and questionnaires to relevant and involved 
personnel. 
Figure 4. Training Effectiveness Protocol Design and Timelines (months) 
Preliminary Interviews Observe Questionnaire Lessons Learned Questionnaire 
Interviews HTA of EOPs Simulator Training Interviews Feedback Interviews 
Review of documentation 
` I I I t 
0 2 3 8 11 14 
Background Crew I Team Training Managers, Crew I Crew 2 and 3 
Data Collection EOP Crew Crew I Training Staff, EOP Crew 
and Crew 1 
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Case study approach 
1. Develop an understanding of the historical background and the training platform 
and process baseline. Completed through interviews with managers and trainers, 
and review of supporting documentation; 
2. Develop an in-depth understanding of emergency operating procedures, the 
tasks required, sequence, their interrelationships with systems and personnel, and 
their difficulty and criticality. Completed through in-depth interviews with crew 
who perform the duties, review of EOP procedures, simulator-training observation, 
and in depth observation of the working platform; and, 
3. Identify the effectiveness of the training platform capability to provide training 
for emergency operating procedures for transfer. Completed through questionnaire 
and interviews with relevant crewmembers in training from the first, second and 
third submarine crews. 
4.1.1. Integration Process and Training Timeline 
The integration process involved the successive training for four complete 
crews, intended to train personnel (individually and as a team) to form competent 
crews, one crew at a time, in an expected total timeframe of 4 years. The contract 
intended to provide conversion training to Canadian submariners and thus all selected 
personnel must have achieved the required pre-requisite knowledge and skills prior to 
course loading (discussed later in Chapter 4.4.1). Military succession planning for 
operations, training and recruiting is an ongoing process and thus personnel were 
course loaded as required. Therefore, the relevant data was collected during the 
training regime with those who performed the training irrespective of individual prior 
experience or expertise (i. e., time qualified as a submariner, years of operational 
experience, and years since operational service). 
The case study was performed in the midst of continuation training. All 
personnel were either active military in the CF or RN, or contracted personnel with 
Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering Limited (VSEL) to perform training (through 
RN); with training observation, interviews and questionnaires completed with 
available personnel as training and operational commitments proceeded and allowed. 
Due to unpredicted significant delays in reactivating the submarines, beyond 
collection of data from RN trainers and Canadian management, data could only be 
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collected from the first three Canadian crews at various stages of completion of the 
training programme. The training of the first crew was considered a pilot course 
(within this training platform), and just prior to their departure from the UK to 
Canada an invitation to participate in the post training lessons learned meeting with 
the involved crew and management was conducted to identify shortfalls and 
appropriate training changes for further crew training implementation to ensure 
effective transfer of training. 
4.1.2 Stakeholder Involvement 
Prior to initiating the case study formal approval was sought from senior 
military stakeholders to approve the proposed research. This included approval from 
the post-graduate sponsor of this author for this PhD thesis and approval to conduct 
research within this platform was sought from the senior managers of Navy Personnel 
and Material (Appendix A). Once approval was gained, interviews were conducted 
with management of the new submarine programme and training to gain support for 
the intended research and the methods to achieve results, as well as to delineate who 
were the training stakeholders, both nationally and internationally. In order to 
achieve the research objectives the scope of the work involved all training 
stakeholders at all stages in the process as it unfolded, to identify who were involved, 
the rationale and process of the training programme, what was involved, and how 
adjustments to the programme were put into practice. 
International stakeholders were identified as those RN staff who were either 
responsible for the submarine fleet prior to transfer of ownership (RN Commanding 
officer (CO)) or RN training staff. National stakeholders were Canadian training 
managers, Commanding Officers for each of the submarines, and the crew directly 
involved in the performance of EOPs. These were individuals who perform the duties 
of Ship Control Officer of the Watch (SCOOW, officer in charge on a watch for 
systems, manoeuvres, SOPs and EOPs), Ship Control Console Panel Watchkeeper's 
(SCC 1 and 2, senior control room panel operator and junior assistant), Machine 
Control Console WatchKeepers' (MCC 1 and 2, motor room senior control panel 
operator and junior assistant) and the Helmsman (driver of the submarine). 
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4.1.3 Experimental Design 
The case study was approached and. conducted recognising the variable control 
limits imposed by performing research within an ongoing training programme as it 
proceeded. First, background information was collected to identify the details of the 
purchasing of the submarines and the training contract, training platform, timelines, 
and the details of the instructors (history, experience). Then, a detailed task analysis 
was completed for all EOPs (Section 4.2) with Hierarchical Task Analysis of the 
system and personnel contributing factors, concurrent with the observation of team 
simulator training. This work was followed by interviews and completion of 
questionnaires by the identified stakeholders. Beyond the trainers, RN manager and 
Canadian Navy management, three successive crews were interviewed and provided 
questionnaires: 1) to crew one after the initial completion of the final phase of 
training and testing of capability (knowledge, skill and Upholder Submarine 
Qualification (USQ) certification), and immediately upon completion of sea-trials; 2) 
to crew two after the completion of formal training (knowledge and skill acquisition 
and USQ certification) but having not completed sea-trial testing; and, 3) to crew 
three after completion of phase one classroom training and submarine certification 
(knowledge acquisition, USQ certification, and individual simulator training) but not 
having completed simulator team training or sea-trials. 
Interviews with the respondents and questionnaires were completed 
simultaneously; either individually, or where multiple individuals performed common 
tasks or duties in the work environment (i. e., trainers and trainees) the format for 
discussion was set up in a focus group format incorporating all available participants. 
The same individuals perform both the duties of the SCC and MCC, on a rotational 
schedule, thus the focus groups for these tasks were grouped into senior and junior 
technicians. The Helmsman was not interviewed as all members of a crew are capable 
of performing the task, therefore this position would not be considered an 
interdependent. Data collection for involved crewmembers for each of the three 
submarines was completed consecutively, or as near as possible, to control for inter- 
group interference. Timeframe between crew interviews could not be controlled. 
Detailed discussions were held with crew-one post-training at a formal post- 
training lessons learned meeting to identify shortcomings and changes for future 
implementation for successive training. 
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Partite ants: Of the 71 possible individuals involved in managing (3) or providing 
training (10), management of the CF crew (4), or the crew from each of the three 
submarines employed in performing EOPs (SCOOW (6/submarine), SCC 1 and MCC 
1 (6/submarine), and SCC2 and MCC 2 (6/submarine)), 42 individuals were available 
to be interviewed and receive questionnaires. All participants were men as there were 
no women submariners at the time of this study. 
Demographic variables: In addition to the collection of responses to the perceptions, 
desires and expectation of training, training aids and support, several demographic 
variables were identified. These variables included: rank, occupation, years in the 
military, education, years qualified as a submariner, years of operational service, and 
years since operational service and on what vessel. These factors were considered 
valuable as depth and range. of experience and training and-operational currency could 
be related to perception and expectation of the training and outcomes. 
4.2 Task Analysis Technique 
The Hierarchical Task Analysis approach was used to identify and define each 
of the 16 EOP tasks with a total of 31 different subtasks performed to achieve system 
safety goals during an emergency. Specifically, HTA was used to identify the plan to 
achieve each EOP goal; the set of sub-operations that each person must carry out to 
achieve the desired goal (s); the sequence between personnel to achieve desired 
results; and, when they are carried out, based upon the operational goal, task and the 
contextual constraints of the operational system and resources available (B. Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1993). All 16 EOP categories and 31 specific EOPs were delineated for 
the goal, task and operations with the aid of detailed interviews and walk-through 
with personnel/positions who performed the specific tasks (i. e., SCOOW, SCCI and 
SCC2, MCC 1 and 2 and Helmsman). Examples of the task analysis provided in 
Appendix D have been prepared in the style and format used today by the Canadian 
Navy, as the task descriptions have been used in the procedural development of the 
Emergency Operating Procedures document. Although for discussion purposes within 
this dissertation detailed description of the tasks, 
4.2.1 Simulator Training Observation 
Observation of simulator training served two functions: 1) to observe the 
integrated performance of EOPs by crewmembers in both the control room and motor 
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room, and, 2) to observe the team training and assessment process. Two opportunities 
were made available to observe ship control team training and formal assessment of 
team capabilities to successfully complete EOPs for the first crew in the control room 
and motor room simulators. First, within the scheduled 5-day training programme, 
then again 2 months later in the added 5-day refresher team training and re- 
certification provided to meet the requirement to have successfully completed team 
training 16-weeks prior to completion of sea-trials. 
Observation involved the onsite real-time training and testing of progressive 
single to multiple EOP drills within both simulators with pre-selected teams 
(available for training) who will perform the required tasks on transfer (SCOOW, 
SCC 1 and SCC2, MCC 1 and 2 and Helmsman), as well as, discussion amongst 
trainers of progress of individual trainees and, provision of criteria to determine 
successful completion of team-training. 
4.3 * Questionnaire and Interviews 
The intention of this empirical case study was to broaden the scope of multilevel 
training effectiveness understanding as it relates to the links and influence of 
constructs from the training programme, individual, organisation and situation to have 
a vertical effect to learning and subsequent transfer to the workplace. There have been 
no studies to date that have simultaneously identified or examined the link between 
individual through to team influences, training outcomes and organisational 
effectiveness (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001), and it is argued that multilevel issues 
must become more central in research if training is to contribute to training 
effectiveness (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
However, although there are a very large number of factors. related to training 
effectiveness, as this research was performed during an organisation's training with 
the understanding there would be no interference it was impossible to design and 
measure for all variables and their interrelationships. This empirical case study could 
not control for the impact of variables, nor was measurement of all factors possible. 
The limitations of this case study will be described in detail in Chapter 8. 
It has been said that as a result of individual characteristics and experiences 
(within and outside an organisation), individuals enter into training with different 
expectations and desires that play. a central role in determining training effectiveness 
(Tannenbaum, 1993). Over and above the critical variables such as organisational 
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support and input, training medium, training design and quality of delivery (Kraiger 
& Aguinis, 2001), it has been further suggested that interpersonal perception of the 
organisational climate (Noe et al., 1997; Rouiller & Goldstein, 1993), perception of 
trainees on instructors and vice versa (Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001) and expectations 
from training (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Mathieu & Matineau, 1997; 
Tannenbaum, 1993) will affect motivation to learn and transfer. Thus, factors related 
to perception, expectation, and satisfaction with the training platform could therefore 
provide broad indications of the perceived success and changes of the training 
platform over time with successive crews, which would therefore provide an 
indication of vertical transfer and the effect to an organisation. 
Therefore, within the constraints of this research platform, the questionnaire 
was developed to identify organisational, trainer and trainee perception, expectation 
and satisfaction with the training platform, aids and support, and the resulting 
reactions and perceived influences on the training platform after completion of 
various phases of training. Interviews further delineate and expand on individual 
responses and provide details of individual, team and organisations' reactions. 
4.3.1 Questionnaire Development 
The questionnaire was developed into two Sections (Appendix C), and 
development ensured a discrete question from each of the respondents would result in 
a single data point relating to the pre-training and training influences. One portion 
was given only to managers and trainers that dealt with perceived pre-training 
knowledge, skill, ability and experience, preparations for training and training needs 
analysis; information that individual crewmembers would not be aware of and 
therefore presentation of this to all crew would very likely artificially skew results. 
Also, it was felt by the experimenter and training managers that presentation of this 
portion of the questionnaire to crew might raise doubts of the capability of the 
training staff and thus have a negative impact on training. 
The second portion of the questionnaire was standardised and given to all 
interviewees to identify their perceptions and expectations to: training content, 
format, formal and informal training aids, team composition influences, evaluation 
methods, learning outputs, and, degree of learning of knowledge and skills; as well 
as, their expectations from training and the satisfaction with the outcome of training, 
or the phase (s) completed (Appendix Q. 
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The questionnaire was tailored to meet the specific needs of the unique training 
environment, and although items to support the thesis were identified (Noe & 
Schmitt, 1986) it was supplemented by the experimenter based on the theoretical 
constructs for multilevel approach to training effectiveness and vertical transfer that 
met the unique training platform. The draft questionnaire was then circulated within 
the university to assess clarity, detail, completeness, and circulated to Canadian Navy 
managers familiar with the programme, but not involved in the case study, to identify 
relevancy, clarity, detail and completeness (J. R. Wilson, 1998). 
4.3.2 Questionnaire Content 
Training expectations, desires and perceptions must be tailored to the training 
environment (Tannenbaum, 1993) and, as such, the items to support the questionnaire 
and the thesis were identified from previous motivational constructs related to 
training and transfer (Noe & Schmitt, 1986) but also supplemented to meet the 
research outcomes and the specific training platform. 
The questionnaire contained as a preface a request to provide demographic 
details such as: name, rank, and identified work position (for identification purposes 
only); and, number of years in the military, education, number of years qualified as a 
submariner, number of years of operational service, and number of years since 
operational service and on which vessel. Managers and trainers were provided 18 
questions as identified in Section 4.3.1. The remaining 34 questions, as amplified in 
Section 4.3.1 were distributed to all participants. 
The self-reported response to each question was based on a 5-point Likert scale 
(I =strongly agree, 3= neither agree or disagree, 5= strongly disagree) with a random 
inversion of the scale throughout the questionnaire to prevent the likelihood of an 
automated response. The only exceptions were four questions to identify self-reported 
perceptions for the pre-training guidance given in training preparation (e. g., Did the 
trainers receive any guidance for the training syllabus content? ), provided only to the 
RN trainers and CF managers, and three self-reported perceptions of the changes to 
training curriculum, content and supporting documentation were provided to all 
participants (Appendix C). The scale was denoted as `entirely, some, barely, and not 
at all' for all seven questions. To attempt to control for misinterpretation of the 
questions and thus contamination of data, each distinct question was placed on a 
separate page. The questions were then presented, one at a time. 
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4.3.3 Questionnaire Distribution 
Upon initiation of each individual or group interview, each participant was 
given an introduction letter, a consent form, and the questionnaire. The experimenter 
welcomed the participant (s) and informed them that the intent of the research was to 
investigate perceptions, expectations and satisfaction with how knowledge and skill 
are acquired, and what support and value the training programme, individuals and 
resources were provided to aid them in their expected emergency operating duties 
(Appendix B). Individuals were advised that participation was voluntary, and along 
with completion of the questionnaire an interview/focus group would be conducted to 
provide participants the opportunity to voice their opinions and expand on their 
questionnaire responses as it applied to them at this point in their training. 
Participants were asked for permission to record the interview to prevent response 
misinterpretations and so comparisons could be made with other interviewees at a 
later time. 
Participants were also advised that if they chose to participate, their identity and 
all information supplied in this interview would be treated confidentially, and used 
solely for this study. Participants were advised that the provision of personal 
demographic information would only be used to identify and categorise responses to 
determine if any of the specific groups had a unique view or requirements. As the 
participants were military, members were further advised they should not fear 
repercussion for speaking freely in regards to perceptions, expectations and 
satisfaction with the training programme. 
Following the introduction and consent to participate, the experimenter led the 
participants through each question in the questionnaire and invited conversation or 
discussion surrounding each question (Appendix Q. 
4.4 Statistical Analysis 
Confidence intervals were computed for the demographic historical data of 
qualification, operational experience and number of years since operational service to 
identify within crew, within position and across crew variation. The non-parametric 
statistic, Spearman rank correlation coefficient, was performed on pre-training and 
training perception factors and with training perception and training expectation 
factors. Additionally, the non-parametric equivalent to the ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis 
test and Chi-square was used to identify possible differences of training perception 
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and expectation between crews. Prior to statistical analysis, all questionnaire 
responses denoting a negative impact were reverse coded. 
4.5 Role of Researcher, Opportunities and Constraints 
As a member of the Canadian Forces, there was an awareness of the training 
to integrate the Canadian Navy to a new system, and thus an opportunity to assess the 
training programme, upon approval. Formal approval was gained to perform the 
research, as the Canadian Navy considered the research of value to identify 
improvements to training, if needed. In spite of the military association, the sole role 
of the researcher was that of a scientist, to collect the necessary data to achieve the 
research objectives. The Canadian Navy did not direct the research design, nor did 
they censor the findings from this research. The Canadian Forces also advocates a 
transparency in their work efforts and research findings. Thus, the Canadian Navy 
also provided approval to have the thesis published in the open literature. 
However, although research efforts were welcome, they could not interfere 
with the training process or outcomes. Constraints were not imposed to limit access 
or conceal portions of the training programme, individual opinion, or state of the 
systems. Rather, research constraints were imposed to ensure that the strict timelines 
to complete the total training for all crews were met, conditions of the contract to 
perform training were adhered and individual and crew training proceeded as 
planned. Furthermore, research could not create perceptions that might negatively 
influence training progress or outcomes. 
To meet with these conditions, the research constraints were such that not all 
of the multi-level influences to training effectiveness could be assessed. This would 
include assessment of cognitive and performance abilities and trainability, as well as, 
behavioural influences such as self-efficacy and motivation. Further, questions 
relating to the perceptions of the pre-training influences from the historical RN 
training programme were not distributed to the trainees, as perceptions of the value of 
the training programme could have been altered. For the same reason, individual 
perceptions of the influence from organisational factors were also not obtained. 
Although there are constraints to performing research while an actual training 
programme is being conducted, valuable information can be obtained. This training 
platform provided the opportunity to examine the integrated influences of the 
organisation, individuals, the training programme, and situational variables to training 
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effectiveness. Thus, within an actual training platform there was an opportunity to 
identify and assess combined influencing factors, their impact, link, and the 
interventions and adaptations taken to achieve organisational objectives from pre- 
training through to training. This case study thus afforded the opportunity to broaden 
the scope of multi-level approaches to training effectiveness by examining the links 
between individual through to team influences, learning, training outcomes and 
organisational effectiveness. 
The completion of this research also had to conform within the timelines of 
the training programme as it progressed. Intended timelines for training each of the 
four successive crews was nine months, with each new crew initiating training as the 
previous crew completed the first phase of training. However, unexpected, significant 
cascading training delays further controlled the protocol design. Data collection 
occurred over a period of 14 months (Figure 4), and although data was collected 
during the midst of training, if training had proceeded as planned, three crews could 
have been interviewed upon completion of their entire training. As such, pre-training 
influences were identified retrospectively, monitoring of individual and team 
simulator training only occurred with crew one, during both sessions, and crew 
interviews and questionnaire distribution occurred at various stages of training 
completion. Interviews for each of the crews were thus staggered over time, and as 
training had to proceed without interruption, only available personnel could be 
interviewed. 
4.6 Evaluation and Implementation of Proposals 
The results of the task analysis of the EOPs, questionnaire and interview 
responses, and resulting conclusions from this case study were presented to senior 
Canadian submarine managers prior to submission for review of accuracy, 
completeness, and acceptability (submitted to Captain (N) L. M. Hickey, 5th Maritime 
Operational Group Headquarters Commander and Commander S. Virgin, 
Commander Submarine Sea Trainer Group). Hierarchical Task Analysis for all EOPs 
was supplied to the Canadian Navy to assist in the development of the CF submarine 
training programme and policy and procedural development. 
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5. Hierarchical Task Analysis of Emergency Operating Procedures 
In order to have a greater understanding of all of the Emergency Operating 
Procedures (EOPs) that could be required to be performed, at any time, by selected 
positions in a submarine (SCOOW, SCC1 and SCC2, MCC 1 and 2 and Helmsman), 
a detailed Hierarchical Task Analysis was completed on all 16 categories of EOPs 
that contained a total of 31 separate EOPs. The objective was to have a greater 
understanding of the crews' perceived and actual training outcome acceptability of 
their knowledge and skill acquisition, a detailed HTA would also identify if the 
training platform reflected the environment, task, and tools of the working platform. 
Emergency Operating Procedures are a sequence of tasks that must be 
collaboratively performed by a series of crewmembers to deal with any emergency 
that arises to ensure the safety of the crew and the submarine. The tasks must be 
performed accurately and completely. Although procedures are kept onboard the 
submarine the tasks must be performed in an expedient, controlled manner, and thus 
all sequences for each EOP are expected to be memorised. Thus, the criticality of 
successful completion is paramount. Performing a task analysis using HTA was 
considered appropriate as tasks detailed through this process identify the operation, 
provide a detailed statement of conditions to undertake the specific goal, and the 
personnel and system interactions involved to successfully complete the operational 
goal (B Kirwan, 1998; Shepherd, 1993). To assure training effectiveness and 
identification of the factors that could contribute or deter learning and transferring 
what was learned, a clear understanding must be had of the operational goal, and the 
individual (s) and system (s) requirements to achieve that goal. Within the context of 
training effectiveness HTA also provided the details necessary to delineate the task 
(s) to identify the complexity of the task and with that the physical and cognitive 
demands on personnel (Brauchler"& Landau, 1998). Defining these specifics aided in 
establishing the training needs (Landau, Rohmert, & Brauchler, 1998), redefined, as 
needed, the training design requirements thus aiding in identifying improvements that 
could be made to the training programme (Shepherd, 1985; Stammers & Shepherd, 
1998). As well, the HTA helped to define the added support mechanisms, in the form 
of training and operational training aids that would support the learning, transfer, and 
maintenance of what has been learned in this applied environment (Brauchler & 
Landau, 1998; B. Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1993; Landau et al., 1998). 
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The rules for HTA were applied, in that tasks were described in sufficient detail 
utilising the stopping rule criterion, `P XC rule', where re-description of the tasks 
were described to the point where the Probability (P) of inadequate performance of 
the operation and the Consequence or Cost (C) of inadequate performance are 
considered acceptable to the operator (B. Kievan & Ainsworth, 1993; Redmill & 
Rejan, 1997; Shepherd, 1985). As the consequences of an accident or ineffective 
response to an emergency in this operational environment can be catastrophic, 
sufficient detail was supplied to ensure the motto of the submarine environment "to 
keep the men and the boat safe" was applied. Thus, although the PXC rule is 
suggested as a guiding rule-of thumb for stopping the detailing of a task (B. Kirwan 
& Ainsworth, 1993), it also prompted consideration (through detailed discussion with 
operators) of the severe consequence of an emergency in this environment, the 
operational requirement to have mastered all of the procedures, and how they might 
be achieved and maintained - through training and non-training solutions. 
As part of the information gathering, comparisons were made with the CF 
EOPs, Canadian Submarine Standing Orders (CANSSOs) (Navy, 1997) from their 
now decommissioned Oberon class submarine and with the RN Upholder class EOPs 
(Royal Navy, 1999b) used in the training programme. Completion of a previous task 
analysis from the RN could not be determined; however, discussions with both RN 
and Canadian managing staff and students identified their discontent with the RN 
format within the training platform. Canadian crews identified, "With less 
(submariner) experience, I had trouble; I didn't know the details of how to perform 
shortened descriptions (EOP format). (I) did not know the details to complete 
Sections of EOP, had a great deal of difficulty. With training lapses (2 months), did 
find it difficult to learn" (crew one). "From a learning process it would have been 
much easier to have everything in a list, there should be a training EOP book" (crew 
two). "Would have to refer to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to identify the 
steps" (crew three). Over all, crews two and three found EOP procedures incomplete, 
sequencing poor, and difficult to learn. 
Upon review of the RN EOPs (see Figure 5 as an example), the structure of the 
operating procedure appears to follow the entity-relationship based analysis format 
(McCrohan, 1997), in which individuals perform actions upon objects changing the 
attributes of the object in the process. There is a relationship between objects that can 
be related to each other by physical location or to actions that are either performed 
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with them or on them. Figure 5 indicates within each individual box the roles for each 
team member (SCOOW, SCC, MCC, Helmsman, person identifying the emergency), 
the verb action is highlighted and the specific object or task is then indicated. 
Figure 5. Royal Navy EOP 1.1: Emergency Stations at Sea 
SCOOW/POOW 
Person Discovering the 
Emergency 
General Alarm FMB: 
"Emergency Stations, Emergency 
Stations 
............................. 
Stop: 
Snorting/Ventilating 
All Ventilation 
Order Planesman: 
Go to Safe Depth 
If at PD remain at PD 
Reduce: 
Speed (4 knots) if required 
MCC 
STOP: 
Snorting/Ventilating 
Axial Flow Fan 
Check: 
56-Bulkhead Shut down, door manned 
Man: 
Damage Control HO and DC net 
Raise: 
The Alarm by Quickest Means 
Inform: 
Control Room. 
a. Type 
b. Location 
c. System Involved 
scc 
STOP: 
Snorting/Ventilating 
Select: 
Ships Ventilation, Battery Ventilation 
and Fuel Firesafe switches to- 
Emergency Shut down 
Make: 
VCS and VICES Monitor Switches 
Each task box for the RN EOPs provides in sequence the activity to be 
performed for each member (e. g., STOP: snorting/ventilating found in SCOOW (2"a 
action), SCC (1St action) and MCC (1St action)), but the format does not describe how 
that should be achieved for each member (e. g., SCOOW- via communication, MCC 
and SCC- via perform panel sequence of events), nor does the format supply further 
detailed sub-operations, or indications if a sequence between members is required for 
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I 
Helmsman 
completion of the task or if they should be performed simultaneously. Further 
descriptive details of the emergency procedures are discussed below in Section 5.1, 
but it appears that the EOP document was not written for training purposes, but as a 
job aid to cue memory of task requirements and assure completion thereof, as well as 
to identify the role (s) and inter-relationship of each member of the team. 
In reviewing the EOPs previously used in the Canadian Oberon class, the 
display of the information was not in a text box format, but as in the RN format each 
position was identified and the tasks listed. The only difference between the two is 
that in the previous Canadian format, verb actions do not precede the task and the 
verbiage for the same task is described slightly differently. For instance, in the 
SCOOW, Canada CANSSOs provide two task orders, as in the RN's (Figure 5), to 
sound the general alarm and broadcast "Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations", 
then, crash stop ship's ventilation, rather than, STOP: snorting/ventilation, all 
ventilation as seen in the RN EOP. The guidelines for the person discovering the 
emergency are the same; however, the Canadian Oberon EOPs provided no further 
indications for orders to the Planesman/Helmsman, as seen in the RN EOPs. Thus, the 
RN EOPs seem to have more details and are inclusive for all positions and all broad 
identification of actions, but rather than sequencing the events/actions required, the 
RN has separated the duties into a box format. 
Perhaps part of the perceived differences, and likely discomfort, with training 
expectations for the trainees is that the tasks in the Upholder class submarine are 
semi-automated, and tasks once performed solely by technical personnel in the motor 
room/engine room have expanded duties (such as managing water levels in ballast 
tanks) that are now performed in the control room, on the control room panel. There 
appears to be familiarity with duties, and as such a comfort, in the motor room/engine 
room, even though they will now be performed on a panel rather than manually. One 
could assume then that the difficulties lie in new skill requirements rather than 
presentation of documentation. The specific tasks in the control room for the SCC 1 
and 2 are new roles for personnel and have not been performed before (quote: 
"Electricians have never been in the control room. "), although the systems requiring 
the effort such as stop snorting/ventilating are familiar. Thus, those most dissatisfied 
with the format of the RN EOPs are for those tasks performed by the SCC 1 and 
SCC2 in the control room. 
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What is also different between the RN and the CF performance of EOPs, and 
likely the cause for the significant discomfort for the individuals performing these 
duties is that the RN has one occupation that performs the combined duties of SCC 
and MCC operator in the control room and motor room. By contrast, the CF has an 
occupational structure in which the duties are performed by two occupations, 
electrician and a marine engineer, which on the previous CF class of submarines was 
only performed in the motor room. There was an overwhelming agreement amongst 
the senior technical operators to merge the occupations within the CF, and as a 
minimum provide more detailed cross-training in both occupations so that upon 
completion of training the basic knowledge and skill for an electrician and a marine 
engineer were known and individuals could thus feel more secure that they could 
operate the submarine sufficiently and capably. Interviews with senior electrical 
technicians revealed, "Integrate the marine engineers and electrician training, as the 
trades are now combined (for the RN). " "Cross-train the engineers and electricians, 
engineers only got engineering courses, and vice versa. Or at least provide general 
knowledge in the other trade (marine engineer), as the occupation has now merged, 
and we now need to know both jobs (in this submarine). " The same feeling was felt 
by the CF marine engineer occupation, "Procedures are different for the RN than for 
the CF, marine engineers are not allowed to touch breakers and must be certified as 
an electrician (in the CF). " "They (RN) have integrated the marine engineer and 
electrician trade and so the RN had an expectation that Canada would have the basic 
knowledge. The marine engineer was not allowed to touch the stuff; in O-boats we 
weren't responsible. " 
This conversion course was taught within the RN training platform, and thus 
there was an assumption that individuals had the basic knowledge required. Thus, 
from the interviews it could be seen that the trainees have neither previously 
performed or know the details of each others' duties, and therefore discomfort is 
based on a true lack of knowledge, not just discomfort with performing a new activity 
in the control room or performing a task differently (on a panel rather than manually). 
This would suggest that there would be a reliance on training content within this 
training platform to achieve the desired (would like to happen) knowledge and skill 
for their future duties. 
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5.1 EOP Work Description 
The RN Ships Operating Procedures, which outline the Emergency Operating 
Procedures for a submarine, are identified in a sequence from 1-35. Each EOP is 
designated with a specific number, not necessarily in sequence, as an EOP is defined 
for a specific task in a submarine and the operating procedures for each class only 
define those that are needed for that specific class of submarine. For instance, 
although there are 35 EOPs in existence, only sixteen classes of EOPs are used in the 
diesel electric Upholder class submarine. Thus, EOPs 3,9,13,15-25,30, and 33-35 
are not used for this class of submarine, and therefore were not reviewed. 
The specific EOPs that have been indicated as a safety requirement procedure 
for this class of submarine, that have been reviewed through an HTA include: 
1) Emergency Stations; 
2) Collision -a) surfaced, b) dived, and, c) grounding; 
4) Flooding accident- a) surfaced, b) dived; 
5) Control Surface Failure - a) dived, b) surfaced, c) Loss of Foreplanes, d) Loss 
of Control of Afterplanes - Failed to Dive, and, e) Loss of Control of Afterplanes 
- Failed to Rise; 
6) Man Overboard at Sea; 
7) Hydraulic Burst- a) Hydraulic Burst, b) Recommissioning an Hydraulic Plant, 
and, c) Emergency Repressurization of Hydraulic System; 
8) High Pressure Air Burst; 
10) 140 KW Motor Group (MG) Failure, a) Single MG Failure with both MGs 
Running, and, b) Complete Failure: Loss of Single MG when Supplying both AC 
Switch boards; 
11) 24 Volt Failure- a) Total 24 Volt DC Failure, and, b) Loss of 24 Volt DC 
Grade 2 Implications of Failure; 
14) Fire General (at sea); 
26) Fire in Battery Switchboard at Sea; 
27) Fire in Main Battery at Sea; 
28) Fire in Main Propulsion Switchboard; 
29) Propulsion Failures- a) Loss of Foreward/Aft Field Converters, b) Loss of all 
Field Converters, c) and d) combined - Loss of ACU when not in known Group 
or Camshaft has run out, and, e) Loss of Camshaft Drive Motors; 
31) Fire in an Oxygen Generator; and, 
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32) Accidental Initiation of Man Overboard Marker. 
The duties of those crewmembers who perform the EOPs (beyond those of the 
individual who discovers the emergency) are divided between two Sections of the 
submarine, those within the main operational centre of the submarine, the control 
room, and those who perform the complementary required duties in the motor room, 
both on the same deck of the submarine. The duties of the members in the control 
room include: the SCOOW, an officer responsible for the overall state of the 
submarine, and control of tactics and navigation; the SCC 1, a senior technician 
responsible for the ships' control systems managed by operating the control panel; the 
SCC2, a junior technician who acts as a runner when needed and performs the manual 
tasks within the control room and surroundings as necessary, as directed by the 
SCC1; and, the Helmsman, a duty that can be allocated to all other submarine 
qualified technicians within the submarine, responsible for steering and trimming the 
submarine. 
The motor room is monitored and controlled by only two members of the 
submarine crew, the MCC 1a senior technician and the MCC 2a junior technician, 
both of whom are either an electrician or a marine engineer, although not necessarily 
one of each during a shift. The MCC 1 is responsible for the electrical and mechanical 
portions of the submarine (e. g., engines, batteries, compressors, propulsion, electrical) 
that are controlled by the panel in the motor room, and the MCC 2 acts as a runner 
and performs manual duties as assigned by the MCC1 within the motor and engine 
room compartments. The duties and responsibilities are allocated according to trained 
capabilities, but the Commanding Officer is always ultimately responsible for the 
crew and the submarine and if needed (e. g., state of emergency) will take charge of 
the submarine from the SCOOW. 
5.1.1 Description of Tasks 
Of the 16 categories of EOPs with a total of 31 separate EOPs, HTA identified 
that all procedures require the efforts of all six positions who respond directly to 
EOPs (SCOOW, SCC 1 and 2, MCC 1 and 2, and Helmsman), with the exception of 
EOPs: 1.2 Emergency Stations in Harbour, which is performed, if needed, by crew on 
duty-watch; and, 4.2 Flooding Accident Surfaced, where there are no directives for 
the Helmsman. Emergency Stations in Harbour do not have specific directives for 
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each position as in the other EOPs as the submarine is tied up along side and is not 
operational, thus minimally manned. But, if an emergency were to occur, the general 
emergency knowledge and skill obtained by all submariners in their dolphin 
qualification would allow duty crew to complete and deal with any emergency. The 
procedure for Emergency Station in Harbour would be to announce the emergency 
within the submarine, which can be done by any member onboard, man stations, and 
if needed, the control room duty-watch would stop battery charging and ventilation, 
and contact shore duty officer3. 
Emergency Stations, the first EOP, is used to bring the Ships' Company to the 
highest possible degree of readiness to respond to any situation that threatens the 
safety of the submarine or crew (Royal Navy, 1999b). The submarine is brought to 
Emergency Stations for collision and grounding (EOP 2), flooding (EOP 4), hydraulic 
burst (EOP 7), fire (EOP 14) and any other situation requiring a high degree of 
readiness (e. g., intruder alert). 
As seen in Figure 6 as an example of a detailed HTA, when Emergency Stations 
is indicated at sea (by any member of the crew) a simultaneous interdependent 
coordinated effort occurs by all six members, controlled by the SCOOW. Many 
activities to secure the submarine and make it safe must occur together. Once the 
emergency is indicated and announced on the general alarm system (located 
throughout the submarine), the SCOOW then provides the string of orders to "Stop 
snorting/Stop ventilating, Do Not lower masts, Do Not flood the induction system" if 
at periscope depth (PD), if not then he will say " Go to safe depth (55m), 6 down. " 
This initial communication provides the direction for the members in the control 
room (SCCs and Helmsman) and the motor room (MCCs), who then simultaneously 
complete the series of functions to stop engines, ventilation, compressors, and change 
the depth and speed of submarine, and if needed (if at PD) secure openings in the 
submarine to prevent flooding. The SCC 1 and MCC 1 complete their portions on their 
respective panels, but as seen in Figure 6, plan 3 a) and b), further orders are given to 
their second-in-command for manual completion. 
To ensure the orders are understood and completed as directed, all orders at all 
times are repeated by the actionee prior to execution and then reported when 
3 Emergency Stations in Harbour have specific actions but tasks cannot be position driven, as the 
location of the limited number of duty personnel onboard is not static and the duties require submarine 
inspections. 
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completed, as the command was given (see Appendix D for complete details). 
Communication of events is provided verbally, and progress within the motor room is 
relayed directly from the MCC1 to the SCC 1 (via direct communication through 
headset), and then relayed to the SCOOW. As there are many activities occurring 
simultaneously in a stressful situation, communications are given when appropriate so 
the SCCOW is kept appraised of the status of the condition of the emergency and the 
state of resolution and its effect. 
The directives for EOPs dictate that if the submarine is brought to Emergency 
Stations for collision, grounding, flooding, hydraulic burst and fire, then one would 
presume that the tasks and sequencing identified in EOP 1.1 would be identical, or at 
least provided in the initial sequences for each of the EOPs for all positions. That is not 
always the case, as depending upon the emergency other tasks must proceed for safety or 
other tasks must be put into the sequence. The sequence is dependent upon the danger 
and the priority for resolution. 
For instance, in collision, dived and surfaced, or grounding none of the three EOPs 
are identical to the EOP for Emergency Stations for all positions (see Appendix D, EOP 1 
and 2). The duties of the MCC 1 and 2 are the only tasks that remain the same. However, 
the SCOOW's initial directions for each EOP are different, in that beyond identification 
of what the emergency is the SCOOW first orders are to deal first with the crisis and 
avert the potential outcome and then to ensure the safety of the submarine. In the 
collision EOP, the changes/additions are that the SCOOW first indicates "Emergency 
Stations, Emergency Stations, Stand-by Collision", indicates port or starboard, then "Shut 
bulkhead doors, shut all hatches, Man compartment blow" whether the emergency occurs 
surfaced or while dived. The sequence of tasks for the SCC remains the same, except 
monitoring and blowing the ballast tanks as required when surfaced, but when dived the 
additional task of lowering and securing the masts and periscopes are inserted midway 
through the sequence. The Helmsman will as in EOP 1 go off autopilot, if needed, and 
await direction to change course and speed. Additionally, for the EOP Collision Dived, 
the initial order will proceed with "Go Deep, Go Deep, Go Deep, keep safe depth" and as 
such the tasks change for the Helmsman. When initiating the Grounding EOP, the initial 
direction and response is to reverse the submarine and open vents to attempt to prevent 
grounding, and then to secure the integrity of the submarine by shutting the doors and 
hatches. This follows through with the immediate and initial response by the SCC to open 
vents, and then proceeds with the sequence in Emergency Stations. While the Helmsman 
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duties change again from the Emergency Station EOP and that for collision dived (for 
HTA details see Appendix D). 
From this overview of four of the 31 EOPs it can be seen that there are variations of 
the tasks and sequencing for the three types of collisions from the general EOP for 
Emergency Stations. Although in some cases small insertions for the SCC and in the case 
of the Helmsman major changes to the sequence, all tasks and the sequence in which they 
are ordered are very explicit and critical to providing an effective emergency response as 
an interdependent team. 
In further comparison of the additional three EOP categories in which the 
submarine is brought to Emergency Stations, for flooding, hydraulic burst and fire, it can 
be seen again that the tasks for each of the 7 EOPs does not follow that for the 
Emergency Stations EOP for all positions, even the MCC positions except when dealing 
with Flooding Accident Surfaced, which remained the same (Appendix D). The changes 
range from small insertions (2-4) to the Emergency Station sequence in the hydraulic 
burst for SCC and Fire at Sea for both SCC and MCC, to major changes, such as those 
seen in Flooding for SCC and Hydraulic Burst for the MCC. The changes to the SCOOW 
and thus the directions and sequence of actions from the Helmsman are very different for 
the flooding and hydraulic burst EOP from that of the Emergency Station EOP, with 
minor alterations, and acute vigilance of the status of the fire. Although many of the 
commands are similar with the Helmsman, such as "disengage autopilot" and "go to safe 
depth" to manage pitch, depth and direction, the task and sequence is very dependent in 
an emergency and will vary on the type of emergency. 
In a selected review of the remaining EOPs to identify the consistency of the tasks 
and sequence, responsibilities, and knowledge needed to perform the skills, a 
representative EOPs (8, High Pressure (HP) Air Burst, 10,140 MG Failure, and 11,24 
Volt Failure), provides a selection of the range. Complete outline of the HTA for all 
positions can be found in Appendix D. The HP Burst EOP follows the EOP for 
Emergency Stations closely for the SCC and MCC with the added requirement at the end 
of the sequence to be able to shut down the air compressors and group isolation valves. 
The Helmsman as in Emergency Stations disengages the autopilot, then maintains 
depth, course and speed and awaits further direction. The tasks for the SCOOW are new 
from those seen previously. In EOP 10, there is an electrical failure and in EOP 11 the 
battery power has failed. The initial sequence for both the SCC and the MCC are the 
same as Emergency Stations but the final half of the sequence requires the checking of 
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the panel to identify loss of capabilities (by SCC and MCC) and switching off and 
overriding those systems that are not functional both from the control room and motor 
room for EOP 10, and additionally in EOP 11, switching systems to manual override. 
Override to manual may also be required in EOP 10, depending on the severity of the loss 
of electrical power. The initial order by the SCOOW is the same for EOP 10 and 11, 
however the rest of the orders have not been seen previously. The Helmsman also has 
some of the same tasks, to disengage autopilot and come to safe depth. But in these two 
EOPs, the Helmsman must engage the back up compass as capability is, or might be lost. 
In DC Failure, propulsion is lost and this capability cannot be maintained in the control 
room and is managed in this EOP in the motor room. If hydroplanes are not available in 
EOP 11, the SCC runner moves forward or aft to centre the Foreplanes or Afterplanes 
manually. 
As seen in the diagrammatic HTA task detailing of the simplest EOP completed 
by the crew, Emergency at Sea (Figure 6), and further selected review of the 11 EOPs 
in which the submarine would be brought to Emergency Stations to deal with a 
specific emergency (see Appendix D for complete details), the tasks are very 
complex, integrative and involve interdependent actions by six-team members. As 
such, the similar tabular approach taken by both the RN and the Canadian Navy, 
although different in their presentation style, the format clearly identifies the goal, a 
detailed task description, resources, interactions and communications with team 
members, and the sequence in which the procedure is to be completed. 
5.1.2 Requirements for Undertaking the Tasks 
The HTA has identified that all 31 EOPs are different, some follow the same partial 
sequences for some positions, some of the tasks have minor and some have major task 
insertions, while some of the tasks in the EOPs are almost entirely unique. To carry out 
the tasks capably there is a requirement to learn the procedures individually and with 
intact teams to achieve competency. Also, as the tasks may be performed infrequently, 
under stressful conditions, but still require an expedient, controlled response, each EOP is 
performed in the same sequence each and every time. The capability to perform EOPs 
accurately must be maintained, and crewmembers must also remain current and their 
performance error-free, as errors could be catastrophic. Thus, the performance of the 
EOPs must be an automatic response and therefore are expected to be memorised. 
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The EOP document is not intended to provide cues during an incident. It is a 
referral document that is kept onboard to remind crewmembers of the procedures and 
sequence for each of the critical positions. Initiation of drills for EOPs occur regularly to 
ensure competency, and for post emergency support and review for accurate completion 
the EOP document is further reduced and simplified to the major task elements in a 
referral document (also called Scandex cards by submariners). 
The review of the tasks and the procedures required to complete the tasks indicate 
the procedures are very clear for task initiation; the event is identified by a crewmember 
and reiterated by the Officer-of-the-Watch (OOW) who confirms and identifies the 
requirement to proceed with the action. The communication of the events, actions to be 
completed and feedback of completion are also clear and concise, as is who is responsible 
to complete the procedures and in what sequence. 
The HTA identified that all personnel on a submarine must fully understand and be 
capable of performing all safety aspects within the submarine given that an emergency 
could occur at any time, anywhere, and therefore all crewmembers must have a 
comprehensive understanding of submarine operations, systems (air, hydraulics, 
mechanical, weapons, safety and escape and rescue), and functioning, and have the skill 
set to complete emergency procedures (for further details see Sullivan, 1998). As 
identified in Section 4.4.1, prior to initiating the Upholder class submarine training all 
personnel must as a pre-requisite have obtained their basic submarine certification, 
although this qualification was based upon Canada's former Oberon class submarine. 
Upon completion of the knowledge acquisition phase of training, the training platform 
(Figure 4) required all trainees to successfully achieve the Upholder submarine 
qualification through a process of self and directed-learning, walk-through of the 
submarine, and a verbal exam to confirm knowledge and skill (Section 4.4.2. ). 
The training platform provided individuals with systems knowledge based upon their 
occupations, but specific EOPs and the interaction of systems were not taught in the 
knowledge acquisition phase. Trainees reiterated this sentiment. In crew one the 
impression was, "Systems were taught separately but not brought together. " While in 
crew two they identified in a separate interview, "Knowledge of systems we've 
learned throughout the curriculum, EOPs we've had to learn on our own"; and, in 
crew three the technicians reported, "The knowledge we learned from the training 
but the skill we learned a lot from the O-boat (Oberon class submarine). " Training 
provided occupational knowledge, but there was an impact to those designated to 
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perform EOPs. Interviews revealed, " Initially, when learning EOPs (We) needed to 
refer to TABs (technical specification documentation) to find out the details of 
procedures (e. g., putting on a snort). " This was further amplified by the technical 
operators in crew two who indicated, "In learning the EOPs, had to look at the SOP 
(Standard Operating Procedures) and had to know the SOP. " 
For those individuals who were designated to perform the functions of 
SCOOW, SCC 1 and 2, MCC 1 and 2 and the Helmsman, individual and team 
practice and testing of capabilities occurred during simulation training and during 
sea-trials (Figure 4). As clarified by the technical staff who were responsible for 
operating the console, "having less than 1-year active service (in submarines), and 
having never seen the control room (which now I have the responsibility of as first 
panel), the (knowledge) training (3 %2 wks) in Collingwood helped, but it was the 
training at sea that provided the operational experience. " Formally, the EOPs were 
not distributed until just prior to simulator training, although informally, the crew one 
distributed the EOPs to those in earlier phases of training and discussed the 
knowledge gained extensively. The interview with crew two revealed, "Teaching and 
guiding crew three will happen informally, it happened with crew one we drilled them 
for hours. " 
5.2 Challenges and Limitations 
Performing the HTA also identified the operator resources, constraints and 
preferences to establish how these combined factors influenced the trainees in their 
success to learn and to transfer what was learned. Specifically, beyond the detailing 
of the task requirements for EOPs, the work environment (Upholder submarine) was 
examined, which included the operating requirements, limitations of the technology, 
the structure of the interface, physical factors, over and above the review of 
supporting documents such as the emergency operating procedures (Stammers & 
Shepherd, 1998). The interviews with trainers, management and all individuals who 
performed EOPs supplemented the physical examination to gain a full and accurate 
picture of the environment and events, but also, the interviews provided an 
understanding of the perceived and actual difficulties with training and the 
preconceived notions and experiences that the trainees brought to the training 
platform. Thus, a detailed HTA provides support for the research as the review 
identifies the task, system, tools and personnel requirements and limitations within 
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the workplace. Therefore, the information aids in determining the training 
requirements and methods needed to provide the necessary skills and system 
knowledge to effectively operate the system under the range of anticipated (or 
perhaps unanticipated) conditions (B. Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1993). 
The overall impression of the conversion training from technical trainees 
who perform the EOPs is that, "You can operate the console without knowing 
behind why" but "Technical aspects we've fallen short, we have operators only 
not maintainers. " The officers concurred with the statements from the 
technicians, with crew one indicating "With 20 plus years experience on 
submarines (for all senior technicians), there are small things you don't know, but 
the gun drills (performing EOPs) you do, (based on) experience. " "(They) can 
operate the submarine, but problem solving is another story. " 
These reiterations from trainees reflect the type of training provided, even 
though there was dissatisfaction and a perception of concern with the depth of 
training. The training was intended and provided conversion training, expecting 
and requiring submariners to have the basic safety qualifications, to which the 
training programme provided the knowledge and skill "to safely sail surfaced or 
submerged back to Canada" from an operating view as well as the capability to 
perform emergency operating procedures studied for this thesis. The training was 
not intended to provide training to a level that maintenance or problem solving 
could occur proficiently, that level of training could not be provided in the 
timeframe of nine months allocated for each successive submarine. 
As indicated in crew ones' post-training lessons learned meeting, "From a 
training design perspective, not all Planned Maintenance (PM) or Corrective 
Maintenance (CM) procedures are taught in the classroom. What actually takes 
place is the teaching of overall system knowledge, followed by the practical 
execution of a broad spectrum of PM and CM tasks. Training design assumes 
that given system knowledge and the appropriate technical background, 
maintainers will be capable of performing all PM and CM tasks in the workplace. 
As a result, from a training design perspective, the fact that certain PM tasks 
related to Latent Failure Checks are not being taught should not be considered a 
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shortcoming of the training. " (Detachment, 2001) Further maintenance and 
problem-solving training was expected to be done with the crews once they 
returned to Canada. 
5.2.1 System Design 
In relation to system design, the intention of performing an HTA was to 
support the completion of tasks, ensure there are sufficient personnel to perform 
the tasks, but as well, to identify if the system design could increase the likelihood 
of errors and what solutions might be available to reduce errors. In stressful 
situations, inadequate design features such as awkward movements in 
performance of the tasks, poor visual identifiers, lack of labelling, and scattered or 
non-grouped actions within a panel can increase the risk for operator error. 
The panels in both the control room and the two panels in the motor room 
(motors, electrical, battery, pumps on one and propulsion system on the other 
panel) identify problems centrally within the submarine and manage the systems 
and functions in most all of the submarine semi-automatically, unless there is a 
power failure and then the responsibilities must be turned to a manual operation. 
Both panels are therefore complex and full of dials, meters, gauges, switches and 
buttons. 
Although both panels are very complex they both contain well-marked 
demarcations to divide systems, with well-marked lines that indicate the flow of 
systems and joining of systems. It is realised that major redesign of system panels 
is not within the realm of possibility, but small changes could be made to ease 
performance and reduce the risk of errors. 
In review of the EOP task sequences with the operators of the panel it was 
noted that all emergency shut down switches were covered with Plexiglas to 
prevent accidental depression. Although this protection will prevent accidental 
errors, the operators indicated that during a blackout or night conditions under red 
lighting the switches were difficult to find. If the switches were backlit making 
the LEDs red they would be easier to find during night operations. 
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Panel operators also found that the motor room panel notations were 
inconsistent with the EOPs, in that the EOP directions did not reflect the notations 
on the panel. Specifically, the directions in the EOPs to control the batteries 
indicated the MCC operator must `OPEN and Tag open', however, the selector 
switch on the panel required the motion of moving the switch from the marking of 
`close' to the position of 'off. Another mismatch between EOPs and the motor 
room panel is that the EOP direction to manage the DC power provides the 
directions to "Affected DC contactor to STOP", however, the panel selector 
switch again requires the motion of moving the switch from `close' to 'off'. In 
discussion with the operators it was determined that what appeared an error was 
in fact a mismatch in terminology; the console used lay terminology while the 
EOPs used electrical terminology. 
Although the MCC position is now filled by electricians and marine 
engineers, common, consistent terminology needs to be used, in EOPs, SOPs, 
training, and panel indicators as confusion arises and there can be difficulties in 
learning, memorising and performing the tasks. As the panel cannot be changed 
easily, it is suggested that the changes should occur within the EOP document, 
directions or teachings so that passage of information reflects the console panel 
and the working platform. This mismatch between the working environment and 
the training platform content and training aids would suggest that these factors 
could pose a problem with learning and subsequent transfer. Case study findings 
of the specific training effectiveness factors and links will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
As identified earlier in this chapter no two EOPs are exactly the same or 
require the same actions, thus the manoeuvres on the panel are never exactly the 
same routine. Thus, although the panels are complicated, a sequence or pattern 
display change would not make the motions any easier. Only adequate training 
and consistent practice to achieve a comfort and in-depth knowledge of the 
position of each system component and the location of all dials, switches, gauges 
and valves would solve this problem. Small changes that could ease the 
performance and provide clear indication to the operator would be to explicitly 
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identify set points on gauges. There were several console gauges on the control 
room panel which indicate the critical state of various system pressures, flow or 
position as in the state of the mast; providing clear markings of the critical set- 
point would further assure performance and reduce the risk of human-error 
because of oversight or misread. Also, beyond the panels, all manual operating 
portions of the submarine that are critical to the safety of the men and the 
submarine should provide clear labels to indicate sufficient information to 
perform the task at hand correctly (for example, providing the direction of 
movement required to open and shut a valve). 
5.2.2 Documentation 
In review of the EOPs with the operators it was identified that some of the 
operating procedures used during training did not directly reflect the task; 
contained errors; provided taskings in which there were insufficient personnel; 
identified taskings that were not reflective of an emergency action; or, the 
sequence of the taskings could be changed to make the tasking more efficient and 
timely. 
As identified in Section 5.2.1 the EOPs did not always reflect the labelling in 
the panels, as that seen in the motor room for the battery and DC switches. Common 
terminology must be used that is reflective of operations and the panels. The EOP for 
grounding contains errors such that the procedure does not make sense to the 
operator. The directions for the SCC indicates `STOP generating/ventilating', but 
generating indicates that the submarine is surfaced and the engine is running and 
ventilating also indicates surfaced or dived at periscope depth, as the engines do not 
operate when dived. Thus, the term generating is incorrect and should be removed 
from the procedure. In review this is likely a typographical error, but changes should 
be made to ensure no misinterpretation and thus potential affects to learning and 
subsequent performance. 
In the EOP for hydraulic burst there were several observations from 
individuals who performed the taskings. It was noted by the SCC operators that 
the sequence of the taskings was not efficient, and the current sequence made it 
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difficult to learn, memorise and perform, especially in an emergency, as the 
sequence was made up of a decision tree, `with if this result perform this action, if 
that result perform this alternate action'. This class of submarine is different from 
the CF's earlier Oberon class submarine in that this system has three hydraulic 
plants rather than the one, so the sequence of performance is not as that performed 
previously nor is it as simple as that done previously. The EOP for hydraulic burst 
used for training indicated observations were required prior to action to identify 
where the burst has occurred, and then one of two sequences would be followed 
(see Appendix D for specific details). The operators suggested that rather than 
waiting until confirmation of which system is known to be down, the EOP should 
be adjusted so that the action required would be to shut all hydraulics (e. g., the 
Fire Isolation Valves (FIV)) as a precaution, as they can be brought back up. 
They indicated that this method would be much easier to remember as one 
sequence would be applied rather than trying to remember the ifs and/or statement 
currently identified (e. g., if not in the AMS.. in system.. shut FIV, if in 
AMS... then plant... leave open). 
It was further identified that the EOP 7.3, Emergency Repressurization of 
Hydraulic System, should not be present in the EOPs as this task is not performed 
in an emergency, the task is performed after the emergency by the Damage 
Control Headquarters (DCHQ) team, therefore is not within the principles of an 
EOP to "make boat and men safe". 
In procedures such as in a hydraulic burst when manual operation might be 
required, the currently proposed two sole crewmembers allocated in the motor 
room to perform the functions are not sufficient to complete all of the tasks 
required. For instance, in EOP 28.1: Fire in the Main Propulsion Switchboard, the 
task in the RN EOPs identified that the MCC2 Will fight the fire until relieved by 
the attack party. This insufficiency of personnel was not dealt with in training. 
The potential problem is that panel operation must still occur, and if manual 
operation is required insufficient personnel are present to also fight the fire. The 
HTA suggests, and individuals have concurred, that there is ä requirement during 
these types of emergencies to have three personnel stationed back-aft of 56 
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bulkhead. The potential problem without three personnel will be that the access to 
the after ends part of the submarine is not readily available as the hatch to this part 
of the submarine will be shut, as a common practice to protect the submarine 
during an emergency. Therefore, proactive planning is necessary to designate an 
individual to aid in these potential emergency functions. 
The overall observation by the trainees as identified earlier in the chapter 
was their displeasure with the current RN format of the EOP document. There 
was no indication of lines of communication or how, link between each of the 
team members activities, no indications in the current EOPs that activities of team 
members must precede another's action for success of the task, nor are the EOPs 
considered sufficient enough in their detail. Crewmembers clarified, "There is no 
clear direction as to who is responsible, CANSSOs defined who, when and 
sequence. " " (EOPs) not written as a task, want chronological with orders". "We 
have had in the past more details in EOPs and structure. " 
This difficulty was further discussed in the interviews in terms of learning 
the EOP procedures. Even after changes were made to the curriculum and EOP 
procedures document, those who were in the second wave of training commented 
that, "From a learning process it would have been much easier to have everything 
in a list, but after in ops you don't have time. " "The EOPs are written (and) 
assumed you have the knowledge of why it is written. " "There should be a 
training EOP book. " However, the technicians commented that "Training in 0- 
boats (you) know what stop snorting means, the operation of the submarine is 
different (for the Upholder submarine) but the process is more or less the same, 
and everyone has their dolphins. " But when asked for further details in regards to 
the benefit of the document for training, the technicians responded that, "Another 
book would be beneficial, but don't see the need for ops (operations). A book to 
explain why for the inexperienced would have made the learning much easier as 
they want to learn why. " "In learning the EOP had to look at the SOP and had to 
know the SOP. " 
Review of the additional supporting technical and procedural documentation 
used for training identified, and was confirmed in interviews, that the SOPs, 
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technical documents, even after the third crew commenced training were still in 
the update and re-writing process. Individuals from crew three also revealed, 
"There were less discrepancies and inconsistencies with us than with the earlier 
submarines, but still some. " "When we went through they were only through 50% 
of rewriting (basic 255 course) ref material, especially the electrical documents. " 
These quotes suggest there was a perception and expectation in EOP 
documentation to provide two different capabilities, reading to learn and reading 
to do (Duffy & Curran, 1983). There was also an underlying perception that 
previous experience was and will continue to provide the background needed to 
perform the duties onboard the submarine. However during training, some 
individuals found their experience was not sufficient enough and training did not 
supply sufficient details for all to satisfactorily learn and complete emergency 
procedures. The EOP document was therefore considered insufficient in detail 
and thus, as a formal training aid also considered insufficient. Further results of 
perception and expectation are presented in Chapter 6 as they relate to training 
content, support from formal training aids (e. g., EOP documentation, technical 
documents) and the perceived accuracy of the training platform and supporting 
tools and aids to reflect the intended working platform. 
The HTA detailing of the 31 EOP tasks (representations seen in Appendix 
D) further provided detailing of the tasks than that provided in training by the RN, 
as seen in Figure 5, and was reviewed and edited to ensure correctness of 
terminology and completeness of the sequences. The HTA results were passed on 
to the Canadian crews, at their request, to assist them in future learning of EOPs 
and have been used to aid in the preparation of the Canadian EOP document. 
5.2.3 Training 
5.2.3.1 Training Staff 
The historical review of the Upholder submarine purchase and the 
subsequent training programme development identified many challenges and 
limitations to successfully train the Canadian crews. A definite hurdle was the 
preparation and challenges that needed to be overcome by training staff before 
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and during training (Chapter 4.4.3). The RN had decommissioned the Upholder 
class six years prior to initiating training for the Canadians, thus documents, 
lectures, and the RN trainers needed to be refreshed, updated and upgraded to 
meet the training needs, but also to meet the increased requirements of today's 
standards of teaching. 
The UTT team took it upon themselves to complete all that was required, 
but the training team did acknowledge their shortcomings and difficulties in 
trying to regain their lost knowledge and skill to achieve a personal aim as the 
contract did not dictate what level of expertise was required by the trainers. The 
trainers identified in their interview, "The entire RN team is not well rounded, 
have not sailed for a long time, and the selected team does not have a pool 
(collectively) of all the knowledge (needed). " This lack of initial capability of the 
trainers appeared to be a significant hurdle that could significantly affect the 
quality of initial and ongoing training, and therefore could influence the teaching 
of the knowledge and skill needed. The Canadian crews acknowledged the lack of 
knowledge and skill, but the perception in interviews was that the RN trainers' 
depth of knowledge and skill progressed over time; "UTT definitely had holes in 
their knowledge and skill initially, but they made sure they needed what they 
needed to know. " The first trained crew further clarified, "Without a doubt, it was 
a learning process for them as well. " "They learned a lot during fast cruising (sea- 
trial testing of personnel and submarine capabilities), it was a double-edged 
sword, sea-training by committee. " Technicians from crew one revealed, 
"Instructors didn't know everything about the submarine, they admitted when 
they didn't, would search out the answer and then come back to you. " This would 
suggest that the training platform did not formally supply what was perceived to 
be needed for emergency management, but the information was sought out and 
provided by the trainers, when requested. This would suggest a definite informal 
component to the training platform. Discussion of the impact of informal training 
aids and the possible link with instructor capabilities and training content to 
influence learning are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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5.2.3.2 Training Platform 
The training for emergency operation was also seen to be deficient in that 
training was provided at one level and operational duties and responsibilities 
within the submarine are divided and increase with increased rank (management 
and technician). The first trained Canadian crew, in their interview expressed this 
concern, "(We) need to have level of knowledge and skill for rank/responsibility, 
we are all taught to the same level. " This deficiency was formally presented at the 
post-training lessons learned meeting, "Most operator courses were focused on 
equipment functionality rather than the operational employment of the 
equipment. " The training management cell, noted that this point was raised at the 
end of crew one classroom training (crew one) and changes were implemented to 
improve the situation from Wave 2 onwards (crew two-four) (Detachment, 2001). 
Even though changes were brought to the training platform to change 
training to include a more operationally focused platform, the Canadian crews still 
informally obtained knowledge outside of the training platform. Both the second 
and third trained crew expressed this view, "Don't need to know everything to do 
EOPs, they give us the basics, although, we're not all that comfortable yet with all 
the information needed. System knowledge had to gain from elsewhere, but 
experience, training and documents help carry us over. " "We have a number of 
resources to draw from, that is informal" (crew two, senior technicians). "(We) 
didn't get all we need from the training (formally), there's Standard Operating 
Procedure (SOP) or EOP training, it's fine for a certain level but NOT for all" 
(crew three). 
Further issues in training as they applied to the performance of emergency 
procedures were: the lack of systems knowledge and the integration of systems; 
the EOPs documented sequences were not as suggested in training (e. g., EOP 4.1- 
Flooding Dived); there were no standards for testing or assurance of capability; 
and, sufficient skill training for dealing with multi-emergencies. 
Trainees found that there were discrepancies between the EOP document 
and that trained, as that seen in EOP 4.1 Flooding dived, where the document had 
errors in the procedure (see Section 5.2.2). This discrepancy was frustrating for 
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the trainees but it was also considered to make the learning process more difficult. 
This sentiment was presented even in crew three training, "I was under the 
impression that everything had to be done as it was written. " "The way they're 
written is not how they are done, the individual training was not as they are 
written and the pattern in Collingwood (skill training) was much easier. " 
Hierarchical Task Analysis interviews with the trainees also indicated that 
the emergency procedures sequences taught in training for the common tasks seen 
in Emergency at Sea were neither efficient nor timely, and thus the performance 
of the sequence as trained could increase the likelihood of errors. Technicians 
suggested that the sequences (1-4) performed on the motor room panel for the 
MCCI to stop the engines and compressors would improve if the shutting down 
of port and starboard engines and compressors was done simultaneously (port 
with left hand, starboard with right hand), or if the sequence of the task was 
changed such that a complete system was shut down before proceeding to the next 
(see Appendix D for details). That is, that the port engine is shut down then the 
starboard, rather than performing each sequence for port and starboard (Stop port 
and starboard engines, shut controllers, shut hull valve, agitation for each, etc). 
Hierarchical Tasks Analysis identified that knowledge training was specific 
for the systems that each occupation was responsible for but no formal knowledge 
was provided to gain an understanding of how the systems were connected and 
the potential multi- or cascade consequences that could occur in an emergency. 
There was no formal knowledge training for the sequencing or systems involved 
in EOPs during phase-one training. Hands-on skill training occurred during 
simulator training and again during attainment of USQ. Also, the training 
platform provided individual and team training in the simulators, but time 
constraints specified within the contract did not allow all permutations of each 
emergency to be practised in simulator training. The limitations of the training 
contract and the very restrictive timelines to complete the training did not allow 
much room to expand the training platform. In the post lessons learned meeting 
with crew one, training management identified they had completed a cursory 
survey with both crew one and two to determine if they felt confident to do their 
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jobs safely at sea, to which crews replied in the affirmative. They further noted 
that a balance between the knowledge and skill training was needed, and those 
personnel who had achieved operational certification were already subjected to 
one of the longest training profiles of any crewmember (Detachment, 2001), but 
they would continue to track the capability of ongoing crews training and 
satisfaction. This would again suggest a heavy reliance on past capability and 
achievement of submarine certification prior to attending the training. This would 
also again suggest a heavy reliance on informal training aids to support the 
gaining of knowledge and skill to perform the required duties. 
The final issue with the training platform that was identified in the HTA was 
that of testing to assure capability, both in knowledge and in skill. This question 
was posed in the interview to the trainers, management and to the trainees of 
crews one through three, in regard to assurance of trainers' capability and that of 
the trainees. 
The interviews revealed each group's perceived capability or comfort with 
what had been achieved to date. The interview with the UTT training team 
revealed their own misgivings with testing of their own capabilities, "There are 
definite gaps in assessment, no confirmation or assurance that all is known (by the 
instructors). " This statement reflects the fact that there were no standards to 
identify the knowledge or skill levels which the trainers must attain, they trained 
themselves, and tested themselves against the USQ that was written by the 
training team (see Chapter 4 for more details). The perception of the trainees was 
that they did not know if the trainers were tested to a standard to assure capability, 
but they did assume that even if there were no standards that the training team 
would do their utmost, "It's hard to say we don't know if the trainers have the 
knowledge or skill, that's all we have, they are the only ones who know. " "I 
believe UTT truly care and want to make sure you know. " 
In regard to the trainees' perception that measures were in place in the 
training platform to test and confirm the skill and knowledge of the crew, the 
overall consensus was that the testing in the first phase of the training tested 
knowledge. The second phase, including the individual and team simulator 
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training tested both knowledge and skill, and the final confirmation of team 
(crew) capability was tested during sea-trials. However, testing of skill was based 
upon achievement of a successful endpoint for that tested, and as testing was not 
done with a checklist to assure successful performance of sequences, confirmation 
of ability can be considered somewhat subjective. 
Management concurred with the sentiments, " Certainly the trainees were 
tested in the motor room and control room trainer, spot walk-through, and USQ 
are a confirmation of knowledge. " "I don't think it is a confirmation of skill. " 
"Testing I think it is a combination of both end-point or series testing, is certainly 
subjective as the RN CO makes the final decision of capability on board (during 
sea-trials). " The trainees' overall view was that, "The trainers confirm you know 
your job (endpoint only), and spot checks by UTT, confirms I know what I'm 
doing. " "Sea-trials tested our general ability, safety wise. " This again confirms the 
aim of the training, to assure a safe transport surface and sub-surface. Training 
was not intended to supply maintenance capability or problem solving. 
The issue was, in fact, not the testing, but confirmation that individual 
crewmembers had attained the desired knowledge and skill. Trainees did not 
receive formal debriefs of performance or an outline of strengths or weaknesses 
after evaluations. The trainees identified, "Have not seen any of my reports after 
simulator training and the evolutions performed, and it would definitely be 
worthwhile to see as it is a performance objective" "I don't know how well I'm 
doing, or how much I need to grow. " "There is nothing official, nothing formal to 
say strengths or weaknesses. " With no feedback of strengths and weaknesses 
trainees had to presume their own and their crewmembers capabilities. This 
shortcoming in the training programme would suggest that the training methods 
employed could influence learning and thus subsequent transfer. Further 
discussion of the impact of training methods to test and confirm capability and the 
potential links with other training factors is included in Chapter 6. 
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5.2.3.3 Repercussion from Training Delays 
The skill set training for emergency operating procedures was provided 
individually and in a team setting in the control room and motor room simulators, 
and final training and assessment of a complete crews' capability was completed 
during sea-trials. Simulator training initially provided individual and team training 
in a five-day period for the first trained crew. During this initial "continuation" 
training team-crew selection occurred randomly based on availability of trainees 
and did not necessarily represent those who would be performing the duties let 
alone those who would perform the operational duties as intact teams. 
The post training lessons learned meeting with the first crew upon their 
return to Canada identified, "That training was designed as conversion training for 
an existing submariner with the intention that training would be completed and 
then immediately followed by sea-trials. Due to programme delays, this did not 
happen. In some cases end of training occurred more than one year prior to the 
commencement of sea-trials. Accordingly, it was noted that some skills were lost 
or suffered from skill fade over time, therefore it was felt that more training time 
was required closer to sea-trials. " (Detachment, 2001) This expression of 
dissatisfaction was based upon crew ones' own training that took more than 18 
months to complete. As it had been over a year between training and sea-trials, 
simulator training and testing had to be performed again to meet the 16-week 
window criterion for continuation team training. As a result of this meeting, in 
which advice was sought from this research, individual and team continuation 
training was extended to a two-week period for all follow on crew training. 
The need for further hands-on training was identified but as well, the post 
training lessons learned meeting with crew one also formally identified the 
emphasis of crew selection for individual and team training. It was noted in that 
meeting that, "That particular emphasis should be placed on the selection of 
crewmembers for continuation training (simulator training), to ensure that the 
Helmsmen who needs the most time get the best opportunity" (Detachment, 
2001). Further details of the perception of the benefit of composition for learning 
and performance are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.2.3.4 Individual Background Influences 
Review of the demographic data, as seen in Figure 7, has shown that the RN 
and CF training team, senior managers (RN Captain, crew one Commanding 
Officer (CO) and crew two CO) have been submarine qualified for the longest 
(RN training team Cl, 22.5 + 6.0 yr., CF training managers CI, 21 + 8.5 yr., senior 
managers Cl, 14.3 + 3.8 yr. ) and have the most experience (RN training team Cl, 
21.5 + 5.1 yr., CF training managers Cl, 10.1+ 7.6 yr., senior managers Cl, 9.2 + 
3.3 yr. ). However, it was the SCOOW, the person in charge of the control room 
during emergency procedures, that has the least time qualified across submarines 
(Cl, 7.93 + 2.18 yr., Table 1), but overall also has the least experience across the 
three submarines (Cl, 5.64 + 1.77 yr., Table 2), and it can be seen that this 
inexperience is more pronounced for crew two (CI, 3.25 + 2.66 yr., Table 2) and 
is also present in crew 3 (Cl, 5.58 + 1.5 yr., Table 2). While the senior non- 
commissioned members First Panels (combined control room and motor room 
SCC 1 and MCC I panel operators) have a wide distribution of the number of years 
qualified (Cl, crew 1,11.5 + 7.69 yr., crew 2, Cl, 13.63 + 10.01 yr., and, crew 3, 
Cl, 9.2 + 8.84 yr., Table 1) and years of experience (crew 1, Cl, 9.43 + 7.02 yr., 
crew 2, CI, 11.75 + 11.24 yr., and, crew 3, Cl, 7.63 + 7.4 yr., Table 2) within 
crews 
Table 1.95% Confidence Intervals for the Number of Years Qualified as a 
Submariner for Trainees Prior to Initiating Training (Crew one, two and three represents 
the crew who would perform EOPs for each of the three submarines under going training. Years 
qualified is presented as Confidence Intervals). 
Position Crew one Crew two Crew three Total 
SCOOW 10.0+4.66 4.66 7.13+6.54 7.08+1.0 7.93+2.18 
1S` Panel 11.5+7.69 7.69 13.63+ 10.1 9.2+8.84 8.84 11.27+4.85 
2° Panel 10.88+4.66 9.3+6.62 10.21 +3.96 
Total 10.79+3.26 10.09+4.56 8.05+3.85 
This was especially apparent in crew three in which three of the five 
operators had been qualified as a submariner for two years, with experience that 
ranged from two years to two weeks. There was a great variance between the 
senior First Panel operators, in that at least two First Panel operators from each 
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crew had greater than 10 years as a qualified submariner with equal operational 
experience, but also each submarine had at least one member designated for First 
Panel with less than three years of qualification. 
Table 2.95% Confidence Intervals for the Number of Years of Operational 
Experience by Trainees by Position and by Crew for each Submarine. (Crew one, 
two and three represents the crew who would perform EOPs for each of the three submarines 
under going training. Years of experience are presented as Confidence Intervals). 
Position Crew one Crew two Crew three Total 
SCOOW 8.13+4.64 3.25+2.66 5.58+ 
_ 
1.5 1.77 5.64+1.77 
1S` Panel 9.43+7.02 11.75+_ 11.24 7.63+7.4 9.6+4.63 
2" Panel 8.88+4.64 7.33+4.23 8.21 +2.56 
Total 8.81+2.77 7.45+4.54 6.4 + 3.01 
It could be said that the lack of experience may have an affect on learning 
and subsequent performance. The trainees commented that, "There is a lot of 
concern in regards to knowledge, especially in senior (engineering) positions, 
because 0-boats served 15-20 years and gained a lot of expertise and knew the 
equipment inside and out. Here, the training process that lasts 5 weeks (for 
engineering knowledge acquisition) we're expected to have the same level (of 
knowledge and skill) which is impossible. " " There is a lot of apprehension 
because we haven't grown up with the material. " This would suggest a lack of 
confidence in their capabilities and perceived difficulties in achieving what was 
expected from training individually. From a performance perspective the 
demographic data indicate there was for the most part a balance between 
qualification and experience within each crew (Table land 2). 
What is also notable from the demographic data that could affect learning is 
the lapse in operational experience (Figure 7). The trainees were expected to have 
their basic submarine qualification prior to entering training, but the currency of 
that qualification and time since they last served operationally on a submarine 
were not considered in the training platform. Thus, a potential degradation and 
loss of skill and knowledge was apparent in the RN Captain (7 years) who was the 
final assessor of skill and knowledge prior to hand-over, the CF managers (Cl, 9± 
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4.2 yr. ) who implement and suggest changes to the training programme, and the 
Commanding Officers of the submarines (Cl, 5+1 yr. ) who have final authority 
and control of operations on their submarines. 
Figure 7. Demographic Details of the Trainers, Trainees and Management for the 
Upholder Submarine Training Programme. (Management designated as RN Captain and 
Commanding Officers (CO) of each submarine, and crews indicated by position: OW= Ship 
Control Officer of the Watch (SCOOW), and ls` Panel and 2"d Panel = merging of Ship and 
Machine Control Console Operator (SCC and MCC) senior and junior positions, provided as mean 
years of crew with standard deviation of crew positions). 
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This lack of recent operational experience in senior military personnel 
would not however be considered unusual in the military, as members progress in 
rank in the military they move to managerial responsibilities. Progression in rank 
and delegation of responsibilities is based upon occupational and leadership 
capabilities, thus there is a reliance on the hierarchy of junior members, of varied 
occupations, to successfully perform their assigned duties during operations. 
Senior members involved in this training platform did, however, make final 
assessments of the crews' capabilities, monitored training and made the ultimate 
decisions to change the training platform. This lapse in operational experience 
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Ethnographic Details 
could therefore have potentially influenced the training platform and outcomes 
from training. Results of the perceived influences of the demographic history of 
trainers, trainees and management on learning and training outcomes, and the 
expectations of training that were developed from the demographic history are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
However, lapse in operational experience was not considered or dealt with 
in the training programme for many reasons. The basic submarine qualification 
(Oberon class) was considered a sufficient prerequisite of the submarine systems 
and emergency management knowledge and skills. Canada no longer had a 
platform to check capabilities because the previous submarine fleet (Oberon class) 
had been decommissioned. The contracted training timeframe. could not be 
extended for supplementary training, and for Canada to operate, train and manage 
the four new Upholder submarines all previously Oberon-class trained 
submariners were required. 
Even so, it can be seen that the lapse in operational service prior to training 
was not as extensive for the crews who would perform the emergency procedures, 
as seen in Table 3. For all positions within each submarine and across positions 
the lapse in performing operational duties was fairly consistent, varying by 
months rather than years. This lapse can be almost entirely attributed to the time 
spent in training, especially for the first submarine crew whose training took for 
most crewmembers 18-months to complete (Figure 4). Thus, it would appear that 
the SCOOW from the first crew had the greatest length of time since actively 
performing duties on a submarine (2.25 + 0.49 yr., Table 3). However, excluding 
training this lapse would have actually only have been of several months duration 
prior to initiating training. For the latter crews, who had been in training for 10 
months and seven months for crew two and 3 respectively (Figure 4), there had 
been at least a year lapse for most crew since they had actively performed their 
duties. The officers from crew 2 had the least lapse in time for the officers in 
training and the least operational experience, while in crew three the officers had 
the greatest lapse since performing their duties when compared to their 
crewmates, but did have more experience than the second SCOOW crew. 
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Table 3.95% Confidence Intervals for the Years Lapse in Operational 
Experience for Trainees by position and by crew for each submarine (years). (Crew 
one, two and three represents the crew who would perform EOPs for each of the three submarines 
under going training. Lapse in experience is presented as Confidence Intervals). 
Position Crew one Crew two Crew three Total 
SCOOW 2.25+0.49 1.0+0.85 1.50+, 1.22 1.88+0.52 
1" Panel 1.58+0.42 2.0+0.4 0.98+0.04 1.48+0.29 
2" Panel 1.5+0.49 2.0+0 ND 1.71+0.36 
Total 1.78 + 0.33 2.0 + 0.44 0.91 ± 0.55 
Review of the demographic details from the trainees reveals that from a 
performance perspective all three crews appear balanced in the combination of 
operationally experienced members with those that do not have many years as a 
qualified submariner, and lapse of operational service was less than three years 
for any crewmember on training. However, although opportunities are available to 
gain knowledge and skill from others during simulator team training and during 
sea-trials, there is an individual-based learning requirement as each member must 
be able to perform his respective duties. The method of training, delays and 
complications within this training platform (see Sections 4.4.3, Training 
Complications, 5.2.2 Documentations, and 5.2.3.2, Training Platform for more 
details) would suggest inexperienced individuals would rely on the more 
experienced to support them in learning to achieve performance requirements. 
This reliance on other team members to achieve organisational goals would 
suggest an inherent vertical transfer process. The perceived effect of the delays in 
training and the support of individual learning in the training platform and 
influence to learning are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Over and above experience and time lapses in experience, it was agreed in 
the interviews from all involved in the training programme that the perceived 
percentage of new knowledge and skill required to perform the tasks in the 
Upholder submarine varied depending upon whether the crew position was that of 
an operator or a maintainer. 
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The difference in what needed to be learned between the two was 
considered significantly different, with the overall view that the percentage of 
new knowledge and skill for operators was 32.63 + 5.31%, while the new 
knowledge and skill required for the maintainers was considered 73.38 + 9.7%. 
Interviewees revealed that, "From an operator's point of view, quite a bit of what 
needs to be done are the basics and the same (as before), but automated now with 
different positions. Dolphins give you the groundwork (theory and the way 
systems work), but base knowledge is the same it's just changing the application. " 
"The only thing that remains constant is the commands, the operations (duties of 
the SCOOW), the hierarchy is the same but the technical ability has to change. " 
"For the maintainers, it's difficult receiving training they have never received or 
know of, they have to understand their equipment and everything around them 
(SCC and MCC positions). " 
With this information it could be concluded that for those individuals who 
would be maintainers in the submarine there would be a heavy reliance on the 
training platform content, presentation and training aid material to learn the new 
knowledge and skill required. It was unfortunate that no crewmembers were 
available from crew three-second panel for interviews. Thus, for consistency of 
comparisons for all material for the thesis no demographic data were taken for 
these positions. 
There were clear indications by all training stakeholders, especially the 
trainees, that the knowledge and skill needed to be gained to adequately perform 
duties on the submarine would require a sufficiently detailed training programme. 
Furthermore, the HTA identified that the characteristics that an individual brings 
to the training programme and the compensations derived from more experienced 
team members and crew are all-important factors to the success of the training 
programme and ultimate transfer of performance outcomes. Although the RN 
training team had a great deal of experience on submarines (Cl, 21.5 + 5.1yr. ) the 
RN training team also had a lapse in operational experience (Cl, 6.5 + 2.4 yr). 
Also, their experience with the Upholder class consisted of only a period of seven 
years (1987-1993) during the building, activation (1990-1993) and operational 
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usage (3 and 1.5 years with 2 of 4 submarines) of the four submarines (see 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 for more details). 
The trainers and management had differing opinions on the completeness of 
the past training package (Figure 8). The questionnaire indicated that the training 
team agreed to somewhat agreed to the completeness of past training, while the 
RN Captain responsible for the overall assessment indicated he strongly agreed to 
past training completeness. Although both are RN, the apparent difference in the 
opinion of training completeness could be that the RN Captain, although 
submarine trained, had never served on the Upholder class nor had he taken part 
in any portion of the training for that class of submarine. The trainers revealed 
that the training, at that time, consisted of little formal training, "There was an 
informal passage of knowledge, interaction and presence during the building of 
the boats and testing of systems to see parts of the boat, how it works. " "The USQ 
was used, as is now (although) during the building phase, then Operational 
Certification during sea-trials. " This information was known to the Canadian 
training managers, which may have contributed to their likely opinion of the 
completeness of training. 
The opinion of the completeness of the past Upholder submarine training by the 
trainers could also be due to the fact that they are the ones who had to prepare and 
complete the training package for the Canadians, thus they had a more accurate 
picture of the historical influences and the subsequent work involved for 
preparation. Upon completion of the preparation for training and having 
completed crew ones' complete training and crew two and three partial training, 
the trainers indicated that the lapse in operational service somewhat affected to 
not having affected recall at all, but there was almost complete agreement that the 
lapse somewhat influenced their ability to train. 
The RN Captain and the Canadian training managers revealed that the lapse 
did have some, albeit small, affect on the trainers' recall but disagreed that the 
lapse affected their ability to train. Both COs felt the lapse affected the RN 
trainers' ability to recall, the first CO more so than the second CO, probably 
because the first course was considered a pilot course and documents to support 
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training became available sporadically through training. Both also agreed that the 
lapse influenced the trainers' ability to train. Both COs had significant time 
qualified as submariners (15 years), although differences in operational 
experience (crew one CO, 12 years and crew two CO, six years), the first crew 
CO had a six year lapse in operational experience while the second only had 
three. Thus, their differences in response were not considered related to historical 
experience. This would suggest that although changes had been made to the 
training programme after crew one's completion of the pilot course, either the 
changes were not seen by crew two at their stage of training or further changes 
were still deemed to be necessary. 
Figure 8. Historical Influences of the Trainers and the Perceived Capability to 
Prepare and Train (Rating scale: 1= strongly agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 5= 
strongly disagree). 
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This was clarified in the interview with Canadian management by the 
comment that "Late crews had the benefit of courses developed specifically for U- 
boats (rather than heavy reliance from training from the Trafalgar class 
submarine), but once again these appear to never have been fully developed and 
validated. " The Upholder class submarine design was based upon the Trafalgar 
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class nuclear submarine, and many of the original courses provided to the RN on 
training and initially in this training platform were courses developed for the 
Trafalgar class. Thus, -the comments suggest lack of specificity of the courses to 
the Upholder class submarine, providing instead general submarine concepts. 
The Acting Commanding Officer (A/CO) for crew three had the opportunity 
to be interviewed only with the officers of crew three, and therefore questions 
regarding the capability of the training team were not discussed so that the crew 
would not question the capability of the trainers or the training platform, therefore 
potentially influence the training. 
Thus, although there was an agreement that lapse in operational service with 
the Upholder class affected recall of the trainers and training, all agreed on the 
trainers' capability to train the Canadian Navy. As discussed in detail in Chapter 
6, and has been to earlier, this belief is due in part to the historical training 
approach of submariners (both RN and CF) that included and expected both 
formal and informal approaches to learning during training. 
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6. Training Effectiveness Influences 
As identified earlier, the research for this thesis was performed while an 
organisation engaged in training and, as such, permission was granted on the 
condition that there would be no interference with the training. Interference was 
deemed interruption in the conduct of training, but as well, interruption was also 
considered as perceptions developed by trainees from this research that could 
influence training progress or outcomes. 
Therefore, training effectiveness factors to support the thesis objectives 
were limited to the identifiers that could be obtained retroactively for pre-training 
influences, as well as, identification of the perceptions, reactions, expectations 
and satisfaction of trainees, trainers and management of the training process as it 
related to the performance of safety-critical elements of operation (performing 
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)). Further, to ensure that trainees' 
perceptions of the training programme were not altered, questions related to the 
potential influences of the training programme history to this training platform 
were only provided to CF and RN management and trainers. 
6.1 Pre-training Influences 
As identified in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.2), individual responses were 
obtained for the pre-training factors for participants' characteristics (years of 
military service, education, years qualified as a submariner, years of operational 
experience, and years lapse in operational experience), and the RN historical 
training programme influences to the current training programme (including 
training content, principles, formal and informal training aids, and instructor 
ability) were obtained from management and trainers only (see Chapter 3 for 
further details). Individual responses to the perception of additional influence 
from organisational factors were not obtained to avoid potentially influencing 
training perception. However, general situational and perceptional influences of 
the organisational climate from both the CF and RN were identified during the 
investigation of the background history of the Upholder class submarine and 
subsequent CF submarine procurement and contract details for the training and 
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submarine reactivation requirements (see Chapter 4 for further details). Specific 
perceptions of organisational influences were also identified through the interview 
process with stakeholders in the training programme. 
6.1.1 Participant Characteristics 
As discussed in detail in Section 5.2.3.3 the demographic details of the 
trainees suggest there was a balance between submarine crews for the number of 
years qualified as a submariner (Table 1) and years of Oberon-class submarine 
operational experience (Table 2) that would support and ensure operational 
capability on the platform that utilises the experience. Although there was a 
balance between experienced and inexperienced crew within submarines, 
individual crew history has shown that crew one had the most overall experience, 
but at least one member designated for First Panel within each crew had less than 
three years of qualification as a submariner. The SCOOW of the crew three had 
two members with less than two years experience and within crew three, three of 
the five senior First Panel operators' experience ranged from two weeks to two 
years. Lapse in operational experience was not significant between crews or 
positions, but the senior managers and trainers, the key decision makers, did have 
a lapse of five years or more (Figure 7), and only the Commanding Officers. 
completed the training. As indicated in Section 5.2.3.3, experience and 
inexperience were not seen as significant deterrents to learning. Officers 
revealed, "The experience you gained on the O-boats was a massive foundation 
on which to build, and it made the learning process that much easier. You found 
that it is more of a positive influence as it is only the changes that have to be 
learned. " Inexperience was also not considered a deterrent to learning, 
"Inexperience was not thought of as a learning problem (knowledge) just 
practising of skills missing. " 
Further, there was a general agreement among trainees that the prerequisite 
submariner certification was of value, "Having dolphins and experience makes a 
difference, requirement of contract to have dolphins was in hindsight a true 
necessity. " These comments would suggest that overall the trainees had the 
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necessary certification pre-requisites for training and considered the pre-requisite 
certification a sufficient antecedent. Thus, one would conclude that there was a 
misconception of what the training platform would provide, which then 
transferred to an expectation that the training platform would provide the 
knowledge and skills needed for transfer. 
The phrase `young man's game' is commonly referred to in the submariner 
community and this phrase might suggest that age might be a factor that would 
influence learning. However, interviews revealed that age and level of scholastic 
education were not considered a deterrent to learning. Interviews also identified 
that age was considered a factor in performance capability. As one gets older one 
loses agility and may not fit as well into the small compartments to perform 
maintenance. But interestingly, the submariners believe with age the willingness 
to take risks decline, "Young men will take more risks in operations. The older 
you are you know you have more to lose, you're not invincible. " This view of 
risk-taking and the relationship to age may be related to influences outside of the 
work environment such as social influences and responsibilities to family and the 
community. As well, although this case study was not able to delineate or confirm 
the associations, the relationship between age and risk-taking may be related to 
life experiences gained with aging and recognising one's own limitations. 
Thus, rather than experience influencing learning, comments from the 
interviews have suggested that the perceived amount of knowledge and skill to be 
learned for this new class of vessel was dependent upon whether the crew position 
was that of an operator (32.63 + 5.31%) or a maintainer (73.28 + 9.7%). From a 
maintainer's viewpoint there was a perceived discomfort whether the training 
platform would provide the necessary knowledge and skills, "In some cases a 
little of the machine is the same, more automation, more intimidating 
(combination electrical/engineering trades) and some view as a positive most do 
not. Also, introduction of digital electronics, worries me, we have been instructed 
but the fault finding defects is going to be a hard-learned skill, that we haven't 
even looked at. " 
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The perceived differences in the amount to be learned between the operators 
and maintainers and the discomfort voiced by the maintainers would suggest that 
perceptions of dissatisfaction and greater expectations from training would not be 
to the same degree for operators as that for maintainers. The specific influences 
from training and the differences of perception and expectation between trainers, 
management, crews and positions are discussed in Section 6.2. 
6.1.2 Organisational Influences 
Although specific questions were not asked about the perception of the pre- 
training organisational influences from the CF and RN, information was gained 
from interviews and historical information. Therefore, although statistical 
comparisons cannot be made, those pre-training organisational contextual 
situational factors and perceptions of the organisation and their influence on 
training that are known are discussed to gain a better understanding of the multi- 
factorial and multi-dimensional influence on training effectiveness. 
6.1.2.1 CF Organisational Influences 
The CF conversion-training programme to the Upholder class submarine 
was considered mandatory for all submariners who would hold a position on the 
submarines, act as trainers in the future, and for those who would hold 
management positions responsible for the submarines. Although mandatory, 
accommodating and supporting the training was not an issue as the organisation 
was supportive of the training and recognised the need for training for all. Canada 
had decommissioned their previous class of submarine and recognised that RN 
personnel, although not current at the time of purchase of the submarines, were 
the only individuals who had a repository of information on the Upholder class 
submarine. The CF did have an input to the training programme, "The guidance 
given from Canada was based on a plan initiated in 1995 by Canadian 
representatives. The rationale was to bring back as much information to Canada 
as possible so that by the end of training in the UK we would be the repository for 
everything U-boat. " 
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The training objective of the organisation was to ensure that adequate 
training was received within the constraints of the contract to ensure safe passage 
of the crew and submarine back to Canada, both in a surfaced or submerged 
configuration. It was, however, realised from the outset of planning that the RN 
training of 344 basic submarine qualified personnel within the time constraints 
could not provide the detailed knowledge and skills for personnel to perform all 
operating and maintenance tasks. The interview with management who attended 
the planning meeting identified that, "In the first meeting (1995) with Canada the 
RN discussed courses for each position and RN courses and depth were 
recommended. Dilution (from all courses and content) was agreed. " The resulting 
package was then sent to the FOSM for approval to ensure the courses covered 
the required safety aspects. At that time it was also determined that pre-requisite 
qualifications were necessary for the course (dolphins). 
This philosophy continued throughout training, as training management 
sought the opinion of trainees from crew one and two to see if they felt confident 
to do their jobs at sea. Although the initial indications were positive the training 
management continued to monitor the progression of the courses and address the 
concerns identified by crew. 
However, trainees were not always aware of this proactive monitoring and 
the resulting changes implemented to the training programme to support the need 
to achieve the desired knowledge and skill. As the training programme was the 
responsibility of the RN, any changes made to the training content required the 
approval through the RN hierarchy (MoD) to assure safety was maintained. This 
took time, and resulted in the first and in some cases the second crew not seeing 
many of the resulting training programme changes. Trainees agreed they could 
provide critique on courses, although they were not aware whether all their 
concerns were investigated and if they needed to be addressed. However, with 
regard to documentation, changes were quick and apparent, although not formally 
processed and approved. "We were able to provide suggestions, had lots of 
opportunity (course critiques) for input/suggestions taken regarding 
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documentation. The final input to RN documentation required approval by MoD. 
Initial approval and temporary changes were made and done by UTT. " 
Enabling subordinates is a foundation principle of the military for 
, 
operational functionality. Leadership in the form of mentorship, guidance, 
discipline when needed, and reinforcement is provided throughout the military 
hierarchy, both formally and formally. This supervisor and peer support network 
was especially evident within the submarine community, perhaps derived from 
necessity because of the inherent risk and consequence of the working platform. 
As well, working in an enclosed and isolated environment with essentially no 
privacy and nowhere else to go, requires direct and effective communication skills 
to facilitate an efficient and productive workforce. Submariners further clarified, 
"Individuals in a crew are a close bunch and if someone is having a problem 
someone will pull you aside and let you know. It behooves the panel watch 
keeper, in one way or another, to let them (crewmembers) know there is a 
problem as they could be or are putting the submarine at risk. A submariner is 
more conscientious about their decisions and the consequence. " Management 
endorsed and amplified this leadership philosophy both within the work 
environment and during training. This endorsement was personified in their 
operational policies. "The checks are there, but if it (sic) is bypassed then the 
supervisor will pick it up or someone within the crew. Incompetence will be 
picked up, and then they will be given more training, more time at sea or more 
time in the trainer. If he can't do it at the end of the day, he's gone. " It could 
therefore be inferred from comments that the policies and procedures within the 
submarine workforce provided a supportive climate both in pre-training and 
during training. The comments would also suggest there was a reliance on the 
organisational leadership climate (management and crew), both prior to and 
during training, to identify and deal with crew capabilities and individual 
shortcomings that may or may not be identified or dealt within the training 
programme. 
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6.1.2.2 RN Organisational Influences 
Leadership and enabling subordinates was not unique to the CF; it is a 
foundation for the successful function and operation of any military organisation. 
The RN submariners were not any different in that regard, and the sentiments and 
philosophy of leadership between submarine crewmembers and forthright 
communication of capabilities appeared to be the same. The training and 
performance philosophy within the RN submarine community was also 
essentially the same as that of the Canadian Navy. As a norm the submarine 
organisational hierarchy monitors performance and capabilities internally (on a 
micro-level); individuals and teams are expected to identify performance 
capability shortfalls. As identified in the interview with the RN trainers, the RN 
submariner historical training philosophy was such that individuals were expected 
to identify further training or refresher needs, "I'm not happy with the time span 
between courses, and want a refresher. " It is not known if this training philosophy 
continues with the RN submariners, but the historical organisational climate 
whereby the onus of identifying perceived performance shortfalls was in part the 
responsibility of the individual could have impacted the degree of knowledge and 
skill obtained by trainers, affected the forthcoming attitude of the trainers to train 
the Canadian Navy, and, as a result, could have had an impact on the resulting 
training to the CF. The perception of the effect of the pre-training influences is 
discussed in Section 6.1.3., Historical Training Influences. It should be noted that 
on a macro-level, training and capabilities (in the form of yearly evaluations) are 
monitored within the military for occupational and leadership requirements within 
the varied occupational structures and levels of responsibility (military rank 
structure) to identify criteria and eligibility for promotion and career progression, 
for both the RN and the CF. The submariners maintain a formal and informal 
support climate. 
Like the Canadian submariners the RN submariners have an organisational 
structure that requires interdependence of individuals within a team. This 
characteristic is observed upward through the organisation, and forthright and 
direct communication of capabilities and shortcomings both upward and down the 
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chain-of-command was (and is) common and expected. There was a "can do, 
must do" attitude amongst this group of individuals as it applied to their 
submarine training. Interviews with the RN trainers in regards to their initial 
training for the Upholder class submarine revealed, "We were around while the 
submarines were being built, testing of systems, thus (there was) no formal 
training. There was an informal passage of knowledge and presence during testing 
of systems, and thus we had a chance to see parts of the submarine, how it works, 
that you would not normally see. " These statements identify both the formal and 
informal qualities and expectations from past RN submariner training, that was 
perceived in a positive light rather than a negative influence. Further distinctions 
of RN and CF management and trainer perception of specific historical pre- 
training factor influences are discussed in Section 6.1.3 
6.1.3 RN Training Preparation and Historical Influences 
6.1.3.1 Training Content 
The overall general perceptions of the historical influences to the trainers' 
perceived capability to prepare and train by the trainers and management were 
discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.3.3). There was a varying degree of agreement 
on the completeness of past submariner training by RN trainers and the RN and 
CF management, and only the CF training managers disagreed with the past 
training completeness (Figure 8). The background history and interviews 
indicated that the variance in response was likely due to either the direct 
involvement with the initial Upholder training and preparation for the CF training, 
or direct and intimate knowledge thereof. This was seen in the questionnaires, 
with a general agreement of the RN trainers and COs who were involved in 
training, while the RN Captain and the CF Training Managers formed either 
extreme response (strongly agreeing and disagreeing to strongly disagreeing, 
respectively). The RN Captain who had not received the Upholder initial training 
had also not been involved in the preparation of the training for the CF, while the 
CF training managers were directly involved in determining the courses and depth 
requirements for the trainees. 
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The remainder of the questions indicated the perceived impact of the lapse 
in operational experience to recall and train the Canadians and the influence of the 
imposed training principles and the supporting training aids. To aid in defining 
specific factors that could have a pre-training impact, questions were divided into 
the categories of: training aids (3); instructor characteristics (5); training 
principles (4); and, informal aids (3) (see Appendix C for questions and 
divisions). Training aids and informal training aids were differentiated to 
determine if informal training aids formed a significant portion of the RN training 
regime. 
6.1.3.2 Training Aids 
There was an overall agreement by all (1.45 + 0.62) that the technical 
documents, simulator training and access to the submarine provided assistance in 
recalling that learned (Appendix E). As most of the documents had not been 
completed, much of the supporting information had been destroyed upon 
decommissioning of the submarines, and the original training lectures contained 
only broad statements with very little detail (see Section 4.4.1 for more details), it 
was not surprising that both the simulator and the submarine were considered as 
significant support mechanisms in regaining the knowledge and skills lost. It was 
somewhat surprising that the documents were considered a significant support, 
but as an aid to recalling the systems and functioning of the Upholder submarine 
any completed portions or remnants of the SOPS and technical manuals (TABs) 
would provide systems description. Supporting documentation would also further 
aid in amplifying the sequence statements in the original RN EOP document, 
which provided only broad overview functional statements. 
6.1.3.3 Informal Training Aids 
With the reliance upon incomplete documentation, the geographical distance 
from the simulators and difficulties in gaining access to the submarines during 
reactivation, it could be presumed that other avenues would be sought to obtain 
information. Not surprisingly that was found to be the case. However, the extent 
to which informal aids were used to gain more details than those provided when 
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the submarine was in active service was not considered the same for the RN 
trainers (UTT) and the BAE contractors (retired submariners from Flagship). All 
respondents showed a strong agreement (1.44 + . 44) that the RN trainers utilised 
informal mechanisms to obtain or regain the lost knowledge and skills. But, the 
perceived degree to which the training contractors sought out informal 
mechanisms was not considered as great (1.94 + 0.45). This variance may seem 
small, but there was a considerable difference of opinion amongst the interviewed 
groups. Only the CF training managers strongly agreed that the contractors used 
informal mechanisms, while the RN Captain and the second CO agreed, but the 
RN training team and the first CO only somewhat agreed (2.65 + 0.42). This 
difference in opinion could again be related to either the amount of direct 
involvement with Flagship during the preparation for training or the perception 
developed during training. As the first crew training was considered a pilot course 
and resulting changes were subsequently applied, this could account for the 
greater agreement of the second CO from the first. 
Interviews with the UTT team confirmed their motivation and reliance to 
seek external aid to ensure currency of knowledge and skill, "We went to the T- 
submarines (Trafalgar class submarine) initially, did fast cruises with them, 
fought fires, DCHQ, and CSST training. We volunteered, thought it was good 
idea to increase current knowledge and update (skills). We saw the vision of what 
was needed in both knowledge and skill, knew that in order to have credibility 
(we) have to increase and assure (we) have the knowledge, can't best guess. Went 
to companies that supplied systems for water plant, mustered all the 
documentation held by any of the submariners. " However, the BAE contractors 
were not involved in this process as they were contracted to provide training 
support after UTT had completed the process very near to the time that training of 
the CF began. Interviews with UTT revealed, "When the contract (with the CF) 
Evas signed, BAE were late in being notified and it was too late to train 
themselves. " Even though the contractors were not involved in re-training the 
selection process was stringent, albeit subjective and based upon the UTT's own 
current knowledge and skill base. UTT quotes further revealed, "In selecting the 
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BAE training team, UTT was present in the interview board, assessed skill and 
knowledge, capability, (based upon) previous rank. We looked to see what the 
requirements were, vetoed some people, exchange views even now. " 
Although informal aids were considered a large part of the trainers' methods 
to regain their knowledge and skill after a lapse of experience of 6.5 + 2.4 yr. (for 
UTT), no significant correlation (Spearman rho) was found between formal and 
informal training aids for either the UTT or Flagship trainers. 
Questions relating to the formal and informal methods used to prepare the 
instructors to train the Canadians were created to identify the perception of 
preparation methods to train. While questions relating to instructor characteristics 
indicated the perception of instructor capabilities and the influence of the lapse in 
experience on the trainer's ability to recall, train and assess, as well as, identifying 
the perception of the trainers' (UTT and Flagship) overall knowledge and skill 
once training began. 
6.1.3.4 Instructor Characteristics 
As seen in Figure 8, and discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.3.3) the RN 
training team, RN Captain and the CF training managers were more or less in 
concurrence of the lack of effect lapse in experience had on recall and ability to 
train than were the two Commanding Officers. This pattern of perception was also 
seen in the influence of lapse of experience on ability to assess the trainees. 
Again, both the CF training managers and the RN Captain disagreed there was an 
influence, the RN trainers somewhat agreed, but the COs shifted their opinion 
slightly to somewhat agreeing that there was an influence. It could be assumed 
that the perception of influence from lapse in experience to recall, train and assess 
would be reflected in the opinion of the trainers overall knowledge and skill, and 
therefore capability to train. All agreed (1.39 ± 0.44) that the UTT team were very 
capable of training the Canadians (Figure 8, Capability to train), but the 
knowledge and skill of the Flagship contractors were not seen to be adequately 
sufficient (3.05+ 1.37), by some. The RN trainers and RN Captain agreed to 
somewhat agreed on the capabilities of the contractors to train, but there was a 
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wide discrepancy among the Canadians, the first CO disagreeing, the second 
agreed, but the RN training managers were on either end of the spectrum (either 
strongly agreeing or disagreeing). 
What is noticeable from this is that although there were varied opinions of 
the influence of lapse in operational experience on ability to recall, train and 
assess, all agreed that the UTT training team was capable of training. This 
response to capability seems to contradict those perceptions from the influences 
from lapse in experience. However, many factors could have influenced the 
opinions of those interviewed: knowledge of the training preparation; experiences 
during the current training; past training experiences; training philosophy of both 
countries; and, expectations from this training platform, based on what was 
expected to be provided, what was hoped to be provided, or a mixture. Past 
training experiences could have had a significant influence in the perception of 
the capability to train and the degree of expectation from the trainers. What 
appears to be a contradiction could in fact be related to the expectation from 
training based upon the training philosophy of submariners. As identified in 
Section 6.1.2.2 the RN submariner training involved and expected both formal 
and informal training approaches for learning. Thus, formal training would not be 
expected to provide individuals with all that they needed to learn. Therefore, 
capability to train would likely have been subjectively based on what individuals 
felt was needed formally within the programme with the understanding that 
information would also be gained informally, and was expected. 
The apparent discrepancy of responses between influences and capability 
from the CF managers could be attributed to the expected reliance on the 
leadership climate within a submarine to identify and deal with individual 
shortcomings (as described in Section 6.1.2.1). Thus, crewmembers would be 
expected to identify individual deficiencies (within training or operationally) that 
were not identified within the training platform. Therefore, expectations from the 
training programme would be likely be lower, especially for the pilot course as it 
was recognised that the training programme would likely require adjustments. 
The CF managers confirm this sentiment; "It seems to be getting better over time. 
130 
First crews were exposed very much to a learning experience on behalf of the 
`trainers'. Feedback loop (between trainers and trainees) was heavily relied on 
and as a result things improved. " 
One would expect then that correlations would be found between instructor 
characteristics and formal and informal training aids, but this was not the case. 
Further comparisons of the training programme expectations and perceptions are 
discussed in Section 6.2, under Training Influences. 
6.1.3.5 Training Principles 
The last group of questions was developed to identify pre-training 
influences related to training principles. Specifically, questions were designed to 
identify the perceptions surrounding the guidance given to the training 
programme, syllabus content, depth and breadth of courses, and assessments 
standards (identified as either entirely, some, barely, not at all). Responses from 
all respondents were fairly consistent for all four questions, responding that some 
guidance was given in all four areas. All but two individuals replied differently to 
training programme (rating entirely), depth and breadth of courses (rating barely) 
and assessment standards (one barely the other entirely), while only one 
individual stated that guidance was given for the entire syllabus content. 
The response that some guidance was given to the training programme, 
syllabus content and depth and breadth of courses directly relates to the historical 
preparation and development of the conversion course, and therefore assumptions 
could be made quite confidently that most managers were intimately aware and 
likely involved with the development process. This was confirmed during the 
interview process whereby the Canadian managers indicated, "The guidance 
given from Canada was based on a plan initiated in `95 by Canadian 
representatives. Canada discussed courses for each position and RN courses and 
depth were recommended. " (see Section 6.1.2.1 for further details) The contract 
indicated the RN were responsible for crew training, and thus the RN would train, 
assess and qualify according to their policy and procedures (see Section 4.3 for 
further details). Writing and upgrading of the courses, lectures and documents 
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began in 1997 with the intention to mimic the RN submarine qualification format 
and, although the intention may have been to follow the RN policies and 
procedures, once training began adjustments were needed. The RN trainers 
identified, " (We) went through the procedures and process of how the RN would 
normally follow training. The six-part qualification normally done onboard 
(individually), given the book and do it, but realised at the time that the Canadians 
would be in the UK (we) couldn't proceed as the RN would have. " As the RN 
historical training method for the Upholder class submarine involved learning 
through the building, activation and operational usage of the submarines, relying 
upon formal, self-study and informal methods, this same process could not be 
reinstated. As well, the contract stipulated very strict timelines to which sea-tested 
qualified crew and the reactivation of submarines would be delivered 
simultaneously. However, it is likely that the cascade complications that arose 
from delays in reactivation of submarines severely altered the intended training 
plan (see Section 4.4.3 for further details). 
Although most managers thought that some guidance was given on 
assessments standards, the RN Captain revealed, "(CF trainees would be) tested 
against standard of the levels of training, knowledge and skill required by the RN 
during Upholder training. " That is, MoD, OpDoc, were responsible for document 
format and style control, but the guidance for assessment standards and the 
determination of the content, detail and quality were not managed or monitored 
by a forum outside of the Upholder training staff. Although CSST (Captain Sea 
and Shore Training) was responsible for determining the acceptability of training, 
the UTT team acted as assessors on behalf of CSST as they did not have any 
Upholder experience. The UTT team revealed, "CSST came to assess UTT 
against up-to-date standards for style and policy, but this has nothing to do with 
technical content. No one determined how the programme should go, although 
CSST had final approval (of the training programme). " This would suggest that 
there was no external quality control of assessment standards, and assessment 
standards were based on historical RN training methods. 
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6.1.4 Summary 
Although no significant correlation differences (Spearman's rho) were 
found between the pre-training factors of training aids, instructor characteristics 
and informal aids when questions were presented to trainers and management 
(n=9), the relationships of these pre-training factors to each other cannot be 
completely discounted, as insignificant findings could be attributed to the small 
number of subjects questioned. Further, there were an insufficient number of 
questions and responses to achieve sufficient power to apply any form of statistics 
for the pre-training content that related to the historical Upholder training 
provided by the RN. 
Since the instructors had obtained very little experience with the Upholder 
class submarine prior to decommissioning, the knowledge and skill gained from 
previous training would be heavily relied upon to instruct trainees. As well, prior 
knowledge, skill and experience, thus expertise, would determine the perception 
of competency by the trainers. Do I know all that I have to know in order to 
instruct? Thus, guidance, application and monitoring of training principles from 
prior training could have affected the knowledge and skill acquired, while lack 
thereof could invoke inaccurate estimates of competency by the trainers, which in 
turn would influence the capability to adequately instruct. 
In addition, statistical comparisons of training principles could not be made 
with the other pre-training factors, however, guidance in training content, depth, 
breadth and methods assessment could alter the degree of knowledge and skill 
obtained from prior training. Therefore, prior training could impact trainers' 
capability and attitude (e. g., self-efficacy) to instruct, which could also impact 
training outcomes and therefore achievement of organisational objectives. Pre- 
training influences could thus have an impact on vertical transfer. Although no 
statistical comparisons could be performed on the internal consistency of the 
questions in pre-training, face validity of findings suggest that a capability to 
provide training is dependent upon the prior training received. 
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6.2 Training Influences 
The training influences in this case study of an organisation's training were 
indicated through questionnaire responses that, when needed, were discussed and 
expanded upon by the interviewees' concurrently during interviews (single and as 
a focus group as required). Further information pertaining to training influences 
was gathered through investigation of the historical training programme and the 
subsequent development of the RN training and submarine reactivation contract, 
and through the Hierarchal Task Analysis investigation. All available training 
stakeholders (n=42) were involved in identifying their perception, reaction, 
expectation and satisfaction with the training influences to include the RN trainers 
and the senior manager responsible for the submarine fleet, and the CF trainees, 
senior managers (Commanding Officers), and training managers. For ease of 
discussion, and in an effort to identify specific training effectiveness factors that 
could have an impact, questions were divided into the category of perception 
(training content, training aids, instructor characteristics, informal aids, training 
methods, training content intervention, and learning). Further questions were also 
developed to identify expectations (training content, trainee performance, and 
operational and maintainer knowledge and skill performance) from the training 
platform. 
6.2.1 Training Programme 
Training Programme methods, contents and instructor characteristics 
findings from questionnaire and interviews are discussed in this Section. Details 
of the specific training programme, training requirements and training 
complications can be found in Section 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. 
6.2.1.1 Training Methods and Content 
6.2.1.1.1 Training Methods 
The training methods observed and rated in this study related to the 
perceptions of the training measures in place to test and confirm the knowledge 
and skill of the trainees, RN trainers and contracted trainers (Appendix C). The 
training methods employed to evaluate the progression and capability of trainees 
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and trainers during training also relates directly back to the pre-training influence 
of training principles; the guidance given to the RN trainers of the necessary 
training content, depth, breadth and assessment requirements to assure 
organisational objectives were met. As identified in Section 6.1.2, the CF 
provided some guidance as to what RN courses were needed. However, a training 
analysis of the needs of the CF submarine fleet was not completed prior to 
training, and the routine training practices of RN training could not be exactly 
followed. Historical RN training for this class of submarine consisted of formal 
training and direct involvement of crewmembers during the building, activation 
and operational usage of the submarine. As well, no external guidance or 
monitoring of evaluation criteria was supplied to the RN trainers. This 
background would set the tone of the training programme and provide the 
rationale for the differences in responses by the varying groups interviewed. 
Figure 9. Perceived Training Programme Testing and Confirming of Capability 
of Trainees and Trainers and Knowledge and Skill Growth of Trainees 
(Rating scale: I= strongly agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 5= strongly disagree) 
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Testing and Confirming Capability 
As seen in Figure 9, the responses to whether measures were in place to test 
and confirm both knowledge and skill of trainees and trainers differed greatly, but 
perceptions also varied between management, trainers and between submarine 
crews. The RN manager, RN trainers, CO and the SCOOWs all agreed that 
measures were in place to test and confirm CF trainees. This strong belief was not 
as apparent from the technicians, and although they somewhat agreed that 
measures were in place to test and confirm capabilities, it was crew one 
technicians (SCC1 3.13+ 1.01, and SCC2,3.5 + 1.78) who disagreed that 
measures were in place. As discussed in Section 5.2.3.2 (HTA of the training 
platform), all those interviewed generally agreed that the first phase of training 
tested knowledge, and the second phase (USQ and individual and team simulator 
training) tested skill, with sea-trials providing the final test of team-capability. 
However, as identified earlier in Section 5.2.3.1, the concern was not testing 
of knowledge and skill but confirmation that knowledge and skills were in fact 
obtained. It could be said that testing is a confirmation of knowledge and skill, 
however, if no criterion was provided to identify the details of what should be 
tested (knowledge or skill objectives) or how testing should proceed, and there 
was no external monitoring of the evaluation process, then an uncertainty could 
be present as to whether the required knowledge and skills were in fact obtained. 
As identified during interviews, "All are taught to the same level. Not taught to be 
operational, taught to be safe, surface and subsurface transit. " As well, as the 
testing of skill for EOPs was end-point based and no debriefs of progress and 
capability were provided, the trainees had neither a complete nor accurate picture 
of how well they were doing, or what deficiencies were present. This sentiment 
was most prevalent and most strongly felt by the technicians who would become 
the maintainers onboard the submarine. As stated earlier, this differing perception 
between technicians and management (from CF managers, CO and junior 
management SCOOW) was likely due to a combination of many factors. 
Technicians who will perform EOPs have a discomfort in the new role they will 
assume, in that this RN training platform (based on the RN submarine workforce) 
requires individuals in the positions to have the combined knowledge and skill 
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that in the Canadian Navy is considered two occupations, marine engineer and 
electrician. Also, the volume of new knowledge and skill to be learned to operate 
this class of submarine was considered by all to be significantly different between 
operators (32.63 + 5.31%) and technicians (73.38 + 9.7%). Although, the training 
platform was not designed to provide maintenance or problem-solving 
capabilities, technicians felt they needed more to be able to adequately perform 
their duties. Thus, the managers' agreement that measures were in place to test 
and confirm was again likely based upon the organisational training mindset and 
the supportive training climate of both the CF and RN. The training philosophy is 
such that submariner training involves both a formal and informal component and 
deficiencies that are not picked up in training will be picked up on transfer to the 
workplace. Management stated, " (Deficiencies will be) picked up through formal 
training, (and) the chain-of-command and trainers will pick up satisfaction and 
capability. The system works, it is thought that Flagship and UTT were reluctant 
to fail anyone and gave everyone a rubber-stamp, but this was not the case. In the 
process it will be picked up. " 
The agreement that measures was in place to test and confirm the trainers 
(both UTT and Flagship) was not as positive. As discussed briefly in Section 
5.2.3.2 (HTA, Training platform), there were no set knowledge and skill standards 
which the trainers must achieve in order to instruct: they prepared their own 
lectures, documents and tested themselves against the USQ for capability, and 
there was no outside, objective body to monitor or assess training. The RN 
trainers acknowledged this deficiency. The RN training team also identified that 
the contract trainers, Flagship, did not have the opportunity to train before 
instructing the Canadians. Thus, it was not surprising that the RN trainers 
disagreed that measures were in place to test and confirm their own and the 
contract trainers' capability. 
This was not the sentiment of the RN Captain nor the CF training managers, 
who both strongly agreed that measures were in place for the RN trainers, 
although the RN Captain only agreed that measures were in place for the 
contracted trainers. The RN Captain's perception was that the trainers were tested 
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against the prior RN Upholder training standard. Further, even the trainees were 
not completely sure if the training teams, either the RN trainers or Flagship, were 
tested or assessed for their knowledge and skill (for quotes see Section 5.2.3.2). It 
was not surprising then that all crewmembers disagreed that testing measures 
were in place, with the exception of the SCC2 from crew two who agreed. Their 
response as junior members of the military was likely a combination of lack of 
knowledge of the process, not a party to conversations with those who may have 
had doubts (which would not be considered uncommon in a military hierarchical 
platform to discuss perceived deficiencies with junior members) and thus there 
was a faith in the system or a presumed assumption that testing was present. 
These findings suggest there was a lack in confidence of the knowledge and skills 
obtained from training. 
6.2.1.1.2 Training Contents 
The training contents observed and rated in this case study related to the 
perceptions of the completeness of the formal training to provide the knowledge 
and skills, the continuity and accuracy of the training tools and aids and the 
perceptions of any changes made to the tools and aids (Appendix Q. To account 
for the various stages of completion of training for the three crews and, thus, in an 
effort to control for conjecture or hearsay rather than training first-hand 
experience, all of the questions to the trainees were posed so that respondents 
considered only those portions of training that they had completed. For the 
managers and trainers, as they were well acquainted with the plans, processes and 
procedures of the training programme and made decisions as to what changes, if 
any were made, questions regarding training content were framed within the 
context of the training programme from its onset. 
The interview findings for the completeness of the formal training to provide the 
knowledge and skills for those trainees who were in varying stages of the training 
programme indicated that as of the training to date they agree they have received 
the knowledge needed, but do not feel they have received the skills training as yet. 
Crew two revealed, "Yes we have the skill we know all the pipes and know the 
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procedures, but we haven't tied it to a ship wide evolution yet. We have the skill 
and knowledge, but need the practice. We'll find out in the sea-trials, it will pull 
us together as a team, it's still training. " While crew three stated, " Based on what 
we're supposed to get we expect we will have the knowledge and skill, but from 
where we are today, we haven't had team training, so no we do not have all that 
we need, yet. " Thus, crew two trainees who had completed the formal training 
portion of training but had not yet completed any sea-testing or sea trails, and 
crew three who had completed the knowledge phase and Upholder certification, 
did not believe they had the skill set at this stage of training to perform their 
portion of emergency tasks in an operational setting. 
Figure 10. Perceived Trainees' Capability and Value of Training 
(Rating scale: I= strongly agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 5= strongly disagree) 
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The disagreement that the second and third crew undergoing training had 
not received the knowledge and skill to date was not surprising as the training was 
such that the integration of knowledge and skill and applying what was learned 
comes together during sea-trials (Figure 10, Formal Training). Thus, what 
appeared to be an extreme alternate response to agree that formal training 
provided the knowledge and skills from trainees and managers was not the case. 
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The managers, including the RN Captain and trainers and the Canadian COs 
agreed that formal training would provide the knowledge and skills needed based 
upon the entire training programme, to include sea-trials. The response that does, 
however appear out of character from the other managers, was the disagreement 
of the Canadian training managers that formal training would provide the 
knowledge and skill; this response would also seem out of character for them as 
they have indicated they agreed with the process and the capabilities of the 
trainers prior to initiating this conversion course. This disagreement can be 
explained in that the CF training managers recognised that the Canadians would 
not be taught all they needed to know, both in knowledge and skill, as the training 
was considered a conversion course. Trainees were expected to have pre-requisite 
submarine knowledge and skill and the training platform was neither intended nor 
expected to provide the capability to perform all duties, such as maintenance or 
problem-solving (Detachment, 2001). 
The response from the CF managers was also seen to some degree from 
crew one (average overall response, 3 +. 82), who had completed all phases of 
training, including sea-trials. Although they agreed that knowledge and skill were 
provided formally and that they had the skill set to perform their duties at sea, the 
resulting capabilities were not seen to be gained solely from the training 
programme. "System knowledge we had to gain from elsewhere. Through 
experience of the team (from crew one) and discussions with each other most of 
the gaps are being filled. " 
Perceptions of satisfaction with training to supply the necessary knowledge 
and skills can also be influenced by the amalgamated consistent accuracy of the 
training tools and aids used during training, but also satisfaction and outcome 
from training can be influenced by the reflection of the training programme tools 
and aids to the workplace. As indicated and supported from the Identical 
Elements Theory, learning and successful transfer to the workplace are enhanced 
with a training platform that is reflective of the workplace, both in stimulus and 
response. The overall perception by the respondents was an agreement to identical 
elements within training and that they closely mirrored those of the working 
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environment (1.99 + 0.68). The managers and trainers (to include the junior 
officers undergoing training) provided the more positive agreement, while the 
senior technicians from crews one and two leaned toward lesser satisfaction (crew 
one, 2.88 +. 66, and crew two, 2.44 +. 52). Senior technicians identified, "The 
display consoles in the simulator are close enough to the submarine. Because of 
the programme in the simulator the compensations (reactions) are different in 
trainers than in the boat. " As described in Section 5.2.1, the degree of response of 
satisfaction was not due to the reactionary differences between the simulators and 
the submarine, senior technicians found the discrepancies were between the RN 
EOP document and the panel onboard the submarines. This sentiment was not 
seen or described by the senior technicians from crew three (1.85 + . 14), and 
likely due to the resulting changes to the EOP document at the time of their 
training. Although, as crew three had not completed simulator training at the time 
of the interview, their perception of identical elements can only be based upon 
their satisfaction with the knowledge portion of training and not skill. 
The differences in the changes in perceptions of satisfaction with the 
training programme as each crew progressed in training, although slight, could 
also be related to the changes that occurred during training. This perception was 
reflected in the responses to changes to the training curriculum and content, in 
which all respondents agreed that changes had occurred. When asked to what 
degree changes had been made to the training curriculum, training content and 
documentation, there was almost a complete agreement from all respondents that 
some changes had occurred to the curriculum, content and documentation. Of the 
42 respondents a distributed few identified that the training curriculum had barely 
changed (13), fewer indicated that training content had barely changed (four, 
senior technicians from crew two and three); and, surprisingly only seven 
responded that the documentation had only barely been changed (distributed 
through the three crews, from officers, senior and junior technicians). This was a 
surprising outcome as the discrepancies and differences between the RN and the 
CF content and format of EOPs appeared to be a major concern, especially for 
technicians (Section 5.2.2). However, the questions only addressed changes to 
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documentation and not to the perceived impact of learning and performance from 
the changes. The perceived effect of changes to learning is discussed in Section 
6.2.2 and training expectations are discussed in Section 6.2.3. 
The differences identified between managers, trainers and trainees would 
suggest that significant differences would be found for both methods and content 
between trainers, crews and managers. The Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance 
identified there was a significant difference in training methods (x2=18.91, df=4, 
p=. 001) and training content (x2 =15.58, df=4, p=. 004) (Appendix E). In training 
methods the CF managers indicated more of an agreement of testing capabilities 
than the RN trainers, while for training content it was the RN trainers who agreed 
more to the completeness and accuracy than the CF managers. 
The Spearman rank correlation identified there was a significant positive 
correlation between training content and training methods (p= <. 05, rs . 378, 
Table 4), suggesting satisfaction that training would provide the necessary 
knowledge and skills directly connected to the methods employed to assess the 
knowledge and skill of both the trainers and the trainees. Trainees agreed they 
had received the knowledge and skill as appropriate to the phase of training and 
that the training aids closely mirrored those of the working platform. Thus, with 
the support from the qualifying statements from the interviews of the lack of 
feedback of progress, the correlation would further suggest that the confidence in 
the training programme to provide the knowledge and skills was also based upon 
the self-confidence (self-efficacy) of trainees to achieve the expected outcomes 
from training. As discussed in Section 6.2.1.2, the degree of self-efficacy of 
trainees can be directly related to formal and informal training aids. 
6.2.1.2 Formal and Informal Training Aids 
When respondents were asked the value of the training aids and tools to 
support learning, their response was that individual and team simulator training 
was considered extremely useful to learning. This response would not be 
considered unusual as all those interviewed agreed that the simulator training 
reflected that of the submarine, and thus observations and any practise of the EOP 
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sequences individually or in a team would aid in learning. Trainees identified, " 
Simulator training solidified what you already knew, allowed you to practise the 
conditional response required in EOPs. " As crew three had completed individual 
training in the simulator but had not as yet completed team training, they did not 
respond to perceptions of the value of simulator team training. 
Table 4. Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients for Expectations and 
Perceptions from Training for Trainers, Management and Trainees (number of 
questions per category identified beside measure category, M=Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, 
KS = Knowledge and Skill, Ops = operational, main= maintainer). 
Measures M and SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 89 10 
Expectation 
1. Training 1.98+. 76 
Content (3) 
2. Trainee 1.94+0.51 0.51 -. 181 
Performance (3) 
3. Trainee 32.63+5.3 . 077 -. 257 Performance % 
New Ops KS (1) 
4. Trainee 73.38+9.7 -. 040 -. 122 . 
258 
Performance % 
New main KS 
(1) 
Perception 
5. Training 2.44±. 63 -. 335* . 081 -. 01 . 089 Content (4) 
6. Formal 1.66+ . 87 -. 354* . 368* . 034 . 005 . 440** Training 
Aids (5) 
7. Instructor 2.6+ . 91 -. 055 . 063 -. 20 -. 306 . 442** . 095 Characteristics 
(5) 
8. Informal 2.17±1.1 . 039 . 093 . 033 -. 375* -. 230 . 107 -. 397** Aids (2) 
9. Training 2.97+1.39 -. 177 -. 163 -. 065 . 049 . 378* . 224 . 260 -. 276 Methods (3) 
10. Training 2.3+. 95 . 139 -. 294 . 164 . 039 -. 424** -. 443** -. 093 -. 008 -. 085 Content 
Intervention (2) 
11. Learning(4) 3.15±1.05 . 068 -. 374* . 000 . 106 . 065 -. 394** . 183 -. 313* . 307* . 13 
N=42 *P=<. 05 **p= <. O1 
As seen in Figure 11, access to the submarine was also considered a 
valuable tool to aid in learning, although the responses of crew one and two 
SCOOW and crew two, SCC2, do not appear to reflect this. Trainees found 
overall that, "Accessing the boat allowed the average submariner to consolidate 
the knowledge", however, as detailed in Section 4.4.3 (training complications), 
while a submarine was being reactivated access was not always possible for safety 
reasons and although observation was possible, manipulation of the dials, gauges, 
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levers was not. During crew ones' training, access to the submarines posed more 
of a problem than that seen in subsequent crews' training, "Didn't have 100% 
access, maintenance problems, but could look at panel and systems, but not able 
to punch dials, or touch things. " The variation of response seen by crew two, 
SCC2, was due to one extreme outlier. This individual did not feel there was 
sufficient access or support. 
Figure 11. Value of Training Aids and the Perceived Influence of Team 
Composition to Learning and Subsequent Performance 
(Rating scale: I= strongly agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 5= strongly disagree) 
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All respondents also mutually agreed that the technical documents (TABs) 
and Standard Operating Procedures were an excellent support aid to learning 
(1.57 + 74). Trainees indicated, "TABS were outstanding, best we have ever had, 
format, indexing good. Tabs are brilliant, but maintaining them, currency, is 
difficult. Some things were not accurate. Think they could have had more stuff, 
SOPs, become your user level document, (you) need the TABs and SOPs for daily 
use. " 
This perception of exceptional value of documentation was not equally 
supported for the EOP document (2.33 ± . 99). The original document supplied by 
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Value of Training Aides 
the RN, as discussed in detail in Section 5.2.2 (HTA of documentation), indicated 
that some of the EOPs did not directly reflect the tasks in the workplace, 
contained errors and the sequences for some of the tasks were found to be difficult 
to learn. With no systems integration knowledge provided during training and 
only general task sequence descriptions to refer to in the EOP document, 
individuals found they needed, and were expected, to refer to other methods of 
support (e. g., TABs, SOPs, other trainees) to aid in learning and memorising each 
of the 31 EOP tasks. As seen in Figure 10, EOP Completeness, although interview 
comments from the trainees, especially the technicians, identified an overall 
displeasure with the style, format and content of the RN EOPs, it was only the 
SCOOW's from crew two (4.58 +. 38) and three (3.63 +. 52) who indicated their 
displeasure in the questionnaire response. From the interviews with all three 
crews it became apparent that there was a general acceptance that 
changes/revisions were being made to documentation (e. g., "Although they knew 
(EOPs) were going through revisions, assumed changes were made during later 
training, so crew two should have less changes), and as formal RN document 
approval takes time it was accepted by crew one that official changes would not 
occur during their training. The mindset of the technicians in the subsequent 
crews was one of acceptance. "We will get that knowledge and skill at some 
point, in work-ups, fast cruising, sea-trials. " While the displeasure from the 
officers of the subsequent crews was represented by the comment, "Canadian 
training would benefit from (EOPs) details to learn, incorporate it all as a 
reference in one place, but here (UK). " This statement suggests a frustration, but 
it also refers to the limitations of providing training within a contract and thus the 
constraints and capabilities imposed to the Canadians and the RN within that 
timeline. 
As discussed in detail in Section 5.2.3.2 (Training Platform), all trainees 
relied upon informal sources (e. g., "looked to each other, dockyard, UTT, 
Abbeywood, Collingwood, technical agencies, equipment/instrument 
contractors") to gain knowledge outside the formal platform (2.24 + 1.12). Results 
have shown that even with changes to the training programme, subsequent crews 
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still sought out information informally, especially so for the technicians (Figure 
10, Informal Training). Technical crews from the second and third wave of 
training indicated, "Working on systems (we) found we needed more information 
than was given, didn't have the experience (with this class of submarine). There 
are no holes safety wise, `Know I'm safe. ', but information was definitely passed 
informally as 40-50% of maintenance needed to be learned on our own. " Even the 
RN trainers, RN Captain and the CO somewhat agreed that other methods were 
used to extend the knowledge and skill than training provided formally. Only the 
CF training managers strongly disagreed. This extreme response by the CF 
training managers could be explained by the fact that "the CF training design 
assumed that given system knowledge and the appropriate technical background, 
maintainers would be capable of performing all PM and CM tasks in the 
workplace" (Detachment, 2001). One could then presume that CF training 
managers did not believe seeking out informal support should be necessary. 
The differences identified between managers, trainers and trainees would 
suggest that significant differences would be found for both formal and informal 
training aids between trainers, crews and managers. The Kruskal-Wallis analysis 
of variance indicated there was a significant difference in formal training aids 
(x2=11.90, df=4, p=. 018) and with informal aids (x2 =16.54, df=4, p=. 002) 
(Appendix E). For formal training aids the CF managers indicated more of an 
agreement of the value than the RN trainers. These findings are not surprising, as 
the managers believed the prerequisite training was sufficient. However, for 
informal training it was crew two (1.38 + . 54) who agreed more to using informal 
aids than crew one. (1.85 + 0.91) (Appendix E). These findings of an informal aid 
requirement by trainees were not surprising. However, as changes were put into 
place in the training programme it would have been expected that crew one would 
have indicated a greater reliance on informal training aids. Crew two's greater 
reliance on informal aids would suggest that the changes to the training content 
and aids had not been implemented during their training, or any changes that had 
been made were not considered sufficient and reliance on informal training aids 
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was still considered necessary. These deficiencies in the training programme 
could effect intended training outcomes, and thus impact vertical transfer. 
The Spearman rank correlation identified there was no significant 
correlation between formal and informal aids, but there was a significant positive 
correlation between formal training aids and training content (p= <. 01, rs . 440, 
Table 4). From the above discussion it was not surprising to discover that the 
more useful the training aids the less likely training intervention was needed. 
6.2.1.3 Instructor Characteristics 
As identified in pre-training influences and discussed in detail in Chapter 5 
(5.2.3.3), the capability of an instructor and therefore his ability to pass on 
knowledge and skill was based upon the initial knowledge and skill gained and 
the experience obtained to ingrain capabilities and develop expertise. The 
opinions of the influence of lapse in active experience to recall the knowledge and 
skill and instruct varied between management. The RN manager and CF training 
managers believed there was enough run-up time to regain what was needed, but 
the remainder perceived the lapse had an influence (Figure 8). However, there 
was an agreement amongst managers that once notification was given that 
training would begin the UTT training team was considered very capable of 
training the CF (N=9,1.39 + 0.44), while the overall perception of the contract 
trainers knowledge and skill (Flagship) was not considered to be sufficient (N=9, 
3.05± 1.37). 
This pre-training background of the instructor characteristics would set the 
tone and lay the foundation for the training of the Canadians. Although not all of 
the information regarding the background capabilities of the training teams (UTT 
and Flagship) was known to the trainees, they were all aware that the Upholder 
class submarine had been withdrawn from active service and thus they would be 
aware that there was a lapse in operational experience for the RN trainers. Thus, 
preconceived notions of capabilities were very likely made by the trainees, which 
could in turn influence their perception of the instructors' capability and resulting 
value of training. This in turn could then influence an individual's successful 
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outcome, which could impact the team and crew. This would suggest a potential 
influence on vertical transfer outcomes, and as well, the necessity to identify the 
pre-training influences and the effect during training. 
However, as this training platform was lengthy (four years) and training 
involved successive training of four complete crews, it was also likely that the 
capabilities of the instructors would change over time and, with that, perhaps a 
change in perception of the instructor characteristics. This change could alter 
training effectiveness of the programme over time. Thus, questions regarding the 
growth of the knowledge and skill of the trainers were deemed pertinent. 
As seen in Figure 9, there was a general agreement by all that the RN 
training team knowledge and skill had changed over the course of the training 
programme (2.43 + 1.19), with the exception seen from crew one senior 
technicians. This general agreement of growth was reflected in the trainees' 
interview response to the perception of growth of knowledge and skill of trainers 
from crew one, "Without a doubt, it was a learning process for them as well. They 
learned a lot during fast cruising, it was a double edged sword, sea training by 
committee. " However, the senior technicians revealed, "Instructors didn't know 
everything about the boat, they admitted when they didn't, would search out the 
answer and then come back to you. " This statement likely represents the 
perceptions of trainers seen from crew one technicians, in that they perceived the 
trainers did not have the knowledge and therefore needed to seek out answers 
when asked. 
As seen in the pre-training perceptions, the growth of the Flagship 
contractor's knowledge and skill over time was not seen to be as great as that of 
UTT training team (2.78+ 1.24). Again, the most extreme disagreement was seen 
from the senior technicians from crew one who believed there was almost no 
growth, but crew three as a whole also perceived a lack of growth from Flagship, 
and somewhat agreed to disagreed that Flagship knowledge and skill had changed 
over time (3.36 +. 95). 
Although most respondents indicated that they agreed that the trainers' 
knowledge and skill had grown over time, beyond the crew one senior 
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technicians, there was not, however, a mutual agreement that change in 
knowledge and skill had an influence on the instructors' ability to train. Training 
staff and managers strongly disagreed that changes in knowledge and skill of the 
trainers would detrimentally influence training, as did all of crew one. This 
apparent inconsistency from senior technicians was clarified during the interview, 
"Digging for answers increased your depth of knowledge, your problem solving, 
and damage control skills, the more they know the more they can pass onto us. " 
This would suggest an acceptance of the training style, but also the motivation 
and persistence to learn (on their own) what was needed would suggest goal 
commitment by the trainees. The commitment to achieve the higher-level goals 
was not just individually driven, efforts to assure that the knowledge and skills 
perceived to be required in the workplace were extended within and between 
crews. 
Both crew two and crew three agreed to somewhat agreed that changes in 
knowledge and skill of training staff detrimentally affected training. As crew three 
did not believe Flagship's knowledge and skill had changed over time, they have 
perceived that this would affect training. This response would be heavily based 
upon the Flagship trainers and not RN Trainers, as crew three had just completed 
phase-one training to which Flagship instructed. The response from crew two 
suggests that changes in knowledge and skill of the trainers had a negative impact 
on capability to train. In fact, the sentiments in the interview indicated that 
although they agreed that changes in knowledge and skill had occurred, they did 
not believe that positive changes were put into place as a result. Crew two 
clarified, "The changes, even from boat one should have been documented. The 
system has allowed for improvements and the weaknesses have been indicated. 
Thus, teaching and guiding crew three will happen informally, as it happened with 
crew one we drilled them for hours. " Although dissatisfied that changes had not 
been formally put into place, again we see from trainees a personal drive and 
commitment to seek outside sources to achieve the intended personal training 
outcome, but as well, an emergence of support from individuals upward through 
to the team and between team members. 
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The differences between managers, trainers and trainees would suggest that 
significant differences would be found for the perceptions of instructor knowledge 
and skill and their development over time between trainers, crews and managers. 
The Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance revealed there was a significant 
difference in perception of instructor characteristics (x2 =11.63, dF--4, p=. 020) 
(Appendix E), with the CF managers indicating less of an impact than the RN 
trainers. These findings are not surprising, as the managers believed the 
instructors had the capability prior to training. 
It was not a surprise then that a significant positive correlation was found 
between instructor characteristics and training content (p= <. 01, rs . 442) and a 
negative correlation was found with informal aids (p= <. 01, rs -. 397, Table 4). 
This would suggest that changes in training content are directly related to 
instructor capabilities, and as instructor capabilities improved there was less need 
to employ informal training aids. These significant relationship findings 
corroborate the interview statements, suggesting that globally there was a 
commitment from the trainees, within and between successive crews, to seek out 
and mutually support the retrieval of information outside the training platform. As 
this was a global effort from within and between crews, these findings would 
suggest the efforts expand beyond assurance of achievement of personal outcomes 
to the commitment to achieve the higher-level organisational goal from training- 
as a crew, to safely sail the submarine back to Canada. This individual 
commitment to assure team competency would suggest the existence of vertical 
transfer. 
6.2.2 Learning Perceptions and Training Interventions 
The perceptions of training have thus far examined potential influencing 
factors within this training platform but not on their perceived impact to learning 
(Table 4). As such, learning could be influenced by the overall accuracy of the 
training contents, aids and tools and the resulting changes to the training content 
and documentation that had occurred over the course of the training programme. 
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As discussed in Section 6.2.1.1, Training Content, the respondents generally 
agreed that the training material, tools and aids were an accurate representation of 
the working environment. However, the strength of the agreement was not found 
to be as strong with the technicians, but the degree of satisfaction did improve 
with each successive crew. From the Hierarchical Task Analysis, the reason for 
this lesser degree of agreement from the technicians was thought to have been 
attributed to their strong dissatisfaction with the EOPs (as detailed in Section 
5.2.2), but that was not the case. The technicians agreed that although the 
document had errors and omissions, the EOP document did, in fact, support 
learning. It Evas the SCOOWs from crew two and three who disagreed that the 
EOP document supported learning (Section 6.2.1.2) suggesting details for EOPs 
should be incorporated into one reference to aid learning. It would be expected 
then that the response to the influence of the accuracy of the training content, 
tools and aids on learning should reflect this sentiment and effect of changes to 
the training content and aids should follow this trend. 
As seen in Figure 12, Accuracy Influence, there was an overall slight to 
strong disagreement that accuracy influenced learning (3.77 + . 95), but this time it 
was the SCOOW from the crew one who agreed that accuracy affected learning 
(1.69 +. 42). These responses from crew one are reflective of fact that the crew 
one training was a pilot course and documents contained omissions and 
inaccuracies, but they did however agree that EOPs aided in learning, as did the 
rest of crew one. This apparent concurrence would suggest that any information 
was of value to learning but as the SCOOW from crew one only somewhat agreed 
to using other methods to extend their knowledge and skills (2.88 + . 66), this 
might suggest that although informal aids were used they were either not as 
effective as hoped or perhaps they were not able to find effective or sufficient 
external resources. 
One would have expected the SCOOWs from crew two and three to also 
identify an influence on learning as they had implied their displeasure with the 
state of EOPs during their training (4.58 + . 38 and 3.63 + . 52, respectively) but 
this was not the case. Changes made to the training content and training aids were. 
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also not perceived to have an overall detrimental influence on the ability to learn 
from the CF training managers and all trainees (3.72 + . 93, Figure 12, Influence to 
Change). Two SCOOWs from crew two and three did however respond that they 
respectively strongly agreed and agreed that changes did influence the ability to 
learn. 
As the concept of vertical transfer refers to the upward transfer of individual 
training outcomes to combine and emerge to yield effects at the team and 
organisational level (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997), it was deemed appropriate to 
distinguish the perceived influence of team composition to learning as this could 
influence both individual and team outcomes. As well, to assist in delineating the 
influences from pre-training and training, the influence of prior experience was 
also identified. 
Figure 12. Perceived Accuracy of Training, Changes, and Influence to Learning 
and Performance (rating scale: I= strongly agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 5= strongly 
disagree. Accuracy Influences and Performance Influences were reverse scaled as degree of 
negative impact). 
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Findings indicated that generally respondents did not consider previous 
experience a detrimental effect on learning (3.77 ± . 95), however, senior 
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technicians from crew one strongly agreed it was (1.13 +. 14). Although crew one 
technicians had a mix of experienced (> 15 yr. ) and inexperienced (one and six 
years) personnel, all senior technicians strongly agreed that previous experience 
had a detrimental affect on learning. The general impression in interviews with 
senior technicians from crew one was they felt that lack of experience on 
submarines made it more difficult to learn, "You needed time on the submarines 
to be comfortable. The contract required us to have dolphins, but it is a general 
course, very basic, and if you had any time on the boats you'd know. " These 
comments would suggest a heavy reliance on course content to achieve the 
expected knowledge and skill, but also that there might be a reliance on 
crewmembers for support. 
As seen in Figure 11, Teams and Learning, respondents agreed that team 
composition did influence learning (2.12 + 1.04), but is was the junior technicians 
from crew one who disagreed that team composition affects the ability to learn 
(4.0 + 1.0). The junior technicians qualified this sentiment to mean that they learn 
from all members on the crew and they believed that specific crew composition 
was not a factor; "You learn from everybody, get used to the guy you're working 
with, know what to expect, become a unit, but don't believe it matters who you 
work with". The difference in response may relate to the lack of understanding of 
the perceived and actual higher-level responsibilities and accountabilities of 
senior staff to assure organisational objectives are met. This was reflected in the 
interview responses from the SCOOW and senior technicians, "The guys are 
fairly senior when they get on this platform, in regards to EOPs as there is no one 
that is incompetent, they may not be strong but they met the minimum standard. " 
You have someone that is experienced in the crew they can lead you, you don't 
have the luxury to replace crew, can't any more. Now is there something 
(training) to bring him up to speed, but some positions are more critical than 
others. " Team structure may change within crews but there is an interdependence 
to assure successful completion of emergency tasks. 
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6.2.2.1 Training Interventions 
As much as training content and changes can influence training and 
subsequent learning, the opportunity to provide changes to the training content 
and aids can also moderate the ability to learn or have a direct impact. When 
respondents were asked if suggestions could be made to change training content 
and the documents, the respondents somewhat agreed that changes could be made 
to the training content (2.43 + 1.0) and mutually agreed that changes could be 
made to training aids (1.99 + 0.62). As detailed in Section 5.2.2 although formal 
approval was required for documentation, UTT were very receptive to 
suggestions to changes in documentation and quick to respond. It would seem 
unusual, however, that all respondents replied positively to the ability to provide 
changes to the training content, including the CF managers, however, selectively 
as a group the RN training team disagreed that suggestions could be made to the 
training content (3.81 + 1.19). The training platform was based on and controlled 
by RN policies and procedures, thus changes would have to go through a formal 
approval process. The CF training managers unfortunately did not respond to this 
question, but the response from the senior CF managers would suggest their reply 
was based on the fact that discussions for changes occurred between senior CF 
managers and the RN, and although many of the changes requested were made to 
the training content, implementation was only possible after the fact. This was 
confirmed in interviews with the trainees, "Although receptive to changes (we) 
did not see any of them directly as it took time for the changes to be implemented, 
RN approval, but the next course would see. " 
The differences identified between managers, trainers and trainees would 
suggest that there are significant differences of perceptions for influences on 
ability to learn and intervention capabilities between trainers, crews and 
managers. This was not found to be the case for training content intervention. 
However, a Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance identified there was a significant 
difference in perception of factors that influenced ability to learn (x2 =10.37, df=4, 
p=. 035), with crew three indicating less of an impact than the RN trainers 
(Appendix E). 
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The results of differences between these two groups from crew one and two 
and the CF managers are in fact not unexpected. The RN trainers have likely 
based their opinion on past training experience and a belief that the RN training 
philosophy provides what is needed (Section 5.2.3.3 and 6.1.3). Thus, it would 
appear that they did not believe accuracy or changes to the training influenced 
ability to learn, but prior experience and team composition, as heavily relied upon 
historically, was considered an asset to learning. Crew threes' indication of the 
least impact to learning suggests that thus far in training there was a greater 
satisfaction with the training platform and changes to support learning, and as 
such previous experience did not impact learning. This difference in perception 
from the previously trained crews could also be influenced by the fact that crew 
three had the least overall experience, and thus drawing less on past experience to 
aid in learning and more receptive and open to the training platform. 
However, crew three believed that team composition was a strong support 
net for learning, "The stronger support the weaker, the stronger the team the 
better. To remain a submariner you have to be able to communicate and ask for 
support. " These findings would suggest a strong support climate outside of the 
training platform. Overall face validity of crew consistency in responses also 
supports the model of interdependent teams and vertical transfer, in that specific 
and unique individual learning outcomes are directly linked to the success of team 
outcomes. Thus to achieve effectiveness, individuals must be trained in their 
specific roles as each role provides a distinctive contribution. The statistical 
differences within positions between crews were not performed as each crew was 
at different stages of training, therefore it would be inappropriate to compare 
training perceptions with unequal comparisons. Insufficient numbers of 
respondents were present to perform within crew statistical variations. Discussion 
of performance expectations and consequences from training are discussed in 
Section 6.2.3, Training Expectations. 
In determining the potential relationships between learning and the various 
factors and interventions in the training platform, rank order correlations were not 
found between learning and training content intervention. However, learning 
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positively correlated with training methods (p= <. 05, rs . 307) and negatively 
correlated with both formal training aids (p= <. 01, rS -. 394) and informal training 
aids (p= <. 05, rs -. 313) (Table 4). These findings might be considered at odds 
with each other. However, this intercorrelation suggests that learning improves 
with the ongoing confirmation of knowledge and skill capabilities'provided by 
instructors and attained by trainers, and as formal training aids improve there is 
less of an influence to learning. As learning progresses from the training platform 
there is also less of a reliance on informal training aids. Learning did not 
significantly correlate with training content or instructor characteristics. 
Training content intervention did, however, negatively correlate with both 
training content (p= <. 01, rs -. 424) and formal training aids (p= <. 01, rs -. 443, 
Table 4). This would not surprisingly suggest that as training content and formal 
training aids improve and supply the knowledge and skills there is less of a need 
to suggest training content interventions. 
6.2.3 Training Expectations 
Perceptions of a training programme can influence the outcome from 
training and therefore can influence training effectiveness. Trainees' readiness 
and thus willingness to transfer the newly acquired knowledge and skills can also 
be based upon the value attached to the training and support climate, but also are 
affected by the expectation that transfer to the job will be successful (Noe & 
Schmitt, 1986). Expectations from training could therefore influence the 
individual outcome from training. But in interdependent teams such as those 
found in the military, unfulfilled expectations could influence upward through to. 
the team in the form of attitudes that may impede the successful achievement of 
organisational objectives -vertical transfer. Comparing expectations of the 
training content and performance with perceptions from the training platform will 
identify if the training programme provided what was expected and whether the 
resulting knowledge and skill will lead to perceived specific and desired 
performance outcomes. Thus, achieving vertical transfer outcomes. 
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6.2.3.1 Training Content 
Expectations of training content indicated whether changes to the training 
programme and instructor capabilities affected subsequent training outcomes, and 
if further changes were still needed to the training content and documentation. 
Respondents all mutually disagreed (4.26 + 0.71) that changes in training content 
or growth in instructor capabilities would detrimentally affect the success of 
further training. This outcome was expected as respondents agreed they have 
received the knowledge and skills, even with changes to the programme content 
and documentation (6.2.1.1, Training Content). Respondents also agreed that the 
instructor characteristics had changed over time (6.2.1.3, Instructor 
Characteristics), but changes were seen as a positive outcome to achieving the 
knowledge and skills needed to perform future duties. 
When asked if changes could still be made to the training content and 
supporting documents to support achievement of outcomes, respondents agreed 
that changes could still be made (training content, 1.85 + 0.72 and documentation, 
2.23 + 0.84) to improve the depth and breadth of training courses. With the 
exception of one manager, all respondents believed changes could still be made to 
the training content to include: more knowledge for the maintainers; specific 
knowledge and skill training in EOPs; more operational training for SCOOW; 
and, expansion of EOP training in both the classroom and the simulator to include 
post-emergency actions to restore and repair, if needed, after an emergency. Most 
respondents also agreed that changes could still be made to documentation, 
specifically the EOPs as the technical documents were considered in good order, 
clear and detailed (Figure 12, Expectation Accuracy). As detailed in Section 5.2.2, 
the EOPs, although learned with the support of informal mechanisms, EOPs were 
considered inadequate in content, format and style and thus were thought to be 
more difficult to understand, learn and memorise than necessary. It was identified 
that the current EOP document supports the capability to perform the tasks but 
does not supply sufficient details to learn the sequences. As the training platform 
did not supply formal knowledge training in systems integration or EOPs, it was 
157 
felt that an EOP document specifically designed for learning would be of 
assistance, especially so for inexperienced submariners. 
Although most crewmembers discussed their displeasure wvith EOPs, this 
sentiment was not identified by most when asked if EOPs aided in learning 
(Section 6.2.1.2). Crew two and three SCOOWs did identify their displeasure, but 
this did not affect their response when asked to identify if the accuracy of the 
training content and aids influenced learning. It was the officers of crew one. 
These select groups did agree however that changes could still be made to 
documentation. However, it was the majority of junior technicians from crew one 
who disagreed that further changes could still me made (4.00 + 0.00). 
6.2.3.2 Performance Expectation 
Expectations for performance were designed to identify whether the 
knowledge and skills gained from the training programme would lead to 
perceived specific and desired performance outcomes. As seen in Figure 9, 
Capability to Perform, all agreed that the trainees will have the knowledge and 
skill to perform their duties during sea-trials and thus have the capabilities to 
perform once the submarines belong to Canada (1.92 + .6 1). However, when 
asked if changes to the training content and aids would have a detrimental 
influence on their capability to perform, there was only a overall slight 
disagreement (3.34 + 1.20). These results would seem to conflict with the 
responses for capability to perform. The skewing of results was seen by the 
officers of crew one and two who agreed to performance influences (1.56 + 0.43 
and 2.17 + 0.76), but also the senior technicians agreed (2.17 + 0.76) that changes 
would have a detrimental affect to performance (Figure 12, Performance 
Influence). These findings do not agree with the response of training content 
expectations to changes in content and instructor capabilities to effect future 
training outcomes (4.26 + 0.71). The perceived detrimental influence of changes 
in the training platform to performance during sea-trials from crew one and two 
was based upon their concerns of the delays to deliver submarines (Section 4.4.3). 
Thus, cumulative effects from the delays in delivering the submarines resulted in 
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cascade delays in training to successive crews that had an effect on performance. 
What was learned could not be practised and therefore not ingrained, thus there 
Evas decay in both knowledge and skills. The apparent discrepancy between 
responses of agreement that knowledge and skill would be obtained to perform 
sea-trials and strong agreement by some that changes would affect performance 
could suggest that if the training platform could not provide what was needed, it 
would be gained elsewhere. 
When asked if team composition would have an effect on subsequent job 
performance, there was a resounding agreement (1.80 + 0.72) of the support team 
composition provides (Figure 11, Teams and Performance). Expectations of team 
support for performance was in agreement with the overall perceptions of team 
composition influence on learning (2.12 + 1.04). This was reflected in the 
interviews, "Learning and subsequent job performance go hand in hand. Team, 
composition is a factor when things go wrong. " This response reflects the concept 
of interdependent teams and vertical transfer, in that individual learning has an 
effect on performance and that performance also influences the capabilities of the 
team. Thus, individual outcomes are directly linked upward to team and 
organisational outcomes. Interviews revealed that many individual factors play a 
part in the support provided by a team member, "Personality, method of delivery 
and knowledge and skill combine to make the difference. " 
6.2.3.3 Operator and Maintainer Expectations 
Although an unexpected finding in studying this training platform, it was 
identified and agreed by all involved in the training programme that the perceived 
percentage of new knowledge and skills required to perform the tasks in this class 
of submarine differed depending upon whether the crew position was that of an 
operator (32.63 + 5.31%) or a maintainer (73.38 + 9.7%) (Section 5.2.3.3). 
Although this study focused on the training effectiveness factors associated with 
the performance of emergency procedures, background knowledge and skill is 
necessary to perform each role to understand the complexity of the systems, their 
reactions, and to problem solve when needed. Expectations of the new knowledge 
159 
and skill to be acquired also relates to the perceptions of desired performance 
outcomes, and relating performance expectations with perceptions of training 
satisfaction will identify if the training provided what was expected and to what 
extent. 
To identify whether expectations of training content and performance varied 
significantly between trainers, managers and trainees, a Kruskal-Wallis Analysis 
of Variance was undertaken. No significance differences were found between 
groups for training content expectations or expectations of performance outcomes 
from the training platform. This was not unexpected as all respondents generally 
agreed that changes would not detrimentally affect future training, but changes 
could still be made to the content and documents to improve the training. 
Differences between crews were however expected for training performance as 
both crew one and two identified changes, or rather delays in the training 
programme had a detrimental influence on performance. This difference did not 
ultimately have an effect when expectation training content questions were 
combined. As expected there were also no significant differences between group 
expectations of knowledge and skill to be acquired for operators. 
However, significant group differences were found for expectations of 
knowledge and skill needed for maintainers to perform (x2 =12.95, d, =4, p=. 012), 
with crew three having lower expectations than crew one, whose expectations 
were lower than the CF managers (Appendix E). The differences between these 
groups and crew two, the CF managers and the RN trainers can be somewhat 
explained. It would have been expected that crew one would have had the highest 
level of expectation as they did not know what to expect from training, and crew 
one had the greatest overall experience. Thus, one would expect perception to be 
biased on past experience. Interviews have corroborated that crew ones' lower 
expectations are likely due to the fact that the course was a pilot course and 
therefore training content and documentation were in a state of transition, "The 
content was predetermined, some changes have been put in place but they have 
not affected the crew at the time (of training), but will affect subsequent boats 
(crews). " 
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Crew threes' lower indication of the knowledge and skill required for 
maintainers could be explained by the fact that they were the third crew to be 
trained, and knowing that maintenance would not be taught in detail, they had 
lower expectations. The lower expectation could have alternatively been related to 
the changes in the training platform and the realisation that the training methods 
employed to learn had in fact supplied the knowledge and skill needed to perform 
the tasks for the workplace. This would be a reasonable explanation as it has been 
identified that formal and informal learning is expected within this community 
(both RN and CF), and this style has successfully achieved performance outcome 
requirements (for further details see Sections 5.2.3.3 and 6.2.1.2. ). "Submariners 
learn formally and informally, that how it is, and how it should be. " However, 
although this method has been the norm (sic) for training, this training style was 
not found to be completely satisfactory to assure the performance outcomes. 
Interviews revealed, " They knew we would informally train, but we have 
requested improvements in technical training to formalise that training. In 
operations (performance) we're fine but on the technical side we need more. " 
This would suggest that expectations of training were not being met. 
The lower expectations of the CF manager did not include the CF training 
managers, as they did not respond to this question. Thus, the response from the 
COs was likely a close reflection of their crews' perception, which closely 
followed their junior officers' responses. 
This case study also examined the relationships between perceptions and 
expectations to identify if expectations were met, if the training programme met 
those expectations, and what factors within the training design influenced the 
success of training. Significant relationships were identified. Training content 
expectations negatively correlated with perceptions of both training content and 
formal training aids (p= <. 05, rs -. 335 and p= <. 05, rS -. 354, respectively, Table 
4). This suggests findings that as training content and formal training aids 
improve and provide the expected knowledge and skill, there is a reduced 
requirement for further changes to the training platform to meet expectations. 
Also, trainee performance expectations positively correlated with perceptions of 
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formal training aids (p= <. 05, rs . 368) and negatively correlated with learning 
(p= <. 05, rs -. 374, Table 4). These findings suggest that as formal training aids 
improve and become more helpful in improving learning (such as greater 
individual and team integration simulator training and sea-trials) the more likely 
expected performance outcomes will be achieved. 
As the training programme intended to provide training with an operator 
focus it was not surprising that no significant correlations were found between 
expectation of newly acquired operator knowledge and skill and training influence 
perceptions. As the training was focused on providing operator training, results 
would suggest that trainees' expectations were met. 
It was also identified that there was an expectation that performance 
outcomes required a maintainer capability and, according to the trainees the 
perceived knowledge and skill to perform the new tasks was considered 
significant (73.38 + 9.7%). However, the training programme was neither 
intended nor designed to provide training to support problem solving or 
maintenance capabilities. Thus, one would expect correlations between 
expectations of the amount of newly acquired maintainer knowledge and skill and 
perceptions of training influence. Only a significant negative correlation was 
found with informal training aids (p= <. 05, rs -. 375, Table 4). This finding would 
suggest that the greater the provision of maintainer knowledge and skill within 
training the less reliance there was on informal training aids to achieve expected 
performance outcomes. No significant correlations were found between training 
influence expectations (Table 4). 
6.2.4 Summary of Perceptions and Expectations 
In summary, no relationships were found between the pre-training factors of 
training aids, instructor characteristics and informal and formal training aids, and 
statistical comparisons could not be made with training principles. These findings 
can likely be attributed to the lack of power due to the small sample size. 
However, questionnaire responses and qualifying statements from interviews 
would suggest that RN trainers' capability and self-confidence to provide training, 
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and perceptions of competency by the trainees, would be based upon and strongly 
influenced by the prior training received by the instructors. 
Detailed historical review of prior training has shown the Canadian Navy 
training platform, to include the training content, tools, aids and methods of 
evaluation, that were based upon and very closely reflected the RN historical 
training that the instructors received. Although, current training for the CF 
reflected that of the historical training of the RN, the learning opportunities 
gained during the observation and discussions during the building of the 
submarines was not of course available. The exclusion of this portion of the 
historical training and the further lack to identify and include the information 
gained during this informal learning process within the Canadian Navy training 
platform, could account for the trainees' perception that further knowledge was 
needed, and thus could account for the trainees' attempts to seek out the 
information informally during their training. 
The significant positive correlation found between training content and 
training methods, suggested a satisfaction that the training platform would 
provide the necessary knowledge and skills was directly connected to the methods 
used to assess the knowledge and skill of trainers and trainees. The correlation 
further suggests, with corroboration from interviews, that confidence in the 
training programme was also based upon the self-confidence of trainees to 
achieve expected outcomes. Moreover, no significant differences were found 
between crews, further suggesting there were no significant changes in confidence 
to achieve expected outcomes as training progressed. 
No significant correlations were found between formal and informal aids, 
but a significant correlation was found between formal training aids and training 
content. This finding suggests the more useful the training aids the less likely 
intervention was needed. The significant differences of informal aids used 
between crews (two more so than crew one) suggests that crew twos' greater 
reliance on informal aids occurred either because changes to the training platform 
had not occurred as yet, or changes were not considered sufficient to meet 
expected training outcomes. 
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Instructor characteristics positively correlated with training content and 
negatively with informal training aids. These findings suggested that changes in 
training content (e. g. instruction) were directly related to instructor capabilities, 
and as instructor capabilities improve there was less of a need to employ informal 
training aids. There were no significant differences between crews, however, over 
the course of training successive crews all agreed in the growth of the knowledge 
and skill of trainers over time. These findings would suggest that although 
knowledge and skill of trainers increased with successive courses, informal 
methods to gain knowledge and skill continued within and between successive 
crews. This would suggest a global commitment from trainees to seek out and 
mutually support passing on of information outside of the training programme so 
as to achieve performance outcomes. These findings would then further suggest a 
commitment to achieve higher-level organisational goals rather than just 
achievement of personal performance goals- vertical transfer. 
Findings from the perceived impact to learning identified a positive 
correlation with training methods and a negative correlation with both formal and 
informal aids. This intercorrelation suggests that learning improves with the 
ongoing confirmation of knowledge and skill of both trainers and trainees, and as 
formal aids improve there is less of an effect to learning and less reliance on 
informal aids. Trainees were provided an opportunity to suggest changes to the 
curriculum and training aids. However, negative correlations with both training 
content and formal training aids with training interventions not surprisingly 
suggests that as training content and formal aids improve there is less of a need 
for intervention. 
Training outcomes can also be affected by training and performance 
expectations. Although no correlations were found between expectations, training 
content expectation negatively correlated with both training content and formal 
training aids. As training content and formal training improve and provide the 
expected knowledge and skill there is less of a requirement for further changes to 
the training platform to meet training expectations. Trainee performance 
expectations positive correlation with formal training aids and negative 
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correlation with learning indicated the expectation for performance and how the 
training platform affected that outcome. Again a common theme emerged, as 
formal training aids improve and become more helpful in improving learning the 
more likely expected performance outcomes will be achieved. 
Trainees identified there were very different expectations for the percentage 
of new knowledge and skill needed for operators (32.63 + 5.31%) and maintainers 
(73.38 + 9.7%) (Appendix E). As the training platform was intended to provide 
operator training, it was not surprising to find no significant correlations with 
perceptions or operator knowledge and skill expectations. This would suggest that 
expectations were met for operators, but they were achieved utilising informal 
methods to gain knowledge and skill. However, that was not the case when 
stakeholders were asked if maintainer knowledge and skill expectations were met. 
A negative correlation with informal training aids suggested that the greater the 
training platform provided the knowledge and skill to meet expected performance 
outcomes the less reliant trainees were on informal aids. 
But findings indicated that the training platform did not provide all of the 
knowledge and skill needed for maintainers, thus there was a continued reliance 
on informal aids over successive crews' training. Differences in maintainer 
knowledge and skill expectations were found between crews, with crew three 
having lower expectations than crew one (Appendix E). This finding suggests that 
crew three had lower maintainer expectations from training than crew one, which 
was lower than the other interviewed stakeholders. Interviews revealed the reason 
for the lower expectation was that crew three expected that changes to the training 
platform should have occurred at this point, and more training was expected for 
maintainers. Therefore, one could conclude from the correlation that there was a 
heavy reliance on informal aids to meet expected performance outcomes for 
maintainers (e. g., amplifying the knowledge and skill for marine engineers and 
electricians). It would also suggest that expectations for maintainer training were 
not being met from the training platform. 
As data collection of perceptions and expectations were only determined 
once at various stages of completion of the training for the successive crews, pre 
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and post training perceptions of the effects of any changes to the training platform 
and potential changes of performance expectations could not be evaluated. It was 
also unfortunate that performance measures could not be obtained to measure 
learning, and due to lack of power (low number of subjects) regression analysis 
could not be reliably performed to test the relative effects of these independent 
variables. 
Although performance measures could not be taken, the indication that each 
crew was able to sail successfully back to Canada provides the ultimate indication 
that overall crew performance outcomes were achieved. Also, performance during 
sea-trials and certification of capability from the RN Captain would indicate the 
crews' capability to successfully complete emergency operating procedures. Sea- 
trials are considered a training opportunity as well as a method to evaluate 
capabilities. Sea-trials are progressive in nature, providing initial practise of 
operating and emergency manoeuvres under controlled conditions at sea, 
progressing to more intense and complex multiple emergency sequences as 
assessors confirm capability. The RN policies, procedures and guidelines for sea 
training and certification are pre-defined and very specific and detailed to include 
the requirement for ongoing feedback of progress (Royal Navy, 1999a). Thus, 
certification would reasonably assure a crews' capability to deal with multiple 
emergency failures consistent with those that may be experienced as a result of 
collision (Royal Navy, 1999a). 
Although findings suggest that performance expectations were met for 
operators but not met for maintainers, all crews successfully completed and 
achieved certification of capabilities during sea-trials. Thus, performance 
outcomes were achieved for functional operations, and as a crew they achieved 
the capability to perform emergency procedures even with significant delays in 
the training programme. 
The significant findings between training factors and between crewmembers 
suggest specific training factors influence training effectiveness and outcomes 
from training. These correlations would include training content and methods, 
instructor characteristics, and formal and informal aids impacted both learning 
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and performance. These exploratory findings also suggest a link between pre- 
training and training influences from the organisation, individual and training 
design that combine to influence this complex, interdependent team training to 
achieve personal and higher-level organisational objectives. 
Thus, results have supported the theory that individual outcomes emerge 
upward through teams to achieve organisational objectives. This case study has 
thus provided the empirical evidence to support the theory of interdependent 
vertical team transfer. Common correlations between informal training aids with 
learning and expectations for maintainer knowledge and skill, and between formal 
aids with content and performance expectations would also suggest that 
intervention measures taken by individuals upward through the team, and across 
teams, has enhanced training outcomes. Thus, efforts by individuals upward 
through to teams, and across teams has impacted organisational effectiveness. 
Chapter 7 provides further detail the on the integration and impact of the case 
study findings within the aims of this thesis. 
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7. Discussion 
The objective of this case study of complex team-training was threefold: 1) 
to provide empirical evidence to support the theory of interdependent team 
vertical transfer; 2) to identify the links and influences of training effectiveness 
factors from pre-training and training organisational, situational and individual 
variables, with a focus on the training design, to broaden the scope of multilevel 
training effectiveness on vertical transfer; and, 3) to provide foundation evidence 
to support the theory linking training effectiveness to organisational effectiveness. 
The existing literature in training effectiveness research has evolved and 
proven that learning and transferring what has been learned in training to the 
workplace is influenced by a complex multi-factorial interaction of individual, 
organisational and training factors. However, although training is intended to 
support the achievement of organisational objectives and strategies, training 
effectiveness research has focused primarily on the influences to the outcomes on 
the individual in the horizontal plane (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kraiger & Aguinis, 
2001; Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Research and 
modelling has thus far only assumed the upward linkage and emergence of 
individual training outcomes and organisational objectives (Kozlowski et al., 
2000). It has also been postulated that validation and delineation of this vertical 
transfer linkage would strengthen the link between training effectiveness and 
organisational effectiveness (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
This dissertation builds upon current training research by providing 
empirical support to the theory of multilevel approaches to training effectiveness 
from research findings obtained while the Canadian Navy performed complex 
team-training of successive crews for each of the four newly purchased 
submarines. Although the research focused on the performance of safety-critical 
elements of operations, this training platform was ideal to identify multilevel 
approaches to training effectiveness, as real-world training presents the many and 
often varied interactions, capabilities, complications, and interventions that 
training effectiveness research hopes to understand and address from a system 
perspective. Also, historical concerns of past training research were addressed. 
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Training was linked and integral to organisational objectives (Kozlowski & Salas, 
1997) and, thus, the training platform did not limit or exclude the potential many 
and varied influences that higher-level contexts (team, unit, and organisation) can 
exert on training effectiveness and outcomes (Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Cannon- 
Bowers et al., 1995; Kozlowski, 1998; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). 
Training is predicated on contributing to higher-level group and 
organisational outcomes and objectives. However, although there is a research 
base indicating that training contributes to individual effectiveness (Kozlowski et 
al., 2000), to date it is only assumed that training contributes to organisational 
effectiveness. Furthermore, although assumed, training effectiveness is ultimately 
determined by the degree to which training outcomes contribute to organisational 
objectives and strategies. To provide empirical exploratory evidence to the theory 
of vertical transfer and link training effectiveness and organisational 
effectiveness, this case study focused its efforts on the pre-training and training 
influences within the training platform that influence achievement of higher-level 
goals. The rationale for this approach was that the training platform is central to 
the foundation of the theories, an effective training platform will provide 
outcomes that meet organisational objectives to achieve organisational 
effectiveness, and training effectiveness will identify the multilevel influences to 
prepare and implement an effective training platform that contributes to 
organisational effectiveness. 
7.1 Multilevel Approaches to Training Effectiveness 
This case study provided a unique and yet to be explored approach to 
broaden the scope of multilevel approaches to training effectiveness, 
simultaneously identifying and examining the link between individual through to 
team influences, training outcomes and organisational effectiveness (Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001) across the horizontal and vertical platform (Kozlowski et 
al., 2000). The existing training and transfer literature has indicated many 
individual, organisational, training and situational constructs that can influence 
training and outcomes. Moreover, certain variables have been shown to relate to 
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perception, expectation and satisfaction within a training platform, which together 
would provide broad indications of support and success over the course of crew 
training. Although these constructs have not been studied together, or approached 
within a multilevel framework, pre-training influences such as individual 
characteristics and experiences (Tannenbaum, 1993), perceptions of 
organisational climate (Noe et al., 1997; Rouiller & Goldstein, 1993), perception 
of trainees on instructors and vice versa (Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001), perceptions of 
organisational support and input, training medium, training design and quality of 
delivery (Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001), and expectations from training (Cannon- 
Bowers et al., 1995; Mathieu & Matineau, 1997; Tannenbaum, 1993) have all 
been shown to influence training and transfer. Using these constructs together in 
the research and writing of this thesis has provided the unique capability to 
identify the multilevel influences and interactions within a training programme 
that have influenced both horizontal and vertical transfer over successive crew 
training. 
The additional background history and in depth Hierarchical Task Analysis 
of Emergency Operating Procedures provided additional supportive exploratory 
evidence to support the notion that multilevel influences can have either 
supported or moderated both learning and performance outcomes that have 
emerged upward in the achievement of organisational objectives. 
7.1.1 Implied Training Process for Undertaking Training 
It is well acknowledged that one of the most important steps in training 
development is conducting a training needs analysis (Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Kozlowski, 1997; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). This process focuses on who 
should be trained, what should be trained, and what may affect the delivery of the 
training. A training needs analysis therefore identifies where training is needed in 
an organisation, what needs to be taught and who needs to receive the training. 
This in turn identifies the learning objectives, and shapes the design, method and 
process of delivery of the training intervention. Training effectiveness follows on 
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from this to identify why training did or did not achieve its objectives and what 
factors influenced the training and successful transfer. 
However, the Canadian Navy did not complete a training needs analysis. 
Rather, as the RN controlled training, analysis was limited to discussions with the 
RN who suggested depth of training and currently available RN courses for each 
occupation. Thus, the training programme to integrate the Canadian Navy to a 
new working platform was not developed to identify individual needs or 
interdependent team needs for the tasks in this new platform. This was evident in 
the presumption that the basic certification for systems in one platform was a 
suitable and sufficient pre-requisite for training to the new platform. The 
additional workload in the new platform for technicians and changes to the system 
functioning would, as an example, identify that the pre-requisite from a prior 
platform would not be adequate unless the training programme addressed the 
differences. The training programme also did not take into consideration the 
varied levels of experience and inexperience (less than two years) of the trainees, 
or lapse in experience. 
With no training needs analysis, the Canadian training program remained a 
very close reflection of the RN historical training platform provided by the RN for 
this submarine. The RN had decommissioned the Upholder class submarine six 
years prior to initiating training for the Canadian Navy, thus there was a 
significant lapse since the instructors obtained any training or actively served on 
this vessel. Although instructors had significant submarine experience, most also 
had little active service on this class of submarine prior to decommissioning. 
Training at that time also consisted chiefly of systems knowledge obtained 
informally through the building and activation of the system. So, instructors had 
little to no experience, with a significant lapse since they were involved with the 
submarine, and there was no training package made for this system, the training 
lectures were considered very scant, and supporting documentation were either 
non-existent or incomplete. Thus, the instructors had to re-familiarise themselves 
with the platform and bring themselves up to speed, with very little to aid them 
besides memory. Beyond sketchy documentation, there was also no other experts 
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to seek guidance from and access to the submarines was a continuing problem and 
not within their control. 
With no direct knowledge of the strengths or weakness of the trainees, or 
what specific training needs were required to meet Canadian objectives, all 
training was provided to one proficiency level. Within a military platform, 
operational duties and responsibilities within a submarine are divided, and 
responsibilities vary with increased rank. That is, technicians do not perform the 
same duties as managers. Technicians thus felt they were not receiving sufficient 
training. The first crew presented this deficiency and dissatisfaction to the training 
managers, and it was agreed that the training had an operational focus, rather than 
a technical one. As the first crews' training was considered a pilot course, 
discussions of this shortcoming in the post training, lessoned-learned meeting 
resulted in changes to the knowledge portions of training for successive crews. 
Specifically, it was agreed that certain occupations (mostly technical) were not 
receiving sufficient training to perform their duties and courses were added to 
alleviate this shortfall. It was further identified in the meeting that insufficient 
time was given in simulator training for individuals and teams to be proficient in 
performing the emergency operating procedures. The result was an extension of 
simulator training from one week to two weeks of training. 
It was further noted by the trainees that knowledge training was specific for 
the systems that each occupation was responsible for but no formal knowledge 
was provided to gain an understanding of how the systems were connected and 
the potential multi- or cascade consequences that could occur in an emergency. 
There was also no formal knowledge training for the sequencing or systems 
involved in EOPs during phase-one training. Although individual and team 
simulator training was provided, time constraints did not allow all permutations of 
each emergency to be practised in simulator training. This deficiency was also 
presented in the post training, lessoned-learned meeting. From this, the training 
management completed a cursory survey with both crew one and two to 
determine if they felt confident to do their jobs safely at sea. To which each crew 
replied they were. Training management also noted that a balance between the 
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knowledge and skill training was needed, they considered there was a balance but 
would continue to track the capability of ongoing crews training and satisfaction. 
As trainees were not provided EOP systems sequencing training during the 
knowledge phase, for any of the three crews training, trainees felt they needed to 
take it upon themselves to learn the multi-system linkages and the actions 
required during any of the 31 emergency sequences. They did this through an 
informal process, individually, between crews, and seeking support from 
subsequent crews who had completed this phase of training. 
Throughout training it was also noted that EOPs and supporting documents 
were not complete and contained errors, especially for the first crews' training. 
During the initial training, availability and access to documents were also 
considered a problem, which was noted by the trainees but also acknowledged by 
the managers. The RN were the owners of the documents, but it is likely that 
some of the documents were not complete. As well, it is likely that original 
documents and subsequent requests for changes had not received formal approval 
for distribution while a crew were receiving their phase one and two training. This 
resulted in appearances that request for changes to documents were not 
acknowledged or accepted. However, although formal changes to documents 
took time, most suggestions for changes to documents as a result of errors or 
omissions were changed unofficially by the instructors, throughout training. Upon 
successive crews training the issue of access to documents was alleviated, 
however the issue of completion of the documents, errors and omissions 
continued, although to a lesser extent. 
It was also noted that the EOP procedural document was not written to 
support learning. Rather, it was identified that the document assumed all 
procedures were known, and thus the document acted as a referral or reminder of 
the process. As systems knowledge was not taught, nor were the EOPs taught 
prior to simulator training where memorisation was expected, trainees had to learn 
the procedures informally on their own time. For the inexperienced members, 
learning the procedures through this method was found to be difficult. As a result, 
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more senior members took it upon themselves to mentor the younger crew 
members. 
Delays in re-activating the submarines also had a cascading effect on 
training. As crew one could not complete sea-trials, with no available submarine, 
they could not continue with training. The result was a degradation of knowledge 
and skills, and subsequent re-training was required in the simulator. Further crews 
training were delayed as there were insufficient instructors to complete the 
knowledge and skill phase training for crew three, USQ for crew two and 
concurrent sea-trials for crew one. This deficiency could not be resolved within 
the training program as there was insufficient staff to complete all that had to be 
done. The result was that each crew continued with training on an informal basis, 
seeking advice from builders, contractors, supporting documents, and gaining 
access to a submarine when available to try to maintain knowledge and skill, and 
keep on track. 
Testing measures were in place in this training platform to identify 
knowledge and skill attainment, however, trainees were not given any feedback of 
strengths, weaknesses or confirmation of progress. Trainees thus had to presume 
their own and their crewmembers capabilities. Requests were made to address this 
perceived shortcoming; however, it was not addressed to the satisfaction of the 
crewmembers, for any of the successive crew training. There was therefore an 
uncertainty as to whether the required knowledge and skills would be obtained 
through the formal training process. 
The alternative was to seek out the perceived required information 
informally. This method of information retrieval was considered the norm as both 
nations supported and endorsed a training philosophy that included and expected 
both a formal and informal mechanism for learning. Although there were 
identified deficiencies in the training platform (e. g., lack of expertise of 
instructors, incomplete state of supporting documents, no feedback, and an 
operational focus), rather than succumb to the barriers and limits of the training 
platform all trainees accepted that the training platform would not meet 
expectations and informal mechanisms of learning were sought as compensation. 
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The misunderstanding of the training goal further fuelled the mechanism of 
informal learning. Trainees, especially technicians, expected they would receive 
sufficient training to achieve the same knowledge and skill state as that from the 
previous operating system. This misinterpretation of the training goal further 
cascaded into perceptions that the training content would not meet the 
performance outcome expectations. The lowered expectation was seen from 
technicians, but operators also felt the training content was not sufficient, 
although not to the same degree. Trainees thus perceived a greater level of 
knowledge was needed to achieve performance outcomes in the new working 
platform than that provided formally in the training programme. 
These combined factors resulted in informal methods of learning. The 
informal method of learning and support from other crewmembers within a crew 
and from previous crews continued throughout the training programme. Over 
successive crew training, crews continued to believe that further knowledge was 
needed to perform their duties. Their dissatisfaction was also related to their 
frustration that changes that were present at the start of the training programme 
had not been remedied at this point in the training programme. This resulted in a 
continuation of retrieving information informally. 
Assessment of the influences of this training programme has shown that 
when a person analysis is inadequate and details of who should be trained, why, 
and what should be trained are not sufficiently completed, individual strengths 
and weaknesses are not identified. The result was the provision of training at a 
level that resulted in sub-optimised training effectiveness. 
7.1.2 Vertical Transfer 
The findings from this case study have indicated that even with the 
considerable obstacles and challenges incurred by the trainers and trainees, 
operation performance outcomes were achieved (as they sailed safely back to 
Canada), and the crew of each submarine achieved the functional capability and 
was certified `safe' to perform emergency operating procedures. Findings further 
identified that the process was achieved through individual outcomes that 
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emerged upward through the interdependent teams to achieve organisational 
objectives. Using the VIE theory identified by Vroom (1964) (cited in Mathieu & 
Matineau, 1997; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997), this approach can 
help to explain result findings and verify the theory of interdependent team 
vertical transfer (Kozlowski et al., 2000). 
Motivation was seen as a compelling driving force to learning the 
knowledge and skills for the new working platform(although not measured), but 
as well, there was a strong motivation and persistence to ensure knowledge and 
skills were considered sufficient for performance in the new working platform. 
This motivation to successfully achieve performance outcomes from the 
conversion training was seen to stem from the inherent risk of the working 
platform of the trainees, as the potential consequence of an accident or ineffective 
dealings with an emergency in a submarine, individually or as a team, could be 
catastrophic. With the inherent risk, isolation and confinement of the working 
environment of a submarine each individual is required to fully understand all 
safety aspects, and thus there is a requirement for all submariners to achieve a 
basic submarine certification for the submarine they are employed prior to active 
service. 
However, beyond the requirement for each crewmember to have achieved a 
safety qualification, there is a further requirement for specific positions to 
collaborate in the performance of interdependent tasks to deal with any 
emergency to ensure the safety of the crew and the submarine (i. e., performance 
of EOPs). Thus, the safety of all crewmembers j1s dependent upon the crews' 
capabilities as a whole, but the capability to perform the safety-critical systems 
operation for any emergency is dependent on the capabilities of the 
interdependent team on duty. The consequence of not doing well in training for an 
individual or the team could be disastrous. Thus, there was a collective 
expectancy that training outcomes would provide the knowledge and skills 
necessary to successfully perform in the new working platform. Additionally, the 
consequence within the platform was also an extreme motivator to assure all 
crewmembers achieved the perceived knowledge and skills for this working 
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platform. Thus, the consequences for lack of skill in the working platform was 
seen to shape the belief that training would provide the perceived necessary skills, 
but also is an important factor for the lengths the trainees would go to achieve that 
perceived capability, individually, within a crew and between crews. 
This case study has shown that expectation and satisfaction with training 
content are associated with performance outcome expectations, although a direct 
link was not identified. However, the associations with subunits in the training 
platform identify that specific areas within a training programme influenced both 
learning and expectations. Further, the subunit associations in the training 
programme also provide more explicit answers to the rationale for the approaches 
taken to ensure successful achievement of vertical transfer. 
Significant correlation findings have shown that the greater the 
improvement of training content and formal aids the less need for changes to meet 
training expectations (p<. 05, -. 354), and as formal aids improve and become more 
helpful in learning the more likely performance outcome expectations would be 
met(p<. 05, -368). These common formal training aids negative correlation 
findings from this case study would suggest that the support supplied from the 
tools from training (e. g., individual and team simulator training) were expected to 
support the knowledge and skills to achieve performance outcomes from training. 
As no inter-group differences were found, this would further identify this 
sentiment was felt by all trainees, trainers and managers. Further, a significant 
negative association was found between learning and formal training aids (p>. 01, - 
. 394) and with performance expectations (p>. 05, -. 374). These case study findings 
would identify the benefit of formal training aids to improve learning (Hitt II et 
al., 2001). This common formal aid negative association with performance 
expectation would also identify the value and expectation from the training tools 
to support team performance outcomes (Allen et al., 1985). However, although 
formal training aids were found to be very beneficial (i. e., individual and team 
simulator training), case study findings would further identify that formal training 
aids were not considered sufficient enough to overcome other training platform 
influences on learning or to meet the expectations for maintainers. 
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Even though intervention opportunities were provided and changes were 
instituted through successive crew training, informal training aids were used as 
identified by the negative relationship with learning (p>. 05, -. 313) and with 
maintainer knowledge and skill expectation (p>. 05, -. 375). The significant group 
difference on influences to learning (x2=10.373, d 4, p=. 035) would identify 
that informal methods continued to be used by crew three to support learning. 
This continual heavy reliance on informal aids through successive crews 
was influenced by a number of factors from pre-training and within the training 
platform. Pre-training assumptions that determined the training design can be 
considered as a key influence. Interview corroboration and consistent significant 
differences between CF managers and RN trainers' perceptions of the influence of 
various training platform factors from trainees has identified the disparate view 
that the qualifications were considered sufficient. These consistent and significant 
differences between trainees and both CF managers and RN trainers for the 
degree of influence for training content, training methods, instructor 
characteristics, and formal training aids identified that there was an expectation 
and a belief by managers and trainers that prior training and certification would 
provide the background needed for this training. The mangers and trainers applied 
this belief and expectation to both the capability to instruct by the trainers and the 
capability of the trainees to achieve performance outcomes. 
These pre-training influences would moderate the expectations and 
satisfaction with the training platform, specifically, the interrelationships with 
training content. The case study has shown that there was also a significant 
positive relationship between training content and formal training aids, training 
methods and instructor characteristics that together influenced the satisfaction 
with the training programme. With corroboration from interviews these training 
content interrelationship findings, in concert with the significant negative 
association with perceptions of intervention changes, can be considered together 
as the drive for informal mechanisms to retrieve and share information. 
Confirmation of knowledge and skill (for both instructors and trainees) was not 
provided, as there was no feedback during training. The responsibility for this 
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deficiency was then transferred to instructors, which also influenced the opinion 
of the ability of the instructors and influenced perception of the value of formal 
aids (e. g., incomplete state of documentation) to achieve the expected knowledge 
and skill. 
This research has also identified the perception of the value of training was 
also significantly influenced by the inherent training philosophy of both nations, 
which supported and endorsed both formal and informal components to training 
that included gaining of knowledge from outside sources. The significant 
relationship between instructor capabilities, training content (p= <. 01, rs . 442) 
and informal aids (p= <. 01, rs -. 397), support the existence and significance of 
this philosophy. The overall agreement by all successive crews, especially the 
technicians, was that the trainers did not have the in-depth knowledge or skill for 
this working platform, but considered this an acceptable style as it forced trainees 
to search for answers. As a result informal training aids were sought, shared, and 
accepted and expected within and between crewmembers. This informal support 
network can be considered a compensation mechanism to assure knowledge was 
gained and thus performance outcomes were achieved. 
Together the results have revealed that even with all of the obstacles in the 
training platform, trainees believed they would achieve the knowledge and skills 
necessary to perform their future required duties, and there were no changes in 
confidence to achieve expected performance outcomes for successive crews 
during training. Even so, this case study identified that expectations were met for 
operators but were not met for maintainers within the training platform. However, 
functional operational performance outcomes were still achieved despite the 
challenges, delays, and shortcomings in training. This does not suggest that the 
successful performance outcomes were achieved solely because of the informal 
retrieval and distribution of information. Rather, achievement of performance 
outcomes was attributed to the dedicated informal efforts put forth by the trainees. 
The case study has thus shown there was a strong support climate and an 
interdependence of teams both in learning and in achieving performance 
outcomes, within and between crews. Specific and unique individual learning 
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outcomes were required for the success of team performance outcomes, to both 
functionally operate the vessel and to effectively perform emergency procedures. 
Moreover, significant informal interventions were taken individually to assure 
personal achievement, but they were also transferred between individuals, upward 
to teams, and across teams. This was seen in the informal mechanisms to gain and 
transfer information, mentor and support fellow team-mates, within and between 
crews. The successful achievement of crew functional operational performance 
outcomes thus indicate that individual outcomes from training have transcended 
to emerge as successful interdependent team and crew outcomes that have 
achieved organisational objectives. These results would concur with Baldwin and 
Magjuka's (1997) thoughts, that a favourable context can enhance even sub- 
optimal training interventions. 
Therefore, these case study findings provide empirical evidence to support 
the theory of interdependent team vertical transfer. The analysis has also 
identified that success of interdependent team emergency management to achieve 
organisation objectives relies upon technical knowledge and skill, teamwork and 
taskwork skills identified in Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel framework. 
This case study also supports the notion that interdependent team training must 
achieve individual horizontal transfer and that performance capability transcends 
upward to support the interdependent team to achieve the organisation's 
objective. 
7.1.2.1 Vertical Transfer- Team Compilation Influences 
This thesis has thus far provided empirical evidence to support the theory of 
vertical transfer, however, confirmation of what successfully links lower-level 
training to higher level-objectives has yet to be verified and delineated. The 
multilevel model proposed by Kozlowski and Salas (1997) has provided a 
theoretical framework to expand training and transfer research from an individual- 
level focus to emphasis on an organisational system, that addresses vertical, 
horizontal and top-down organisational links (Figure 2). Kozlowski et al (2000) 
further elaborated on this multilevel approach model to propose a framework that 
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recognises and elaborates the different training and transfer implications for 
independent and interdependent teams. However, they (Kozlowski et al., 2000) 
have indicated that the compilation, interdependent team, vertical transfer 
framework has not been modelled to date, and one of the primary concerns in 
formulation of the model for compilation is to identify the linkages between 
individuals, team and higher-level outcomes across levels. The analysis of 
findings from this thesis is able to build upon the interdependent team theory of 
Kozlowski et al (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997a; Kozlowski et al., 2000; 
Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). Utilising the multilevel framework of Kozlowski and 
Salas (1997) (Figure 2) findings from this research are able to identify individual 
and team-training components that support team compilation vertical transfer. 
Specifically, the results from this research have identified the supporting training 
tools, sequences and timings that can aid in vertical transfer. Within this section 
only team emergent findings are discussed, and results of the specific training 
effectiveness factors and their vertical influence to training outcomes are 
discussed later in this chapter (Section 7.1.2). 
7.1.2.1.1 Technostructural Factors 
Through various data collection methods, this case study has provided 
evidence to empirically support the general team content requirements identified 
in Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel level model as an application for 
interdependent team training (Figure 12). The HTA results identified that for 
emergency management in this platform, specific, non-redundant individual 
technological knowledge and skills were needed to fill the requirement for 
specific jobs that would form the interdependent team in the new working 
platform. As an example, the merging of two previous and distinct occupations 
into one in this new working platform, and the functional operating changes of the 
new system from a manual to semi-automated operations to the perform 
emergency procedures, would confirm that specific individual knowledge and 
skill requirements were necessary for team effectiveness in the new working 
platform. These findings are in keeping with the theoretical framework for 
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interdependent teams, in that the case study identified that the target and sequence 
for training would require training for both the individual (for task-specific skills) 
and for the intact team (for integration) for achievement of horizontal and vertical 
transfer (Kozlowski et al., 2000). The findings have further revealed (and are 
supported by past research) that individual skill was founded on, is required, and 
important for team success (Kozlowski, Toney et al., 2001; Salas et al., 1992; van 
Berlo, 1996) in learning and in achieving performance outcomes. The methods 
through which the individual knowledge and skill were obtained was not ideal as 
there was a lack of control of what was learned (Chao, 1997). However, Chao 
(1997) provides a plausible explanation for why an informal approach can be 
successful. Attitudes and behaviours, and this case study would also suggest 
knowledge, that are implicitly learned contribute to a wealth of knowledge that is 
used to evaluate and make sense of new information acquired through implicit or 
explicit means (Chao, 1997). 
Thus, these empirical findings further support Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) 
multilevel framework approach for integration of interdependent teams, as results 
have shown that each member has unique contributions that are critical to the 
outcome. The results have revealed the criticality that training must first focus on 
the individual but it must also focus on the fit and distinctive contributions of each 
individual to meet higher-level outcomes (Kozlowski et al., 2000). The significant 
performance benefits from individual simulator training to support learning of 
individual skills, prior to interactive team training, further corroborates and 
supports the compilation theory that individual delivery of technical skills is 
appropriate and supportive initially (Kozlowski et al., 2000). These case study 
findings also align with the literature on teams, which has indicated that 
individuals must develop some proficiency on their task before they can devote 
attention and skill in team-based activities (Kozlowski et al., 1996; Salas et al., 
1992). Proficiency is critical for this high-tech environment characteristic of a 
modern submarine. So, for compilation training outcomes to be successful, each 
member must possess the requisite knowledge and skills for his or her role in the 
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team (at the individual level), but team members must also learn to function as a 
whole. 
Results within this case study have further shown that interdependent teams 
also considered team training, as intact teams, extremely beneficial to learning 
when interactive training included an accurate representation of the task 
technology, structure and interdependence of task completion, as identified in 
Kozlowski and Salas' (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997) multilevel model (Figure 12). 
Meaning, the benefit of team, task training was found to be dependent upon the 
reflection of the training to the work related task and environment (Cannon- 
Bowers & Salas, 1997b). Consistent with prior research on the value of simulator 
training, this case study has revealed that simulation training that reflected the 
working platform benefited both learning and performance (Allen et al., 1985; 
Mumaw & Roth, 1995; A. Schaafstal, 1993), but also, creation of a learning 
environment that closely resembled a real-world situation supported effective 
training (Hitt II et al., 2001). Training within this case study reaffirms the 
importance of simulation training that is representative of the working platform, 
as training occurred in a simulator that mimicked both function and response of 
the working platform. Additionally, further benefit was obtained from training 
simulations performed within the working platform under controlled, monitored 
conditions. To provide credence to this body of work, case study findings are 
therefore also consistent with Identical Elements Theory, as satisfaction and 
outcome from training have been influenced by the reflection of the training 
content and programme to the physical workplace (Baldwin & Ford, 1988). 
Kozlowski et al (2000) have suggested that training results will be 
ineffective, as will organisational effectiveness, if the training process does not 
address the combination of differing KSA content of individuals in interdependent 
teams. They further acknowledge that opportunities should be taken to use and 
expand the workflow models to make a workable compilation-based model for 
vertical transfer (Kozlowski et al., 2000). This case study's empirical findings of 
training interventions for interdependent teams permits the validation of 
Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel model for use with interdependent teams, 
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as individual knowledge and skill proficiency was found to be a critical 
antecedent to the formation and development of team-task performance (Figure 
12, technostructural transfer). Results, from this case study also allows other 
models. such as those for team competencies (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; 
Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995) to be evaluated for inclusion in Kozlowski and 
Salas' (1997) multi level model to enhance the framework for design and training 
interventions for interdependent team emergency management. 
This case study's findings are consistent with Cannon-Bowers and Salas' 
(1997b; 1995) teamwork competencies model; that team competencies are 
differentially applicable depending on the nature of the task and environment in 
which the team perform. However, results of this thesis confirm van Berlo's (van 
Berlo, 1996) criticisms of this model, in that the categorisations for the nature of 
their team competencies (i. e., Context drive, Team-Contingent, Task-Contingent, 
and Transportable) do not address teams and tasks that do not fit exactly into one 
category, to include this military platform that also deals with emergency 
management. 
According to the categorisation presented by Cannon-Bowers and Salas 
(1997b; 1995) the team in this working platform would fall under Context Driven, 
as there is a high task interdependence under stressful conditions. The team 
membership is also fairly stable, but the performance of emergency procedures 
requires quick adaptation but not to a strategic, problem-solving level. Teams 
must perform a variety of unexpected tasks as a team (thus falling under Team 
Contingent), and the procedures, sequence, and team interaction and coordination 
for each emergency are defined and must be followed (thus falling under Task 
Contingent). Further, reallocation of workload between team members performing 
an emergency procedure is not possible as members have unique skills and 
capabilities and the entire team is interactively required as a whole to 
successfully, and safely complete the task. Team members do however monitor 
each other's performance, which fits within their Context Driven category. This 
relationship is possible in this working platform because there is a shared, 
accurate knowledge of the task and environmental demand, achieved through the 
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qualification for the platform and an in-depth understanding of the specific 
emergency procedure sequence and the responsibilities for each task. 
Thus, case study findings have revealed that this interdependent team has 
team and task specific knowledge and skill competencies that blend across the 
identified categories of Cannon-Bower and Salas' (1995) framework. Although 
most of the knowledge and skill competencies in the Context Driven category fit 
for this interdependent team, reallocation of function does not. Findings further 
suggest that the critical consequences of performing a task incorrectly and the 
infrequent nature of the emergency procedures required knowledge and skill 
competencies that are not identified in this Context Driven category. They include 
explicit task structuring; procedures for task accomplishment; an accurate specific 
detail of the task, not just a shared concept of the task models; information 
exchange; and, intra-team feedback (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995). This case 
study concurs with past findings that there are challenges and difficulties in 
identifying common task and team competencies that must be identified and 
addressed for interdependent team vertical transfer (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; 
Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). Cannon-Bower and Salas' 
(1995) model for team and task knowledge and skill competencies did not entirely 
fit with the team requirements for this platform. However, this case study's 
findings have shown that some of their modelled competencies are supportive of 
common interdependent team and task competencies that can be used to expand 
Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel framework. 
Empirical findings from this team training platform have identified that 
complex, interdependent teams require team knowledge competencies that ensure 
team members have an accurate, detailed knowledge of the team member 
capabilities and their strengths and weaknesses. As shown in this training 
platform, and further supported within the literature, knowledge of team members 
capabilities, deficiencies and challenges provided opportunities for team leaders 
to shape the degree of transfer through informal reinforcement (Cannon-Bowers 
&. Salas, 1997b; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001). Also, findings have identified that 
peer, subordinate and supervisor support all play a critical role in successful team 
185 
training (Riemersma, 2001), including training interdependent teams for 
emergency management (A. M. Schaafstal et al., 2001). This finding was most 
apparent in the informal support provided to team members as an aid to learning. 
Thus, findings enforce the contention that a shared knowledge of the task and 
environment demand is also critical, as is a clear understanding of individual role 
responsibility and interdependency between team roles and task organisation. 
The findings have also identified that a shared cue-strategy association is 
important for the successful achievement of interdependent team tasks (Cannon- 
Bowers & Salas, 1997b), as explicit and controlled communication in an 
emergency situation requires continual updates of the state of the emergency and 
the system for effective management. Therefore, findings would suggest the 
inclusion of cue/strategy associations from Cannon-Bower et al's (Cannon- 
Bowers & Salas, 1997b) model as a subunit of task interdependence in Kozlowski 
and Salas' (1997) model for interdependent team design and delivery support. 
The findings further suggest that beyond teams sharing the knowledge of 
team mission, objectives and resources (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b), to 
ensure that training integrates into the system within an organisational context, 
organisational contextual factors must also be understood and addressed within 
the training design (Baldwin & Magjuka, 1997). The problems that result in 
designing and performing training when organisational goals are misinterpreted 
have been exemplified in this case study. Further, findings have also identified the 
importance and value of training that is designed and implemented to incorporate 
individual and interdependent team knowledge and skill competencies that fit and 
support the workflow configurations within the organisation, based upon the 
organisational resources and working platform technology and configuration 
(structure) (Figure 12). The HTA for this case study identified resource and 
system issues that when not addressed result in sub-optimised training and 
dissatisfaction when training does not fit the requirements for the workflow 
configurations. This was apparent in the insufficient number of personnel 
available to successfully complete certain emergency procedures for all of the 
tasks (e. g., EOP 28.1, insufficient personnel available to fight a fire should it 
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occur). The issue is allocation of personnel within the working platform, but the 
issue is not so simple as reallocation as all personnel have specific duties already. 
Thus, the impact to personnel in training (while at sea) is that simulations for 
these specific EOPs with personnel shortcomings would not be reflective of a true 
emergency. 
Figure 13. Data Collection Variables for the Multilevel Model for Training 
Implementation and Transfer (Green = data collection and comparisons through 
questionnaires and HTA confirmation. Blue = data collection through historical data, interview 
detailing, and where possible HTA confirmation. Red = no data collection or comparisons were 
possible). 
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Case study findings support the notion that the technostructural factors 
indicated at the organisational level in Kozlowski & Salas' (1997) multilevel 
model could be applied to interdependent team vertical transfer. The case study 
has shown that technostructural factors in this model also fit the team compilation 
vertical transfer model (Kozlowski et al., 2000), in that lower level training 
targets the delivery at the appropriate level and is in alignment with higher-level 
contents from a system perspective. Findings have shown that the derivatives of 
the technostructural factors are based upon the higher-level concrete 
considerations within an organisation identified by Kozlowski and Salas (1997). 
Thus, the findings would support the use of Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) 
multilevel framework as a foundation, as all of the levels, factors and congruence 
collected during this case study were seen as necessary for training intervention. 
Results would further support the notion that preparing individuals to accept 
training-induced change and encouraging them to express their new capabilities in 
the work environment requires training that is delivered at the appropriate level 
and is in alignment with contextual support (Yamnill & McLean, 2001). 
7.1.2.1.2 Enabling Process Factors 
The findings from this case study have shown support for the general 
enabling process factors studied in Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel model 
as an application for interdependent team training (Figure 12). The enabling 
process factors of Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel model refer to the 
human interactions, perceptions, and shared expectations that allow the technical 
knowledge to be usefully applied in the work setting. The process specifically 
focuses on the behavioural components, identifying the social and human 
interaction processes that allow the operation of a system, and the dynamics of 
human behaviour that can influence organisational settings. Thus, findings from 
this research platform used in this thesis are able to identify some of the 
behaviours and attitudes, at each level, that have either been shown to be 
supportive elements for interdependent teams, or have been shown to hinder 
training effectiveness and the achievement of vertical transfer. Findings have also 
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identified enabling process training interventions that should be considered to 
achieve system effectiveness in emergency management of safety-critical 
systems. 
Findings have shown the importance and necessity of the enabling factors 
found in Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel model as a requirement for 
interdependent teams, as the success of integration required that each team 
member must be able to perform their individual skills but they also had to 
integrate as a unit into the system. To achieve this, training design and 
implementation must also consider and integrate the attainment of individual 
technical knowledge and skill with human processing of knowledge and skills that 
are constrained by individual variations in ability (i. e. experience and lapse in 
experience), behaviour (i. e., motivation) and attitude (i. e., commitment) (Figure 
12). The success of integration has been postured by theorists, who hypothesise 
that training that fosters development of a shared mental model has the potential 
to improve team performance (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). This case study's 
findings concur with the shared mental model view capability to support team 
performance outcomes from training (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998), as the 
working platform for this case study implements a shared understanding and 
support of tasks for both the interdependent teams and all crewmembers. 
The requirement for each crewmember to have obtained the working 
platform certification (dolphins) prior to any active service is an important 
example of an effective shared mental model. This self-study, on-the-job training, 
and oral board exam process can be seen as a method of cross-training 
(Blickensderfer et al., 1998) to achieve a shared mental model, as each team 
member achieves the basic knowledge of all systems and their function and 
operation, and is capable of performing any of the basic tasks in an emergency to 
ensure the safety of the crew and the submarine (e. g., shutting of valves in a 
flood). Therefore, basic emergency actions can be taken by any crewmember that 
discovers an emergency, without waiting for direction. Thus, in emergency 
management the achievement and assurance of a system shared mental model for 
this platform has helped to mitigate the risk of errors (Dobson et al., 2001) and 
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also assures the effective dealing with an emergency, as prediction of system 
behaviours is possible (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998), with the appropriate 
follow-on action. 
However, although this shared mental model has been shown to be effective 
and necessary for the working platform, this case study's findings have shown 
that the certification to obtain the shared mental model is only truly effective for 
the specific platform or system for which it was developed. Results have shown 
that consideration must be given, in the form of a needs assessment, whether the 
basic understanding of systems in one platform (certification and a shared mental 
model) is sufficient for application to another platform. There were similarities in 
some of the systems and function, but this new working platform has some very 
distinct system differences (e. g., semi-automated vice manual, and three. hydraulic 
plants vice one in the previous platform) that require different actions. The 
presumption of pre-requisite certification suitability has been shown to influence 
training effectiveness. The case study findings would further speculate whether 
sufficient and accurate individual knowledge was obtained through informal 
mechanisms that were not tested, because of this presumption. 
A more positive influence of the development of a shared mental model in 
training was identified in this case study in the delivery of sequential individual 
and team simulator training. There was a resounding support to the benefit of 
initial individual simulator training as it provided both opportunities for 
development of individual level skill proficiency and understanding of each team 
members' tasks and the integrative role and fit within the system prior to 
integration with the team. Trainees considered individual simulator training of 
such value that they suggested greater time should be allotted in training to assure 
this fundamental building block for team integration was achieved. Although the 
delivery sequence in this case study supported the development of interdependent 
teams, the achievement of skill proficiency was uncertain due to lack of feedback. 
Thus, although performance objectives were achieved, the true proficiency of 
individual skill level and its effect will only be known when tested in real 
scenarios in the working platform (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). This stresses the 
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importance of testing and confirming capabilities in training. Although the 
findings are consistent with the literature in that interdependent team alignment 
between individual level skill proficiency and collective enabling process skills 
are critical to ensure cohesion in performance (Kozlowski et al., 1996), the 
findings have further identified that the training content and methods must both 
support and determine the achievement of individual required skills. 
Following individual simulator training, the training platform provided team 
training that integrated the task linkages, role expectations and goals of safety- 
critical procedures. This sequencing of training was found -to be extremely 
beneficial as the progress to team training provided an integration of individual 
task components, but also allowed the practise and development of integrating 
and coordinating the required teamwork enabling components (Figure 12). Team 
training thus provided an opportunity for the adaptation and adjustment between 
team members in real-time to the emergency task demands to ensure seamless 
coordination of the tasks. Case study findings would therefore agree with the 
literature, that even with all the challenges and obstacles in the training 
programme, that positive outcomes are seen when a shared mental model for the 
interdependent teams is developmentally progressed from an individual 
orientation to a team orientation (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1991; Driskell et al., 
2001; Kozlowski et al., 1996). These case study findings also add to the existing 
literature which has determined that a training platform that has been designed to 
implement both technical and processing (coordination and communication) skills 
is required for interdependent teams in high demand and high threat situations 
(Driskell et al., 2001) and will also mitigate the risk of error (Dobson et al., 
2001). 
Case study findings further support the necessity of incorporating both the 
enabling factors of leadership and climate in Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) 
multilevel framework for design and delivery of interdependent team training as 
they can both improve, hinder and compensate training effectiveness. The case 
study's supporting evidence of the strong leadership (e. g., mentorship, guidance, 
discipline and reinforcement) and organisational training philosophy that was 
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inherent in the working platform of both nations which also transferred to the 
training programme, is an example that application of philosophies can vary in 
effectiveness depending on how they are applied. 
Within the working platform all of the leadership roles are needed to 
achieve performance outcomes, but a particularly effective form of leadership that 
transferred to the training platform was the guidance and continued mentorship to 
expand both subordinates' capabilities and those of colleagues who had less 
knowledge and experience. These supportive informal actions in the form of 
informal peer, subordinate and supervisor support (at many levels), and when 
asked for, the additional informal support from the instructors was identified to be 
beneficial in learning. But as well, the findings that team composition was 
considered important because of the relative support it provides, would further 
reveal that exchanges between crewmembers also provided opportunities to 
clarify material that was obtained, either formally or informally (Chao, 1997). 
This very supportive and cohesive climate is an integral part of the behaviours 
and attitudes in this high-risk working platform that requires an effective response 
to emergency situations. The military provides leadership training for various 
levels in the hierarchy structure. However, within a training platform that supports 
and endorses informal retrieval of information, leadership training in itself would 
not be considered sufficient to pass on technical expertise. Although informal 
support definitely has value, when applied in a training platform that lacks 
assessment standards to confirm that knowledge and skill were obtained, 
questions then arise as to the accuracy, detail and quality of the informal 
information exchanged, as the degree of the colleagues' technical expertise (Klein 
& Ralls, 1997) and the instructional skills to pass on technical information 
(Kozlowski et al., 1996) were uncertain. The effect to performance outcomes on 
transfer could also be further influenced by the leadership policy to deal with any 
individual shortcoming within the new working platform. 
Thus, the findings have determined that Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) 
multilevel framework can identify and address enabling factors that are necessary 
for interdependent team training design and delivery. But as well, the findings 
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have also identified that enabling factors in Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) 
multilevel framework can also help to proactively identify and address those 
moderating influencing factors, such as working platform philosophies, that may 
alter the effectiveness of training. The findings further support and justify the 
requirement for alignment of the task and role responsibilities and fit between 
levels for interdependent teams to develop proficiency. Although this training 
programme was fraught with problems that influenced the training effectiveness, 
the approach to train this interdependent team in teamwork skills, of coordination 
and communication in concert with the practise of integrated skills was key to the 
achievement of successful performance outcomes. These findings clearly identify 
that the overall skill training style (not including assessment methods) was 
effective for dealing with an emergency (A. M. Schaafstal et al., 2001), high 
demand and stress (Driskell et al., 2001), and mitigated the risk of errors (Dobson 
et al., 2001). These results would further suggest that the success of training 
intervention also relies upon a training programme that incorporates the culture, 
climate and leadership values of the organisation (Figure 12). This case study 
revealed that organisational support for training (Cheng & Ho, 2001), informal 
reinforcement (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001) and 
values placed on training (Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001), all improve the likelihood of 
success of the training platform and facilitate successful training transfer if they 
are applied in a manner that supports training effectiveness. 
These findings would further support the notion that training that fosters 
development of a shared mental model of the situation and the task environment, 
roles and abilities of team members has the potential to improve team 
performance (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Serfaty, Entin, & Johnston, 1998). 
In dynamic, complex environments such as that of emergency management, 
training to develop a shared mental model of the interdependencies of the team 
should be considered where timely, error-free performance is required. 
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7.1.2.2 Summary 
The case study findings therefore support the use of Kozlowski and Salas' 
(1997) model as it identifies and addresses historical deficiencies in the 
development of a training design, taking into account, albeit broadly, the 
multilevel linkages to consider and implement to assure training outcomes 
(Ostroff & Ford, 1989) that meet organisational objectives. This case study has 
revealed that when integration of interdependent teams to a new system employs 
the merging of both the technostructural and enabling factors in both individual 
and intact team training, the result is an aid to learning and performance. 
Additionally, the informal approach taken by trainees to obtain the foundation 
knowledge to develop the required skills has identified that individuals must first 
acquire knowledge before some proficiency can be developed in their tasks. 
Individuals, specifically the technicians, could then devote attention to the 
processing skills necessary to enable team performance (Kozlowski et al., 1996; 
Salas et al., 1992). The case study findings have determined the importance of 
training to include the concrete requirements within a system (knowledge and 
skill), but as well, training delivery must also consider the informal social 
interactions, interdependencies, expectations and perceptions (Kozlowski et al., 
2000) within, between and across levels, to ensure alignment (Yamnill & 
McLean, 2001). 
Findings from this case study have thus identified, although broadly, that the 
multilevel theory of Kozlowski and Salas (1997) can provide a framework to 
answer the key organisation questions in training effectiveness- how, where and 
when - to deliver interdependent team training to enhance training outcomes 
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Ostroff & Ford, 1989). Assuming an organisational 
focus, case study findings have also identified and supported the inclusion of 
some of the general teamwork (e. g., task structuring and intra-team feedback) and 
taskwork (e. g., cue/strategy associations, role responsibilities, and accurate task 
models) competencies to additionally support the achievement of interdependent 
team vertical transfer. Thus, consideration should be given to include these 
competencies in Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel framework. 
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The deficiencies and resulting misalignment of the training platform to 
provide expected knowledge and skills also identifies the importance and 
necessity of performing training needs analysis prior to the design of the training 
programme. The importance of conducting a thorough needs analysis is well 
established and accepted in the literature, and the findings further justify that an 
organisational analysis, task analysis and person analysis should not be 
considered in isolation (Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Kozlowski, 1997; Tannenbaum 
& Yukl, 1992). Further, the results have revealed the requirement for both the 
traditional individual-level analysis, as well as, a team-task analysis prior to 
designing and initiating a training programme (Bowers et al., 1995; Kozlowski et 
al., 2000). The additional workload in the new platform for technicians and 
changes to the system functioning would, as an example, identify that the pre- 
requisite from a prior platform would not be adequate unless a personnel analysis 
indicates otherwise. Thus, findings would concur with the literature that a 
personnel assessment for the tasks are needed, and the assessment requires the 
addition of the appropriateness of the background knowledge individuals bring to 
training (Rogers et al., 1997). Assessment of the influences of this training 
programme has shown that when a person analysis is inadequate and details of 
who should be trained, why, and what should be trained are not sufficiently 
completed, individual strengths and weaknesses are not identified. The result was 
the provision of training at a level that resulted in sub-optimised training 
effectiveness. 
This case study has provided an empirical foundation which corroborates 
the use of Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel model as an aid in design and 
delivery for use in interdependent teams to support vertical transfer, although this 
case study was only able to provide a foundation for the general categories. The 
complexities of this training platform and the approaches and interventions taken 
within this platform have also provided an indication of the real-world 
complications in achieving vertical transfer. The findings have also identified that 
different combinations of factors can exert an influence on pre-training that will 
transgress to influence the effectiveness of training delivery. This further supports 
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the requirement to develop a detailed model to support the design and delivery of 
training for interdependent teams. Although this platform required both 
individual and team training, this sequence of training may not be necessary for 
upgrading of individual skills or behaviour integration. Although team 
performance models and team-driven performance strategies have begun to 
address these issues, further research and empirical evidence is still needed to 
address specific team skill-set requirements, and how, when, how long, and whom 
should be trained for training to be effective. 
7.1.3 Training Effectiveness Factors 
To provide further support and advancement to the theory of interdependent 
vertical transfer, this dissertation has identified that Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) 
multilevel model can be used as a framework for design and delivery of training 
for interdependent teams. This dissertation has also identified that some of the 
teamwork and taskwork competencies from Cannon-Bower and Salas' (Cannon- 
Bowers & Salas, 1997b; 1995) should be included in their (Kozlowski & Salas, 
1997) framework for interdependent team vertical transfer as these components 
were found to be integral to the successful achievement of performance outcomes. 
However, Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel model does not include or 
address training design influences in their model. As factors within training are 
known to influence training effectiveness, then training design could also impact 
vertical transfer outcomes and thus potentially influence the impact training could 
have on organisational effectiveness. To further advance the knowledge of factors 
that can influence interdependent team vertical transfer this dissertation further 
identifies some of the pre-training and training influences of the training platform 
on interdependent team learning and performance. This dissertation also further 
explores training design elements within this case study training programme to 
identify the influence of the techniques and tools on training interdependent 
teams. This case study thus provided the opportunity to advance support to the 
theory of interdependent vertical transfer by expanding upon Kozlowski and 
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Salas' (1997) multilevel training interventions approach model with pre-training, 
training design and team training influences (Figure 14). 
7.1.3.1 Pre-training Influences 
Accumulating evidence in the literature has shown that the impacts of pre- 
training fall into three general categories: 1) what characteristics an individual 
brings to training; 2) variables that engage trainees to learn and participate in 
developmental activities; and, 3) how training can be prepared to maximise the 
learning experience (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). 
For ease of discussion findings will be discussed within this framework. 
7.1.3.1.1 Individual Demographics 
Demographic information about the individuals involved in this training 
platform was taken to identify the potential mitigating influence of prior 
experience and lapse of experience on ability to learn, manage and instruct within 
this training platform (Figure 14). The findings concur with past research 
suggestions that experience has not been found to be directly related to training 
effectiveness (Tannenbaum, 1993), as the training platform design did not take 
individual experience into account nor was the lapse in experience. However, the 
literature has suggested that experience can be a useful predictor of training 
expectations, perceptions, motivation and self-efficacy (Mathieu & Matineau, 
1997; Tannenbaum, 1993). The case study identified that although there was a 
balance of experience and inexperience between crews, which would balance 
itself in the working platform, each crew also had individuals with very little 
experience (less than two years). Based on this past experience, trainees would 
develop disparate perceptions of their ability, or lack thereof, and based on their 
experience they would also develop perceptions. of the training needs for the new 
working platform (Noe et al., 1997). These pre-training perceptions then 
translated to personal expectations and expectations from training (Figure 14).. 
The case study findings have shown that individuals have drawn from the 
varied levels of past experience and developed an expectation that the training 
programme would provide the necessary knowledge and skills to allow equivalent 
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performance to the new working platform. The Hierarchical Task Analysis has 
further identified that task emergency management within the new working 
platform required a similar capability to perform the sequences by rote, but to 
perform the tasks and ensure future and on-going capability of the system, further 
technical knowledge was needed of the systems and their integration for all who 
would perform those tasks. Thus, the findings have identified that there was a 
perceived mismatch, especially for technicians, between the organisational goal of 
training and perceptions of required performance outcomes (Figure 14). Those 
with extensive expertise would have superior knowledge of relevant facts and 
procedures (Pokorny et al., 1996), albeit of the original working platform. Those 
with a greater breadth of task experience would also have a greater recognition of 
the necessity and value of training (Ford et al., 1993), recognising the cultural 
norm of a formal and informal process. This was evident in the informal support 
provided during training by experienced members to the less experienced who 
were having difficulties achieving expected knowledge (Figure 14). 
It can be said with certainty that characteristics that an individual brings to 
the training programme and the compensations derived from more experienced 
team members and crew were all-important factors to the success of the training 
programme and ultimate transfer. Moreover, the findings further suggest that 
requisite knowledge and skills are important considerations for learning (Smith et 
al., 1997), as case study findings identified the entry pre-requisites were 
considered insufficient for the level of technical knowledge and skill required for 
performance outcomes. Although motivation was not specifically measured in this 
case study, the inherent risk of the environment; the future system requirements 
for personnel; the significant deliberate informal mechanisms chosen during 
training as compensation; and, corroboration from the comments in interviews 
would suggest that motivation was a driving factor in this training platform. Goal 
setting theory can help explain the motivational efforts of the trainees; as the 
intentional effort and persistence, above that expected, would suggest a 
motivation and commitment to achieve the goal (Yamnill & McLean, 2001). It 
can then be projected that the direction, effort, intensity and persistence of 
198 
individuals and teams was motivationally driven by pre-training and training 
situational factors and individual perceptions. 
These exploratory findings suggest that future research is needed to 
simultaneously investigate the pre-training influences and potential links of 
individual's ability and perceptions of their ability, perceptions of training needs, 
and the impact to effort-performance perceptions and resulting behaviours. This 
interaction has not been explored on an individual front, let alone that of complex, 
interdependent teams and the effect to vertical transfer. Further, team-driven 
strategies using a shared mental model approach have been shown to have a 
positive influence on team performance (Boland & Tenkasi, 2001; Entin & 
Serfaty, 1995; Garbis & Waern, 1999; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001; Tannenbaum et 
al., 1998). If a shared mental model has an effect on team performance, then it 
can be further postulated that a shared mental model could also influence 
individual and team attitudes and behaviour towards emergency management 
training, which could influence training outcomes. 
The commonly used phrase `young man's game' for this working platform 
suggested age might influence learning, as older workers have been found to be 
less likely to participate in development activities and accept new technologies 
(Noe et al., 1997). However, the reasons for the phrase were related to lack of 
agility as one gets older, but as well, with age there was less of a willingness to 
take risks. The relationship could be related to social influences (e. g., family and 
community responsibilities), while it could also be related to maturity with aging, 
life experiences, and recognising one's own limitations. Trainee characteristics, 
such as the behaviours taken to overcome the challenges in training, and the 
conditions and requirements of the work environment have previously been 
shown to influence training effectiveness (Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Thus, 
training preparations and the effectiveness of a training platform could be. This 
potential relationship is worth exploring, especially for emergency management. 
influenced by the combined components of the risk of the working platform, 
situational mitigating influences, and the attitudes and behaviours that result. 
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7.1.3.1.2 Training Preparations 
The training platform for this working environment required considerable 
preparation prior to delivery that included both instructor and training plan 
preparation. To identify the pre-training influences that might have an impact, 
perceived impacts of lapse in operational experience to recall and train and the 
influence of the imposed principles and the supporting aids were investigated. 
Although no significant correlation differences were found between the pre- 
training factors of training aids, instructor characteristics and informal aids, and 
no statistical comparisons were possible with training principles, discussion is 
worthy as many pre- training factors together influenced the quality and delivery 
of the training platform which influenced expectations and learning style. These 
factors together have suggested an influence on the effectiveness of the training 
programme. 
Historical background on the prior training of the instructors indicated there 
had been a significant lapse since any training or active service on this platform, 
and although instructors had significant submarine experience, most had little 
active service on this class of submarine prior to decommissioning. Systems 
knowledge was mostly obtained informally through the building and activation of 
the system. Further, no training package had been made for this system, the 
training lectures were considered very scant, and supporting documentation was 
either non-existent or incomplete. It would then be expected that there would be 
some difficulties in recalling that previously learned, as mere passage of time 
causes forgetting (Wickens & Hollands, 1999). But as well, there would be a 
requirement to recall, if developed, previously learned procedural skills (EOPs) in 
order to instruct. Recall of procedures can be accurate and effortless, but only if 
the skill was thoroughly learned in the first place as procedures that require a 
sequence of steps are more rapidly forgotten (Wickens & Hollands, 1999). 
Surprisingly, lapse in operational experience was not considered an 
influence to recall when the question was presented to Canadian Navy managers 
and RN trainers. This response was also consistent with that given for the 
perceptions of growth of knowledge and skill of the trainers and their 
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development with time. However, trainees' response that they agreed there was 
growth, interview corroboration, and the significant relationship with informal 
training aids would reveal that was not the sentiment of the trainees, as they 
believed there was either difficulty in recall or the knowledge and skill was not 
present in the first place. 
Although no pre-training correlation was found with instructor 
characteristics, the likely reason that lapse was not considered an influence for CF 
managers and RN trainers was that there was a strong belief, by both nations, that 
the method of prior training was sufficient and the aids available (i. e., technical 
documents, simulator training and access to the working platform) would have 
overcome any memory loss that may have occurred. Findings would further 
suggest that the training platform in support of the formal and informal training 
philosophy would overcome any deficiencies (Figure 14). 
The findings have shown that for trainees learning was supported by the 
similarity and reflection of the training environment to the working platform. 
Thus, it was not surprising that representative simulation training was considered 
a benefit to their learning (Allen et al., 1985; Mumaw & Roth, 1995; A. 
Schaafstal, 1993), as did access to the working platform (Hitt II et al., 2001). 
However, although most of the prior documentation was incomplete, their 
resounding support that the documents were of value can be attributed to the fact 
that the documentation supplied retrieval cues to information stored in long-term 
memory (Wickens & Hollands, 1999). Even though they may not have been able 
to recall the information, the literature suggests that often information is 
recognised as familiar once it is seen (Wickens & Hollands, 1999), even if the 
information was not complete or detailed. 
Extensive informal methods were also sought by the RN trainers to extend 
their knowledge and skill over and above that available from the original training 
programme. Although informal training was part of the historical training 
programme and an inherent training philosophy, there was no requirement to seek 
external aid nor was there guidance as to what was needed to be learned to be an 
effective instructor. The Royal Navy instructors chose informal mechanisms to 
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ensure currency of knowledge and skills to assure credibility with the trainees. 
Using goal setting theory as the framework to approach the rationale, this 
intentional effort and persistence, above that expected, would suggest a 
motivation and commitment to achieve the goal (Yamnill & McLean, 2001). The 
contractors were not involved in the re-training process and it was also perceived 
that their knowledge and skill was not adequate. Thus, the motivation and drive to 
achieve a capability to train was not equally distributed among all trainers. The 
reason for the select military instructors' commitment is not likely attributed 
solely to an understanding of the inherent risk of the working platform, as the 
contract instructors were also at one time submariners for the working platform of 
this training programme. Therefore, one could conclude that a reason for the 
military instructors' selective commitment relates to their mutual current 
profession and working platform (i. e., as active military members and 
submariners). A culture exists within the submarine community that traverses 
across nations, in which there is an esprit-des-corps to ensure all that can be done, 
will be, to assure fellow submariners have the capability to perform their duties 
and keep safe. 
However, if skills were not thoroughly learned originally and skills have 
been forgotten or not used, there can be significant disadvantages to gaining 
information informally. Informal mechanisms to learning can result in lack of 
control for what actually gets learned, lack of uniformity across trainees, 
problems with incompetent trainers, and there are hidden costs to informal 
training (e. g., time engaged with questionable value, engaged work delays and 
suffering) (Chao, 1997). Questions then arise, or should, as to whether the 
material had been adequately learned and understood for this application. 
Thus, findings seemed at odds between the perceptions of influence from 
lapse in operational experience and capability to train, as lapse was considered to 
have some effect, as seen through informal mechanisms, but there was a 
resounding agreement of capability to train. As identified with individual 
demographics, experience can be a useful predictor of expectations (Mathieu & 
Matineau, 1997; Tannenbaum, 1993). It can then be concluded that past 
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experience has likely shaped the perception of capability to train and expectations 
from training (Figure 14). It is likely that expectations were strongly weighted 
upon the informal and formal components of the training philosophy observed by 
both nations. Therefore, there was a subjective perception of the formal 
developmental needs, which were likely under-rated because of the informal 
learning expectation. Leadership expectations from the receiving nation could 
also have played a significant part in the lowered expectations from training as the 
working platform culture expects leaders to deal with deficiencies. 
The training programme was also self-regulated by the military instructors 
for the technical content, level of detail and assessment style, as there was no 
outside body with equal or greater knowledge and skills of this working platform. 
Although the instructors measured their knowledge and skill against the 
qualification of the working platform, the level of competency to train for a 
specific skill set was not measured, nor was it possible. 
Thus, although no correlations were found between pre-training influences, 
and performance measures were not possible, this case study suggests that 
different combinations of training design elements could exert a cumulative effect 
on the effectiveness of training and pre-training factors were shown to play a 
major influence on the attitude toward the training platform and actions taken to 
assure that performance outcomes would be achieved. The exploratory pre- 
training factors identified within this case study would therefore confirm the 
necessity to broaden the approach of training effectiveness to include pre-training 
individual characteristics, organisational influences and design elements in 
combination (Figure 14). 
7.1.3.2 Training Influences 
The influences of training design at the individual level are well represented 
by the literature (as seen in reviews by Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Ford & Weissbein, 
1997). Design and delivery of training involve the selection of appropriate media, 
training content, sequencing and learning principles to achieve objectives 
(Baldwin & Ford, 1988). The multilevel model proposed by Kozlowski and Salas 
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(Kozlowski & Salas, 1997) has been shown to address the issues of team-based 
tasks and delivery of team outcomes (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Salas et al., 1992), 
and this dissertation further provided empirical evidence to support its use for 
interdependent teams and vertical transfer. However, the framework has not 
incorporated training design components as factors that could influence vertical 
transfer and organisational effectiveness, although training design is known to 
influence training effectiveness. This dissertation provides further support to the 
multilevel level framework for interdependent teams by identifying the training 
platform factors that have influenced learning and performance, as well as, the 
specific techniques and tools that have hindered or enhanced interdependent team 
outcomes (Figure 14). 
7.1.3.2.1 Training Design Influences and Learning 
The findings have shown that factors within this training design influenced 
both learning and performance. Training methods were found to positively 
influence learning (p= <. 05, r, =. 3.07), using assessment methods as the identifier 
as to whether knowledge and skills had in fact been learned (Figure 14). This 
suggested that learning would improve with ongoing confirmation of knowledge 
and skill capabilities provided by the instructors and attained by the trainees. This 
correlation would further suggest that knowledge and skill confirmation would 
instil a confidence in the capability of the trainers, as well as, corroborate the 
progression and attainment of knowledge and skills for the trainees. This case 
study identified a distinction between testing of knowledge and skill and 
confirmation that the skills had in fact been obtained. Although unusual, when no 
debriefings on progress and capability are provided, trainees question whether 
they have attained what is needed, even though they have been tested. As testing 
was performed, this distinction between testing and confirmation identifies that 
the lack of feedback was considered influential to learning. This further altered 
the trainees' expectation that performance outcomes would be attained (Figure 
14). The literature would support these findings, as training effectiveness has been 
shown to improve when all available sources of relevant feedback are used, and 
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feedback is accurate, credible, timely and constructive (Redmill & Rejan, 1997; 
Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Further, these case study findings are consistent with 
the literature that positive feedback is especially critical for stress management. 
In extremely high demand performance environments individuals will develop 
positive or negative expectations regarding their capacity to perform in the 
environment (Driskell et al., 2001). 
The concern of whether knowledge and skill were obtained was also directly 
linked with training content (p= <. 05, rs -. 378), and this finding can further 
explain the influences of confirmation of skill on learning development. Testing 
of learning outcomes for technical and motor skills, which was of most concern 
for technicians, evaluated skill development using traditional and accepted 
methods of observing trainee performance in role-play (i. e., simulation) and in the 
working platform (Kraiger et al., 1993). However, these observations are only an 
appropriate evaluation tool when the evaluation method has been deemed 
appropriate through a needs assessment using theoretical conceptualisation of 
skill development (Kraiger et al., 1993). This is relevant to this case study as it 
provides a possible explanation for the expected performance outcomes and the 
lowered expectation from the training platform. The literature has shown learning 
outcomes begin with declarative knowledge (what) which is then organised and 
compiled into procedural (how), and with greater experience becomes strategic 
(which, when and why) (Kraiger et al., 1993). Skill acquisition involves the 
transition from knowledge that is declarative to knowledge that is procedural 
(Neves (1981) as cited in Kraiger et al., 1993). Part of the difficulties can be 
explained in that declarative knowledge encourages memorisation (Rogers et al., 
1997), while procedural knowledge is often considered to be directly reflected in 
successful performance outcomes (Kozlowski, Gully et al., 2001). Herein was 
part of the potential problem, dissatisfaction with the training content, and reason 
for seeking informal aids as support. The emergency procedures required 
memorisation, but errors are reduced, verbal rehearsal is eliminated, and 
behaviour is more-task focused with levels of learning that are higher than 
declarative (Kraiger et al., 1993). Trainees believed that they required further 
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knowledge of how a system functions in order to adequately perform the 
functional tasks, rather than just memorisation. They also expected the training 
programme to provide higher-level learning than declarative. The resulting lack of 
feedback and confirmation of progression resulted in significantly greater 
negative expectations from the training programme content (p= <. 05, rs . 335). 
But rather than developing a negative expectation of their capacity to perform in 
the environment, as suggested in the literature (Driskell et al., 2001), informal 
methods were sought to ensure performance expectations were achieved. Thus, 
the positive influence of training methods on learning makes sense and it was not 
the evaluation method that was the issue, but rather that learning improves with 
the confirmation that knowledge and skill had been obtained. This would also 
confirm one of the significant disadvantages of an informal learning process to 
gain critical knowledge (Chao, 1997), but it would also suggest (although not 
measured) a motivation to achieve performance outcomes and a commitment to 
higher-level goals. 
Not surprisingly, findings also indicated relationships with both formal and 
informal training aids. However, both negatively correlated with learning (formal, 
p= <. 01, rs -. 394, and informal, p= <. 05, rs -. 313), indicating that as formal aids 
improve there is less of an effect to learning and less reliance on informal training 
aids (Figure 14). As identified in Section 7.1.1.1.1, the formal training aids of 
individual and team simulator training were found to be extremely beneficial to 
learning, as was access to the platform and technical documents. Although 
considered very beneficial, trainees desired more timely and lengthy simulator 
training, thus the negative correlation with formal aids. Therefore, sequential 
individual and team training that reflects the task and environment can be 
considered supportive of interdependent teams and vertical transfer (Cannon- 
Bowers & Salas, 1997b). 
The findings have also revealed that team composition influenced both 
learning and job performance, which members qualified to mean that there is 
interdependence between team members for support that is relied upon to 
complete the tasks within this training platform. They also identified that this 
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interdependence was also necessary in the working environment. These findings 
further support Kozlowski and Salas' (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997) framework for 
interdependent team training to achieve successful outcomes in both the 
horizontal and vertical plane. Successful performance of interdependent teams has 
also been identified to be critically dependent on the integration of both technical 
knowledge and skills and the enabling processes. As identified in this case study, 
simulation training provided opportunities to practise and develop a mutual 
adaptation and adjustment among team members in real-time to shifting demands, 
uncertain cues, and time compression (Salas et al., 1992). Thus, it was also not 
surprising to find that performance expectations were also significantly linked to 
both learning and formal training aids (learning, p= <. 05, rs -. 374, and formal 
aids, p= <. 05, rs . 368). There was reliance and thus, an expectation from training 
to provide the formal training opportunities. As formal training aids improve and 
become more helpful in improving learning (such as greater time and length for 
individual and team simulator training and sea-trials) the more likely expected 
performance outcomes will be achieved. This would identify the multi-level link 
between training design components, expectations, and the combined 
achievement of both technostrutural and enabling team performance outcomes 
(Figure 14). 
Even the emergency procedure documents were found somewhat 
supportive. Therefore, the formal aids negative correlation with learning was 
further reflected in the learning effects caused from the lack of accuracy and 
detail of the documents and lack of changes over successive crew training. 
Although changes were made to the documentation and training content over the 
course of successive crews training, crew twos' greater reliance on informal aids 
(x2 = 16.54, df=4, p=. 002) would confirm that the changes were not considered 
sufficient. There was also a significant negative relationship between informal 
training aids and expected maintainer knowledge and skill (p= <. 05, rS -. 375). As 
training was not intended to provide knowledge and skill to a level to allow 
maintenance or problem solving, this correlation was not unexpected. However 
this finding suggests that even through successive training, and interventions, a 
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multi-dimensional link exists between formal and informal training aids and 
expectations (Figure 14). 
The technicians also found lack of experience made it more difficult to learn 
the emergency procedures, as the training programme did not provide systems 
integration knowledge. The explanation for the difficulties can be found in Duffy 
et al (Duffy & Curran, 1983) who identified that there is a different 
comprehension skill for documents prepared for `reading to learn' and `reading to 
do'. For performing a task (reading to do), information is gathered for immediate 
use and the text is simply interpreted as it pertains to the specific task. However 
for learning, the sentences and comments must be related and integrated with 
preceding text, as clarity and organisation are far more critical to comprehension. 
The findings of this case study have revealed that the training programme 
influences that have significantly influenced learning in this complex, 
interdependent team training include training methods, and both formal and 
informal training aids, and that performance expectations were significantly 
linked to formal aids and learning. It can thus be seen that even within the training 
design there is a complex interaction of factors that influence learning and 
ultimate successful performance outcomes (Figure 14). Case study findings 
further identify the benefit of individual and team simulator training. There was a 
reliance on documents, although they were not as supportive as they could have 
been. Thus, documents for training should be prepared so that they aid in learning. 
The case study has also shown the benefits of interdependent team training that 
reflects the working platform that further includes training within the platform. 
What again becomes apparent is the need for training needs analysis to first 
identify organisational objectives from training, and further to delineate the 
individual and team task components so that training can be designed to meet, and 
perhaps exceed higher-level objectives. These interactive training design 
influences that influenced both learning and subsequent performance also identify 
the need for further empirical research to clearly delineate the degree of influence 
of these factors. The findings also identify the need to further explore the level, 
209 
sequencing, timing and alignment between individual and team training, for both 
technical and behavioural processes. 
7.1.3.2.2 Further Training Design Influences 
Other training factors were found to influence perceptions and expectations 
from training, and although they were not found to be directly linked to learning 
the factors are interlinked as they are part of the training design, and therefore 
could moderate learning and influence training outcomes. This intercorrelation 
was found with training content, as it significantly correlated with both formal 
training aids (p= <. 01, rs . 440) and training methods (p= <. 05, rs . 378). This 
relationship again draws attention to the perceived completeness and lack of 
sufficient interventions to the training curriculum, contents and documents over 
each crews' training, and over successive training (Figure 14). Although the 
trainees believed they would receive the knowledge and skill needed, the lack of 
feedback and confirmation of progression would significantly lower expectations 
from the training content, and thus there was a greater reliance on informal 
mechanisms. Training content expectations reflected this as there was a negative 
correlation with both training content and formal aids (p= <. 05, rs -. 335 and p= 
<. 05, rs -. 354, respectively). 
As there was always an expectation from trainees that knowledge and skill 
would be gained as well as a capability, by whatever means, this would suggest 
both an individual and team confidence (Ford et al., 1992). Additionally, the 
effort and persistence taken to assure successful outcomes, as a team, would also 
suggest a motivation to learn (Mathieu & Matineau, 1997) and a motivation to 
transfer (Noe & Schmitt, 1986). Although these attitudes were not specifically 
measured, the evidence for their existence is strong within this platform. There 
was also a strong perception of confidence held by others (Kraiger & Aguinis, 
2001), but what was unique in this platform was that confidence was also required 
between fellow team-mates as each individual must be able to perform their duties 
in dealing with an emergency. Interdependent simulator and onboard system team 
training supported and developed this confidence, but as expectations were not 
210 
seen to be met by the training platform, additional informal learning mechanisms 
were sought throughout successive crew training. Consequently, exploratory 
evidence provided in this case study would suggest that future research should 
explore the influence of required confidence between team members and its 
influence to learning and performance outcomes, especially in stressful, 
emergency management,. This attitude or cohesiveness could also be linked to the 
perceived or real risk of the working platform, or an emergency state, and thus the 
combined states should be studied in a realistic platform. 
The trainers' and managers' view of the influence of the training content, 
methods and formal aids were not that of the trainees. Although their perceptions 
did not influence the correlation significance of the relationships, there was a 
significant variance in their views with either the CF managers or the RN trainers 
having the most opposing view to that of the trainees (training content, x2 =15.58, 
df=4, p=. 004, methods, x2 =18.81, df=4, p=. 001 and formal aids, x2 =11.90, d) '=4, 
p=. 018). Their differences in perception are related to their knowledge of higher- 
level planning and preparations for the training platform. Their perception of 
training content completeness was based upon the expected success of the entire 
programme, while their view of the value of the formal training aids was based 
upon the objective of the programme and the belief that the prerequisites were 
sufficient. The differing opinion that methods were in place to test and confirm 
knowledge and skill, specifically for the trainees, was likely based upon the belief 
that the historical methods of achieving the aim would be successful. 
Intervention capabilities in the form of providing changes to the training 
content and training aids would alter the training platform and therefore, although 
not directly, influence the potential to learn. Again there was a common theme 
and an integrative influence, as training content intervention negatively correlated 
with both training content (p= <. 01, rs -. 424) and formal training aids (p= <. 01, 
rs -. 443) (Figure 14). These findings were not surprising considering the 
deficiencies in the training programme. Part of the dissatisfaction with the 
programme, was although changes could be suggested, and were strongly 
supported, the implementation of the changes was usually not seen during a 
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crews' training. Informal changes were made to emergency procedures, but 
formal document and content changes required a lengthy formal approval process. 
The informal changes made by the RN trainers when suggestions were made, was 
not a requirement. Therefore, one could conclude that RN trainees provided a 
facilitating climate for learning. Also, capability to provide changes and the belief 
that suggestions are considered could also moderate the motivation of individuals 
to learn, as trainees' interactions with others will likely influence their motivation 
(Mathieu & Matineau, 1997). It has also been reported that pre-training 
participation is related to trainee motivation when participative input was 
reflected in the training received (Baldwin & Magjuka, 1997). The findings 
suggest that participation and reflection of input would also apply during training, 
thus suggesting a further motivational influence for the trainees. However, rather 
than detracting from motivation, as seen by Baldwin and Magjuka (1997), 
trainees were more motivated and chose additional avenues to support the 
achievement of performance outcomes. Thus, the findings have confirmed that 
opportunities to provide changes to the training programme and the 
implementation of those changes influences the training design, but opportunity to 
provide changes can also be presumed to have moderated the attitudes and beliefs 
of those attending training. 
Instructor characteristics were also looked at to identify the perceived 
capability of the instructors, both military and contractors, and their ability to pass 
on knowledge and skill based on their prior training and preparation. Although 
instructor characteristics was also not linked to learning perceptions, their 
capability, instructional style and even their personality characteristics can 
influence the perceptions of trainees and the outcomes from training. Although 
trainees were not aware of all the preparation and planning of the training 
programme prior to its initiation, it is still likely that preconceived notions of 
capabilities, and thus expectations, were made prior to initiating training. This 
initial perception and resulting expectation would set the tone, as motivation to 
learn and receptivity to training content has been found to be a function of 
identification with and respect for the instructor (Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001). 
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However, the perceptions of the instructors' capability over the course of the 
training programme was not equal between the RN trainers and the contractors, 
and the opinions varied significantly among the various groups and between 
crews (x2 =11.63, df=4, p=. 020). It was the CF managers then the RN trainers 
who indicated the instructors' developmental change over time had the least 
detrimental impact, as they believed the instructors had the capability from the 
beginning. The trainees also agreed that the knowledge and skill of the RN 
trainers had progressed over time, but felt there was very little growth from the 
contract instructors. They also perceived that the contract instructors were not 
receptive to suggestions of change, nor implemented any changes. This was not 
found to be the case, but findings would project that the lack of perceived support 
from the contract trainers moderated the trainees' view of the capability of these 
instructors. A possible explanation can be found with Kraiger and Aguinis (2001) 
who suggest that social categorisation processes may influence trainees' 
perceptions of the credibility of the trainer and relevance of the training material. 
They indicate the bias can be based on whether the trainer comes from outside the 
organisation or has not held the same job as the trainee. This perception could 
have moderated the view of trainees, but as the RN trainers reviewed all of the 
contractors' lectures and all course critiques, this bias of credibility to a select 
group is not substantiated. However, the historical review of the training 
preparation identified, that beyond lapse of experience with this working 
platform, criteria were not specified for training content or level of capability 
required for instructors. There was also no outside body with the knowledge and 
skill to judge the accuracy of completeness of documents, or the capability of the 
instructors. Although the RN trainers took on a greater role in developing 
currency of their knowledge and skill, the level of expertise of all of the 
instructors was not known. This was not considered in developing the training 
programme. It was also not considered an issue during training by the managers 
or trainers as there was a training philosophy and cultural behaviour common to 
both nations that accepted and expected informal mechanisms to assist in learning 
and dealing with deficiencies in capability. 
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The trainees did however have strong views of the lack of improvement of 
the training programme over time to deal with the deficiencies, and placed this 
blame on the instructors who they believed had the responsibility to make the 
changes. Successive crews thought the training programme changes should have 
been implemented at this point in the training programme. As such, although it 
was not perceived as the most effective method of learning or clarifying what was 
learned, successive crews continued to rely upon informal mechanisms within and 
between crews to retrieve and clarify information. Consequently, there was a 
significant influence between instructor characteristics and training content (p= 
<. 01, rs . 442) and a negative correlation was 
found with informal aids (p= <. 01, 
rs -. 397) (Figure 14). 
Although only exploratory in nature, the link between these factors would 
suggest that perceptions and expectations from the training design have impacted 
not only a judgement of the effectiveness of training-related processes, but also 
based upon the perceived capability to deliver expected performance outcomes, a 
judgement of the effectiveness of training was transferred, by some trainees, onto 
the instructor (Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001). Although this case study did not 
directly measure the capability of the instructors, from a training effectiveness 
point of view, it can again be seen that there is a complex interaction between the 
training design factors, attitudes and behaviours of all those involved in the 
programme that interactively impacts learning and the achievement of 
performance outcomes. 
7.1.3.3 Organisational Influences 
Research and modelling has sufficiently established the knowledge that 
group and organisational factors have direct and moderating effects on individual 
learning and transfer (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001; Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). Furthermore, the multilevel 
model proposed by Kozlowski and Salas (1997) has expanded upon the traditional 
individual, horizontal transfer focus to identify a multilevel approach to training 
effectiveness that addresses the vertical, horizontal and top-down organisational 
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links within an organisational system. This dissertation has shown that Kozlowski 
and Salas' (1997) model can be an effective training tool to support design and 
delivery for interdependent teams in the horizontal and vertical plane. However, 
to broaden the scope of the factors that have the potential to impact the success of 
interdependent teams and vertical transfer, it is of value to discuss the 
organisational influences that have influenced this case study training design and 
training platform. Discussion of the influences from the organisation downward 
through to the individual will also provide further empirical support of Kozlowski 
and Salas' (1997) model as a framework for use in design and delivery 
considerations for interdependent team vertical transfer. 
There were many organisational factors that were repeatedly identified 
during this case study. Although not specifically measured for their influence, 
case study findings strongly suggest that organisational factors moderated training 
effectiveness. One of the key organisational influences found in this case study 
was that the goal of training was not specific and the meaning was not clearly 
communicated to the trainees. This resulted in trainees' interpretation of the 
training goal that was much broader than that intended, which then also created an 
expectation from training that was inconsistent with the training goal (Figure 14). 
Consequently, the misinterpretation created considerable uncertainty for the 
trainees of how this training content and objectives would contribute to the 
perceived future needs of the organisation (Hall (1984) cited in Baldwin & 
Magjuka, 1997), and what they would receive from training in order to 
successfully meet those needs. Interviews identified that the misinterpretation of 
the training goal, which was most profound for the technicians, further cascaded 
into perceptions that the training content would not meet the performance 
outcome expectations. This perception was seen in the finding that maintainer 
performance knowledge and skill expectations were not met from this training 
platform, for all successive crews. The lowered expectation was solely seen from 
technicians, operators also felt the training content was not sufficient, although 
not to the same degree. However, trainees were not deterred, as they perceived a 
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greater level of knowledge was needed to achieve performance outcomes in the 
new working platform. 
From interview corroboration it can be seen that the drive to seek 
information informally was further fuelled by the cultural training philosophy, by 
both nations, that supported and endorsed this mechanism for learning (Figure 
14). Although there were identified deficiencies in the training platform (e. g., lack 
of expertise of instructors, incomplete state of supporting documents, no 
feedback, and operations focus), rather than succumb to the barriers and limits of 
the training platform all trainees accepted that the training platform would not 
meet expectations and informal mechanisms of learning were sought as 
compensation. Thus, this misinterpretation of what the training programme was 
expected to provide resulted in informal methods of learning with no confirmation 
of suitability or accuracy. The literature suggests this may have resulted in 
unnecessary efforts for what was thought to be important (Chao, 1997). 
However, as the findings have identified, those with more experience 
supported and mentored those with less experience. In later crew training, those 
who had completed the training supported learning to those still in training. This 
would have somewhat controlled unnecessary efforts, but as identified in the post 
training lessons learned meeting, deficiencies in meeting capabilities were 
identified (e. g., need to improve the overall operator skills of the crews prior to 
the conduct of sea-trials), and training courses were identified as deficient, not 
applicable to the platform, or not supplied but there was a requirement. Although 
some of these deficiencies were corrected, it was not possible to address all of the 
training deficiencies as the RN controlled the training and the contract limitations 
would not permit changes in the timeframe allocated. This would have further 
fuelled an informal drive to achieve the observed deficiencies, but the efforts 
would have been more focused. Thus, these findings would add to the literature 
that not only have team leaders shaped the degree of transfer through informal 
reinforcement (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997a; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001), in an 
environment where the risk is very high, the inherent leadership philosophy 
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within the working platform instils a supportive network whereby all members are 
driven to assure performance capability from all crewmembers. 
Although it cannot be confirmed from this research, it is worth considering 
that although there was a supportive climate to encourage learning, the 
acceptance, endorsement, and support to informal learning could have impeded 
the belief and desire for changes that could have improved the training 
programme. Also, the leadership philosophy to deal with individual shortcomings 
within the working platform, whether identified in training or otherwise, could 
also have influenced the organisation's expectation and satisfaction with training. 
Thus, the combined leadership and training philosophy intrinsic in the working 
environment of both nations together could have further discouraged any changes 
that might have been considered important without them. 
Thus, findings would suggest that organisational goals, leadership and 
training philosophy have moderated both learning and training effectiveness. 
Also, findings would further suggest that policies, procedures and directives, and 
common practices from the host-training nation greatly influenced the training 
design and delivery, which then influenced and directed the behaviours and 
attitudes of the trainees. It could again be seen that although only influences from 
the training platform were assessed in this case study, findings would suggest that 
many different organisational factors in combination have additionally influenced 
training effectiveness (Figure 14). The organisational influences identified would 
further suggest that there is a cumulative effect from these influences that have 
directly effected training, but they have also moderated individual perceptions and 
expectations. In short, organisational influences have influenced training 
effectiveness. It is important to therefore consider and address organisational 
factors and their direct and moderating influence on interdependent team 
performance outcomes meeting organisational objectives. These exploratory 
results have shown that Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) framework can be used to 
guide design and delivery of training to identify the potential organisational 
technostructural and enabling influences that may impact training effectiveness 
(Figure 13). 
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7.1.4 Summary 
In investigating the influences within an organisation's training programme 
to achieve interdependent team vertical transfer, the findings have shown that 
multiple factors from the individual, organisation, working platform and training 
design that have influenced individual learning and vertical transfer are really no 
different than those that have been previously identified (although either singly or 
with few combinations) on individual learning and outcomes (Kozlowski et al., 
2000; Kraiger & Aguinis, 2001; Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Tannenbaum & 
Yukl, 1992). The findings have further shown that multiple factors and 
cumulative events prior to training (i. e., individual, organisational, and 
situational) will influence training design and subsequently training effectiveness. 
This case study would coincide with the assumptions made by Baldwin and 
Magjuka (1997) that all things are not equal between trainees (e. g., experience) 
and that organisational contextual factors have a significant influence on a 
training programme design and delivery. Situational factors also played a 
significant part in pre-training influences to training design. 
This case study has also identified that various factors within the training 
platform have influenced interdependent team learning and performance 
outcomes, to include the training content, methods, formal training tools, and 
instructor capabilities. These training programme elements were seen to have a 
cumulative effect on training effectiveness. However, the effectiveness of training 
was also seen to be moderated by the perceptions of the organisational climate 
(Noe et al., 1997; Rduiller & Goldstein, 1993), policies and practices for training, 
and leadership and training philosophies. The significant degree of informal peer, 
subordinate, supervisor and instructor support also played an important part in the 
perceived degree of influence of the training programme, as does the informal 
mechanisms to gain knowledge. This support was to be important and necessary 
for learning and performance in the working environment of interdependent 
teams. 
Thus, this empirical case study has demonstrated that real-world training 
presents a very complex mix of factors that influences training effectiveness. The 
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empirical findings from this research have also identified that training 
effectiveness is truly multilevel in that it spans downward from an organisation, 
upward through the team to an organisation and across individuals and time. The 
findings further suggest that various components within the training programme 
were considered to have more of an effect on training than others (i. e., significant 
positive influence of formal tools, significant negative influence of lack of 
feedback). This would also suggest that further empirical research is needed to 
explore not just the multilevel influences on training effectiveness, there is a 
further need to explore the cumulative effect of the multilevel influences and how 
that impacts those involved in the training process. 
7.2 Organisational Effectiveness 
The impetus for training for the Canadian Navy was the move to a new and 
somewhat similar platform that required each member of the team with unique 
skills and roles to perform effectively as an individual. These individuals must 
also integrate their duties and interact to effectively operate the working platform, 
and when necessary, effectively and accurately perform emergency procedures to 
ensure the safety of the crew and the submarine. The consequence of not 
achieving performance outcomes could be disastrous. Although the 
interdependent team members had prior experience, this new platform required 
additional knowledge and skills to effectively perform the duties. Therefore, there 
was a collective requirement and expectancy that training outcomes would 
provide the knowledge and skills necessary to successfully perform in the new 
working platform. 
The detailed HTA identified that specific and unique skill-set contributions 
were required by individuals to collectively and cooperatively be able to 
functionally operate the submarine and to perform the emergency procedures. The 
achievement of these skill-sets from the training programme, albeit 
unconventionally provided team members both a capability to perform emergency 
procedures and a capability to functionally operate the submarine, thereby 
supporting higher-level operational functions. The achievement of interdependent 
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performance outcomes and the indication of interdependent team skill 
requirements from the task analysis have revealed that individual outcomes 
emerged upward through teams to achieve performance objectives from the 
organisation. However, significant questionnaire findings, corroborated with 
interviews, have further identified that the success of vertical transfer in this 
working platform relied not only on an individual skill-set outcome for 
interdependent team emergency management. The findings have shown that a 
complex integration of multilevel influences, as that suggested by Kozlowski and 
Salas's (1997) multilevel framework, collectively influenced training 
effectiveness and the achievement of vertical transfer, that together identify that 
organisational effectiveness was achieved. 
It has been identified that a complex interaction of training effectiveness 
factors within the training platform has influenced training effectiveness and 
performance outcomes. Trainees could have accepted the status quo from the 
training platform, but the duties within the platform require unquestionable 
confidence from all team members that each member is capable of performing 
their assigned duties. Thus, although there were many challenges, difficulties and 
shortcomings in this training programme, the underlying achievement of 
organisational effectiveness can be related to the perceptions, expectations and 
satisfaction from this training platform derived from the powerful influence of the 
inherent risk of the working platform. The outcome from this was a drive and 
persistence to achieve the perceived knowledge and skill requirements to 
effectively perform their duties in new working platform. 
As identified by the significant relationship between informal training aids 
with learning and expectations for maintainer knowledge and skill, there was a 
lack in confidence of the knowledge and skills that would be obtained formally 
through training to achieve the expected capability to perform the duties. Rather 
than develop a negative expectation of their capacity to perform, measures were 
taken by the trainees through informal mechanisms to retrieve, distribute and 
support the achievement of performance outcomes. Examples of their efforts to 
gain greater knowledge and skills include their seeking out contractors who had 
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installed the systems; countless hours spent in the platform understanding the 
systems; searches through all available documents; contacting manufacturers; 
and, asking for more courses and time in the simulators which was implemented 
for successive crews. Also, the continued reliance on informal mechanisms was 
present for all successive crews' training, and those who had completed the 
training supported those still in training. 
There also remained a reliance on formal training aids, but although 
beneficial it was not found to be sufficient, as seen by the common correlation 
between formal aids with content and performance expectations. Insufficient 
knowledge and skills provided by the training platform, specifically, the formal 
training aids, were not helpful enough in learning to meet performance 
expectations. One can conclude then that to achieve the expected capability, there 
had to be a global commitment from all trainees within and between crews. 
Therefore, the intervention measures taken by individuals upward through 
the team, and across teams, have resulted in greater knowledge and skill than that 
provided or intended from the training platform. Conclusions can be drawn from 
this exploratory case study that the efforts by individuals upward through to 
teams, and across teams has enhanced training performance outcomes. Albeit 
unstructured, this approach and effort resulted in performance capabilities that 
were greater than what would have been provided solely from the original training 
platform. Therefore, there was an impact to organisational effectiveness. 
Furthermore, these complex multilevel influences within this training programme 
were proven to be effective (although sub-optimised) and have impacted the 
greater effectiveness of training and the outcomes from training. Therefore, one 
could conclude from this case study that training effectiveness is linked to 
organisational effectiveness. 
221 
8.0 Study Strengths, Limitations, Future Research and Conclusions 
8.1 Study Strengths and Limitations 
Strengths 
This case study pioneered a unique approach to broaden the scope of 
multilevel approaches to training effectiveness by examining the links between 
individual through to team influences; learning; training outcomes; and, 
organisational effectiveness. 
This approach was made possible because the research was performed while 
an organisation conducted training for complete crews, of various experiences and 
occupations, to learn the performance of safety-critical operations for a new 
working platform. The benefits to this approach were that research was conducted 
as training proceeded naturally, and training was linked and integral to 
organisational objectives. This training procedure allowed the influences that an 
organisation can exert in design and delivery of training to be readily observed. 
This training platform also provided the opportunity to examine the combined 
influences that the organisation, individual, training programme and situational 
variables from pre-training through to training contributes and influences training 
effectiveness across multi-levels. The case study has addressed past concerns that 
training effectiveness research has only focused on selective influencing factors 
and the complexity of tasks studied have not been representative of an 
organisation (Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Ford & Weissbein, 1997). Further historical 
criticisms and limits of the value of past training effectiveness research were also 
addressed as this research could incorporate training as a multilevel system 
embedded in an organisational context (Kozlowski et al., 2000; Kozlowski & 
Salas, 1997; Tannenbaum & Yukl, 1992). This case study was also able to 
observe and examine individual and team simulator training as it occurred. Thus, 
detailed observations of the training regime were possible, rather than making 
determinations from only self-reporting measures. 
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Limitations 
Several limitations were present in this case study that constrain the 
conclusions that can be drawn. Although conducting research while an 
organisation performs training is a plus in many respects, this research could not 
interfere with the conduct of the training process or impose any perceptions that 
might influence outcomes. Thus, the protocol design was restricted, and many of 
the variables known to influence training effectiveness (e. g., attitude and 
behavioural variables) could not be included in this work. Pre-training 
perceptions could only be identified from managers and trainers to avoid the 
potential development of negative perceptions of the value of training or the 
capability of the instructors. For greater weight of the conclusions drawn from 
this study it would have been preferable to distribute the pre-training questions to 
all involved, but this was not possible because distribution of some of the 
questions to trainees could have altered the perception of the value of the training 
programme. Further, assessment of the constraints and perceptions of the 
organisation was not possible as this could again undermine the value of training. 
Although a great deal of data was obtained for the historical background, the RN 
trainers and Canadian Navy management provided this information, along with its 
own institutional biases. 
Distribution of questionnaires and conduct of interviews with the various 
groups (e. g., managers, trainers and the three crews) over a period of time could 
be considered a limitation as this time lag could have altered perceptions of 
intervention changes that should or could be implemented. However, as crew one 
had completed all portions of training when interviewed, and all members of the 
crew were interviewed within a period of two days, the skewing of results from 
discussions or pressures from other members in this crew is therefore unlikely. 
This data was therefore used as the baseline conditions of the original state of the 
training programme. Interviews have identified that individuals actively sought 
information from crews who had already had the training and, had participated in 
this research. Therefore, interviews and questionnaires could have prompted 
perceptions of training and the need for change. However, as the questions only 
223 
related to the perceptions of the effect of the programme to learning or 
performance; significance of the various training programme support in achieving 
that aim; and, the current state and changes to the training programme, this study 
did not reveal any concepts or perceptions that were not already present. This can 
be said with some confidence as the training programme was receptive to review 
any suggestions for changes, and the post lessons learned meeting from crew one 
identified and collated the concerns and deficiencies in the training platform 
(Detachment, 2001). 
As this research was conducted during successive training of four crews, at 
various stages of training, pre- and post-testing were not possible, nor was this 
study able to complete testing at the same completion phase for each of the three 
crews examined. The availability of the participants during this training controlled 
the timing of the interviews. It was not considered desirable to distribute the 
questionnaires without the researcher present, as skewing, or group consensus 
responses were likely to result. Although data collection over a period of time can 
be considered a limitation, the information gathered and the conclusions drawn 
were able to sufficiently identify the perceived effectiveness of the training and 
the effects to perceptions and expectations from training interventions. Also, no 
performance measures could be taken or obtained to identify the degree of 
progress made from this training (beyond the indication of a pass), or the 
measurement of the true success of this training to achieve the expected transfer 
outcomes. As all contributing influencing factorscould not be measured (e. g., 
organisational factors and individual characteristics), erroneous conclusions 
would have been made to attribute the influence of performance solely on those 
factors examined. As the objective of this thesis was to provide empirical 
evidence to identify interdependent team vertical transfer and the multilevel 
training effectiveness factors that could impact outcomes, performance measures 
would not have added greater value to the outcomes of this thesis. Although the 
only real performance measure was that the submarines sailed safely and intact to 
Canada. Another unexpected performance measure was the effective transfer of 
training that occurred among crews, and among crewmembers of various 
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experience. It is the depth and accuracy of what was learned informally that is of 
question 
There were also potential measurement limitations within this case study. 
This case study had limitations in the statistical analysis that was possible because 
of the small sample population size (maximum 42 participants of a possible 71). 
Thus, although there were sufficient numbers to proximate a normal distribution, 
power was considered insufficient to perform parametric statistics. However, non- 
parametric tests did provide the association between influencing factors and the 
association between groups (Shavelson, 1988). Also due to the low power, 
reliability testing of the questions was not possible. Although questions were 
tailored for the unique training environment, questions were circulated prior to 
their use within academia and within the Canadian Navy non-involved personnel 
to identify relevancy, clarity, detail, and completeness (J. R. Wilson, 1998). 
8.2 Future Research Recommendations 
1. One of the key future recommendations that has been identified in this case 
study is that organisations need to understand the relevance and value of training 
effectiveness research. More importantly they also need to understand the 
practical implications and benefits that can be achieved from research findings 
and models developed for training effectiveness design and delivery. 
Reciprocally, greater empirical research needs to be performed to understand 
operational problems and the training approaches taken, to link research to 
practice. These case study findings emphasise the importance for future training 
research to identify and explain the implications of multilevel influences to 
training effectiveness and how that can be applied in training practice (Salas, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Blickensderfer, 1997). 
2. The findings from this case study have also identified the importance of 
further empirical research that takes into account real-world training and all of the 
multiple influences that could impact the achievement of interdependent team 
vertical transfer. This research has determined that training is bound by 
organisations' objectives, and individual outcomes: emerge upward through the 
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team to the organisation. Thus, training effectiveness is not based on individual 
outcomes rather they emerge upward to effect an organisation (Kozlowski et al., 
2000; Kozlowski & Salas, 1997). If future research is to aid organisations in 
achieving organisational effectiveness, efforts need to expand beyond an 
individual level orientation of training and broaden the approach to consider 
training as a system within an organisation (Kozlowski & Salas, 1997) and 
include all of the multi-levels of influences that can impact its success. 
The research from this case study has identified and confirmed at a cursory 
level that Kozlowski and Salas' (1997) multilevel model framework will aid in 
the design and delivery of interdependent team training, and will provide even 
greater support with the inclusion of more defined teamwork and task work 
competencies (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997b; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995). As 
this research was exploratory it broadly identified how, where and when to deliver 
training and gaps in models to support interdependent team vertical transfer. 
Research is still needed to further detail the requirements for a supportive model 
to aid in emergency management. For instance, this case study has shown that 
both the technical knowledge and skills and the enabling behavioural skills must 
both be provided together for effective performance, and individual skill 
proficiency is necessary prior to team delivery. This was identified through 
deficiencies however and not level of performance. To further validate Kozlowski 
and Salas' (1997) multilevel model further research is needed to identify what is 
the optimum sequence, timing and allocation of training between individuals and 
teams. When should the technical and enabling components be delivered? In 
developing the answer to these questions, determining the acceptable performance 
level would seem to be the way to proceed. Risk analysis of error would also 
assist in determining the level of skill proficiency required. 
Therefore, in environments where the consequence of lack of ability or error 
could be disastrous, at what level of skill is the team and individual considered 
proficient? Guidance in performance outcomes for behaviour can be given by 
theories that pose there are three stages of skill level: initial skill acquisition 
(novice rudimentary skills); skill composition (advanced skill); and, skill 
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automaticity or mastery (Yelon & Ford, 1999) that encompasses situational 
awareness, prioritisation and implementation of task strategies (Kozlowski, Toney 
et al., 2001). 
3. This case study's findings have identified that a complex mix of factors and 
cumulative events prior to training (i. e., individual, organisational, and 
situational) have influenced the training design, which has impacted training 
effectiveness. Although, organisational situational factors (e. g., leadership and 
training philosophy) greatly impacted the design of this training programme, their 
influence was still seen during training. Taking into consideration the impact of 
the pre-training influences, the insignificant findings are likely due to the low 
number of respondents. Thus, further research is needed to measure the pre- 
training and training influence of organisational constructs within a multilevel 
approach to identify the influence of such things as workplace culture, leadership, 
and training philosophy on training effectiveness. The impact from these 
organisational constructs also influenced the behaviours and attitudes of the 
trainees. Although behaviours and attitudes were not measured in this case study, 
it can be assumed with some confidence that the inherent risk of the working 
platform created a motivation and commitment to achieve performance outcomes. 
This assumption was clear in the dedicated informal efforts by all crewmembers, 
within and between submarines to support and assure performance outcomes 
would be achieved. Confidence would also come into play in the scenario, as the 
working platform requires each crewmember to have complete confidence that 
members can perform their respective duties. Interdependent teams could also 
influence this interrelationship of attitudes and behaviours. Thus, further research 
should explore if work related attitudes (e. g., commitment) of interdependent 
teams alters training effectiveness. 
Additionally, case study findings have identified that various components 
within the training programme were considered to have more of an effect on 
training outcomes than others (e. g., because there are likely more components 
than those shown here). This finding was likely again related to the pre-training 
and training leadership and training philosophy. Moreover, there was likely a 
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cumulative effect from the various multilevel factors on learning and 
performance, but to what degree has this influenced training effectiveness and 
training outcomes? Leadership influences and training philosophies, practices and 
procedures are present in any organisation. Thus, future research should also 
explore if there is a difference in the perception of importance of training between 
managers, instructors and trainees, and what influence this difference has on 
training effectiveness. Will the characteristics composition of an interdependent 
team (e. g., their occupation, hierarchy of importance, and individual 
characteristics) be influenced or counteracted by these them? Answers to these 
questions provide practical relevance to research. These answers and their 
implications will allow research to be incorporated into training practice. 
4. Another key finding from this case study was the presumption of the 
suitability of the pre-requisites for this training. This presumption, in part 
determined the training content, but there was also a significant follow-on effect 
to the trainees in learning. The distinct system and function differences between 
the two working platforms required different actions, especially for the 
technicians. The new working platform also merged the duties that were 
performed by two occupations in the prior working platform into one. Although 
this pre-requisite is not solely responsible for the sub-optimal training 
effectiveness, prior consideration of a detailed needs assessment would have 
identified the details of what should be trained, why, and who should be trained 
for performance of the operational duties. These findings have identified the 
importance of a traditional needs assessment, but as well, team-task analysis 
would also be required prior to designing and initiating a training programme 
(Bowers et al., 1995; Kozlowski et al., 2000). Although team performance models 
and team-driven performance strategies have begun to address these issues, 
further research and empirical evidence are still needed to address specific team 
skill-set requirements, and how, when, how long, and whom should be trained for 
training to be effective. 
Informal mechanisms for learning also played a significant part in this 
training platform. The informal support network between trainees was considered 
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very beneficial for the team in performance of their duties as the experienced 
supported and balanced the weak. However, this case study's lead to speculation 
as to speculate whether sufficient and accurate individual knowledge was 
obtained through informal mechanisms that were not tested. It also questions 
whether this informal mechanism to learn would have been required had the 
presumptions of pre-requisite training been different. To answer these questions 
further research should explore the pre-training categories that can impact training 
effectiveness. Specifically, further research is needed to identify what an 
individual brings to training and how and what variables and techniques combine 
and emerge in interdependent teams to learn and how training can maximise 
learning. 
8.3 Conclusions 
In summary, this case study has provided the empirical evidence to support 
the theories of interdependent team vertical transfer and the link between training 
effectiveness and organisational effectiveness. This empirical case study has 
shown that interdependent team training to achieve vertical transfer was 
influenced by a multitude of factors and cumulative events that occurred prior to 
training and during training. It was also determined that influences to training 
effectiveness were exerted from multilevels. Although this case study has 
identified multilevel influences and interactions that can have an effect on both 
horizontal and vertical transfer, further research is still necessary to expand on 
this foundation. In particular, the model proposed for use in this exploratory 
research needs much development and expansion to support interdependent team 
training design and delivery. What has become evident from this body of work is 
the need to employ a multilevel approach when designing training or performing 
research to examine training effectiveness. It is anticipated that the findings of 
this study will enrich existing training programmes and result in improved vertical 
transfer knowledge. 
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Request for Approval Letter Appendix A 
21 October 1999 
Distribution List 
PROPOSAL FOR HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF 
CURRENT SUBMARINE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
Reference: A. Email, Col D. Salisbury, CO CFEME, MAO-Bio OSS Sponsor /Capt Y. 
Severs, U of Loughborough (ATL), 17 Sept 99 
B. Telecon, LCdr D. Davis, Sub Advisor, CDLS London / Capt Y. Severs, U of 
Loughborough (ATL), 7 October 99 
1. As a BioScience officer in the CF, I have done considerable work in the field of 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) identifying hazardous environments and 
producing strategies to prevent or reduce risks to operator health and safety by 
developing policies, recommending changes to SOPs, and training. I believe we can 
further expand the provision of operator health and safety through the proactive 
assessment of the interactions between man, machinery, and the environment to produce 
optimal system performance and efficient use of manpower, resulting in the desired CF 
goal, effective operations. 
2. I am currently on PG training to complete a PhD in the field of Ergonomics, and 
would like to continue research in the field of OHS, specifically dealing with issues of 
health and safety in a submarine. In an effort to continue the pursuit to support and 
augment operations I would like to take advantage of the unique and rare combination of 
current circumstances. Canada is about to bring a new class of submarines into the CF; 
submariners are currently training in the UK; and, there is an opportunity to determine if 
current training and procedures ensure personnel can effectively operate the submarine 
and achieve desired outcomes. 
3. Aware of the time-line constraints and training requirements, the enormity of 
reviewing all systems and tasks would be impossible to complete under these 
circumstances at this time. Thus, in an endeavour to ensure optimum system reliability, 
efficiency, and safety when critical, I propose at this time a study to ergonomically 
review and assess the current emergency procedures. To determine if the procedures 
effectively allow personnel to continue to carry out there tasks as intended and trained. 
4. An evaluation of the demands of the submarine on the operator with the capability 
of the submariner would identify Human Factor issues that are affecting or could affect 
the safety or operational effectiveness of our submarine fleet, and if required, provide 
solutions to alleviate these factors. A task analysis process would examine all emergency 
tasks and evaluate the influence of system design, submariners' limitations (physical and 
cognitive), and environmental constraints to determine if alterations could be made to 
improve procedures and/or training to reduce the risk of human operator error. 
5. Laboratory simulation of events in a submarine is not ideal, as an accurate 
assessment of procedures requires evaluation of all coexisting mitigating factors 
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(systems, submariners, and environment), which cannot truly be recreated. Consequently, 
it is proposed that following familiarization with training, documentation and procedures 
the following protocol and access requirements are suggested: 
a) Describe in detail all emergency tasks as directly observed from personnel, based 
upon desired goal, resources, constraints and preferences. 
Access: During training, Observation, Walk-through/Talk-through tasks 
b) Examine training and identify influencing factors, to compare capability with 
expectations. 
Access: During training, Observation, Questionnaire 
c) Compare and examine training with task descriptions and personnel performance 
results 
Access: No access to submarine or personnel required 
d) If necessary, rectify problems, adjustment of standard, training recommendations, 
job aids. 
Access: No access to submarine required 
e) Personnel performance check against recommended changes (i. e new version of 
standard) to confirm acceptability. 
Access: Training and/or Sea-trials, Observation, Questionnaire 
6.1 would like to reassure you that the proposed study will not interfere with the 
regular scheduled events of training, nor will it affect the scheduled time-line of expected 
sea-trials. To ensure this is achieved, prior to initiation of study, I will liase directly with 
submarine advisor CDLS London, and as so directed appropriate support staff, to 
determine a suitable schedule, and access to needed documentation. 
7. Proactive application of Human Factors principles to emergency procedures prior 
to commissioning of the fleet can remedy inefficient interactions before they become 
ingrained, and from the outset optimise individual and overall system performance as 
well as advocating and promoting health and safety. 
I therefore request this proposal be given reasonable consideration and endorsement 
Y. D. Severs, CD, MSc 
Captain 
Research Student 
for 
Director Human Sciences 
Loughborough University 
DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Action Information 
External 
Col D. Salisbury CO CFEME 
Cmdre I. D. Mack DGMDO 
Cmdre G. Davidson DGNP 
Internal 
Susan Harker MSc. Advisor 
Dr. K. D. Eason HS Director 
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Informed Consent Form Appendix B 
As I'm sure you are aware I am currently in the United Kingdom doing a PhD in 
Ergonomics. My research involves the potential performance effects of Canadian Forces 
submariners' integration to a new class of submarine. Specifically, my interest lies in 
what knowledge and skill is needed to perform complex, team-oriented tasks in the new 
working platform, the value of the training platform, and what support and value 
interaction with other individuals (co-workers, and trainers) and resources assists in 
performing or enhancing those duties. My eventual aim is to provide guidance for the 
development of tools, which will aid learning and subsequent job performance. 
In order to ensure the research accurately reflects conditions and identifies the 
needs of submariners, I am interviewing Canadian submariners and those directly 
involved in the training process (Royal Navy Trainers (UTT), BAE contract team 
members, and Canadian Upholder management team). This questionnaire and interview 
will provide you the opportunity to voice how you feel the process/training has affected 
submariners' ability to perform their duties, to identify interactions that have been 
supportive and as well, the opportunity to express your opinions on what improvements 
you think can be made. 
During this interview to ensure there are no misinterpretations, and so comparisons 
can be made with other interviewees, I would like your permission to record the 
interview and to ask if you would occasionally indicate on the papers provided the degree 
of your reaction to specific questions. I can assure you that your identity and all 
information supplied in this interview will be treated confidentially, and used solely for 
this study. The personal details provided will only be used to identify and categorize 
responses to determine if specific groups have a unique view or requirements. 
Before you begin I would like to thank you for your participation. You will be 
supporting me in the short term to complete my PhD and, I hope, in the long term your 
candour will identify means of easing learning and enhancing the influences training can 
support operations to the Canadian Navy. 
Sincerely, 
Yvonne Severs, CD, MSc 
Captain 
I freely give consent to participate in this investigation 
Print Name Provide Signature Date 
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Questionnaire, Interview Questions Appendix C 
and Category Divisions4 
Please indicate your name; rank; occupation; 
1. Years of military service; 
2. Highest level of education; 
3. Years qualified as a submariner; 
4. Years of operational experience on submarines; and on which class, 
5. Years lapsed in submarine experience. 
Collated Questionnaire and Interview Questions for Management and Trainers 
Responses unless identified otherwise were to the Likert scale of 1-5 (1= strongly agreed, 
agreed, neutral, disagreed, to strongly disagreed). 
6. While the RN was actively serving on the Upholder class submarine do you know if 
you/they were provided with the training needed to perform the required duties? 
Interview question: Explain. 
7. Do you think the documents provided were an aid to learning the required duties? 
8. Once the RN was notified they would be training the CF, do you/they know if the RN 
trainers had the knowledge and skill necessary to train the CF to operate the 
Upholder submarine, specifically, emergency procedures? Interview question: 
Explain what was missing. 
9. Once the RN was notified they would be training the CF, do you/they know if 
Flagship had the knowledge and skill necessary to train the CF to operate the 
Upholder submarine, specifically, emergency procedures? Interview question: 
Explain what was missing. 
10. Do you know if the trainers received any guidance regarding how the training 
programme should be set up (Entirely, Some, Barely, Not at all) Interview question: 
If so, what. information, and from who (i. e. content, form, style, length)? 
11. Do you know if the trainers received any guidance regarding the training syllabus 
content (Entirely, Some, Barely, Not at all)? 
12. Do you know if the trainers received any guidance regarding required depth of 
subject matter (Entirely, Some, Barely, Not at all)? 
13. Do you know if the trainers received any guidance on the standards for assessment of 
knowledge and skill? (Entirely, Some, Barely, Not at all)? 
14. Did the lapse in active service onboard the Upholder class submarine have an 
influence on your/their ability to recall what was previously learned? 
15. Did the lapse in active service onboard the Upholder class submarine have an 
influence on your/their ability to train? Interview question: What operational and 
4 This appendix is a collation of the questionnaire and interview questions provided to all groups 
in this case study. When distributing questionnaires, each group or individual were provided with 
the questions appropriate for the group. The sentence structure was also changed, if necessary, to 
reflect the group and phase of training. To control for misinterpretation and thus contamination of 
data, each distinct question was placed on a separate page. Simultaneous interviews with 
questionnaire completion provided respondents an opportunity to expand upon responses, and also 
provided the researcher an opportunity to tease out the reason for the response. Any reference of 
youfthey or a slash in this appendix is only present to identify the sentence structure change for a 
particular group (Le., you/they refers to RN trainers with you and CF managers with they). 
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training knowledge and ability was required of the RN trainers and Flagship, and 
what level of expertise was expected? 
16. Did the lapse in active service onboard the Upholder class submarine have an 
influence on the RN trainers' ability to assess the trainees for knowledge and skill? 
17. Did the original documentation assist the RN trainers in retrieving the information 
needed? Interview question: Why? 
18. Did the training simulator provide assistance? Interview question: Why? Was it used 
to upgrade/retrain? 
19. Did access to the Upholder class submarine provide any assistance to the RN 
trainers? Interview question: Why? 
20. Did the RN trainers use any other method to extend their knowledge and skill other 
than what was originally provided when the Upholder was in active service? 
Interview question: from what or whom? Interview question: Why? 
21. Did Flagship use any other method to extend their knowledge and skill other than 
what was originally provided when the Upholder was in active service? Interview 
question: from what or whom? Interview question: Why? 
22. At the time that training began, do you believe the RN trainers had the level of 
knowledge and skill to train and assess the CF? Interview question: If not, how did 
you believe they compensated? 
23. At the time that training began, do you believe Flagship had the level of knowledge 
and skill to train and assess the CF? Interview question: If not, how did you believe 
they compensated? 
Collated Training Questionnaire and Interview Questions Provided to RN 
Trainers, CF Management and CF Trainees 
24. Do you believe the CF submariners have formally received and retained the set out 
knowledge and skills to perform emergency operating procedures based upon the 
formal training to date? Interview question: If not, identify what was missing. 
25. Will the CF submariners have the knowledge and skills to perform the set out 
emergency tasks on completion of training/sea-trials? Interview expansion: To what 
level? 
26. Did you find the Emergency Operating Procedure document, in its current format, 
aided the CF trainees in learning? Interview question: Were they complete, or was it 
necessary to refer to other documents (e. g., SOPs, technical documents) in order to 
learn and memorize each procedure? 
27. Did the original technical specifications aid in the CF trainees in their studies? 
Interview question: Did you find the content, format and style was helpful in aiding 
learning of Upholder systems? Were they complete? 
28. Did individual simulator training assist the CF submariners in learning? Interview 
question: Was it of value? Interview question: Why? 
29. Did team simulator training assist the CF submariners in learning? Was it of value? 
Interview question: Why? 
30. Did access to the Upholder class submarine assist the CF submariners in learning? 
Interview question: How and why? 
31. Did the CF submariners use any other method to extend their knowledge and skill 
other than that provided formally in the training platform (e. g., informal aids)? 
Interview question: Did they need to, how did they know or recognize what was 
missing, what specific information was sought, and where did they get it from? 
32. Were the training material and lectures and contents in all documentation accurate, 
and were the display consoles and the training simulator a true reflection of the 
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submarine at the onset of training? Interview question: Was the training a reflection 
of the tasks and working platform? Are there significant differences between 
submarines? 
33. Has the training curriculum changed since the CF training programme initiated? 
(Entirely, Some, Barely, Not at all) Interview question: If so what, do you know why, 
and by whom? Are there significant differences between crew one's training, as a 
pilot course, and subsequent crew training? 
34. Has the training content changed since the CF training programme initiated? 
(Entirely, Some, Barely, Not at all) Interview question: If so what, do you know why, 
and by whom? Are there significant differences between crew one's training, as a 
pilot course, and subsequent crew training? 
35. Has the training supporting documentation changed since the CF training programme 
initiated? (Entirely, Some, Barely, Not at all) Interview question: If so what, do you 
know why, and by whom? Are there significant differences between crew one's 
training, as a pilot course, and subsequent crew training? 
36. Has the accuracy of the training material, lectures, documentation, and accuracy and 
reflection of the simulators affected your ability to learn? Interview question: Has the 
training programme changed to be more reflective of the working platform? 
37. Has the training curriculum changed since the CF training programme was initiated? 
38. Has the course content changed since the CF training programme was initiated? 
39. Were you able to provide suggestions to the training curriculum and content along 
the way?. Interview question: Are there any differences to the training crew one 
received and subsequent crews? If so what are they? 
40. Were you able to provide suggestions for changes to documentation along the way? 
Interview question: If so what and why. 
41. If changes were made to the training curriculum, content or documentation, did that 
negatively affect your ability to learn? Interview question: Why? 
42. If changes were made to the training curriculum, content or documentation, did that, 
or will that negatively affect your ability to perform during sea-trials? Interview 
question: How so? 
43. Does the process have measures in place to test and confirm the knowledge and skills 
of trainees? Interview question: If so, what measures are in place, what is the 
acceptable standard and what has it been based upon? 
44. Does the process have measures in place to test and confirm the knowledge and skills 
of the RN trainers? Interview question: If so, what measures are in place, what is the 
acceptable standard and what has it been based upon? 
45. Does the process have measures in place to test and confirm the knowledge and skills 
of the Flagship trainers? Interview question: If so, what measures are in place, what 
is the acceptable standard and what has it been based upon? 
46. Have the RN trainers' depth of knowledge and skill changed over time? Interview 
question: What, and how have they expanded their depth and capability (with whom 
or what) 
47. Have the Flagship trainers' depth of knowledge and skill changed over time? 
Interview question: What, and how have they expanded their depth and capability 
(with whom or what) 
48. Have the trainers ((1) RN trainers and (2) Flagship) continued to gain knowledge and 
skill during the training process? Interview question: Is that achieved through sharing 
with others (e. g., other training staff, trainees)? (Great Deal, Somewhat, Barely, Not 
at all) 
49. Has this change in trainers' knowledge and skill detrimentally affected how the RN 
trainers train and assess? 
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50. Will the changes in information and knowledge detrimentally affect how the trainers 
will train and assess subsequent crews? 
51. Has previous submarine experience detrimentally affected the trainees learning 
capability for the Upholder class submarine? Interview question: Do you believe age 
might be a factor in the ability to learn, as suggested in the submariner community 
"young man's game"? Do you believe there may be any other reason why the saying 
"young man's game" has been attached to the submariners? 
52. Does team composition of crews affect learning? Interview question: How? 
53. Will team composition affect subsequent job performance? Interview question: How? 
54. Do you believe changes could still be made to the training curriculum? Interview 
question: Why? 
55. Do you believe changes could still be made to the supporting documentation? 
Interview question: Why? 
56. What do believe is the percentage of new operator knowledge and skill needed in 
order for the CF to adequately perform their assigned tasks and sufficiently operate 
the Upholder class submarine? 
57. What do believe is the percentage of new maintenance knowledge and skill needed in 
order for the CF to adequately operate their assigned tasks and-sufficiently run the 
Upholder class submarine? 
Pre-training and Training Effectiveness Question Category Division 
Pre-training Influences Training Influences 
Perce tion Expectation 
Training 6 Training 24,32, Training 50*, 54, 
Content Content 33,34, Content 55 
35,37, 
38 
Training Aids 17,18, Training Aids 26,27, Trainee 25,42*, 
19 8,29,30 Performance 53 
Instructor 8,9, Instructor 22,23, Operational 56 
Characteristics 14,15, Characteristics 46,47, Knowledge and 
16 49* Skill 
Training 10,11, Informal Aids 31,48 Maintainer 57 
Principles 12,13 Knowledge and 
Skill 
Informal Aids 7,20, Training 3,44,45 
21 Methods 
Participants " 1,2, Training 39,40 
Characteristics 3,4,5 Content 
Intervention 
Learning 36,41*, 
51*, 52 
* Denotes reverse scaled questions as degree of negative impact. For statistical purposes, reverse coding was 
completed for those questions denoting a negative impact. 
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Training Effectiveness Questionnaire Responses (Parentheses indicates number of individuals 
or number of questions for each category) 
Pre-training Training Effectiveness Questionnaire Category Responses 
Influences 
CF RN Trainers Crew One Crew Two Crew Three Total 
Managers (5) (12) (10) (11) Mean and 
(4) SD 
Training 2.13+1.03 1.85+0.86 2.42+1.10 
Content (1 
Training Aids 1.40+0.43 1.50+0.75 1.45+0.62 
Instructor 2.80+1.44 2.33+1.44 2.58+1.44 
Characteristics 
(5) 
Informal Aids 1.79+0.53 
- 
1.87+0.70 
- 
1.83+0.62 
- (3) 
Training 
Influences 
Expectation 
Training 2.04+1.05 2.08+0.75 1.78+0.86 1.99+0.85 1.97+0.47 1.98+0.76 
Content (3) 
Trainee 1.63+0.71 1.93+0.35 2.12+1.25 2.19+0.85 2.34+0.74 1.94+0.51 
Performance (3) 
Trainee 40+14.14 37+4.5 31.25+4.83 32+4.83 31.36+3.23 32.63+5.3 
Performance % 
New Ops KS 
(1 
Trainee 70+14.14 79+2.24 2.24 70.42+8.91 8.91 81+8.76 8.76 67.73+8.17 8.17 73.38 + 9.7 
Performance % 
New main KS 
(1) 
Perception 
Training 1.86+1.13 1.55+0.35 2.54+0.95 2.71+0.80 2.67+1.01 2.44+0.63 
Content (4) 
Formal Training 1.26+0.44 1.33+0.43 1.72+0.88 
- 
1.81+1.06 1.76+0.87 1.66+0.87 
Aids (5) 
Instructor 1.96+ 0.91 1.72+ 0.38 2.54+ 1.66 2.63+ 0.90 3.12+ 1.03 2.6+ 0.91 
Characteristics 
(5) 
Informal 3.25+ 1.51 2.25+0.46 1.85+0.91 1.38+0.54 2.66+1.03 2.17+1.1 
Aids (2) 
Training 1.75+1.22 2.18+1.39 3.74+1.25 2.98+1.29 2.93± 1.14 2.97± 1.39 
Methods (3) 
Training 2.5+1.29 3.29+1.68 2.02+0.84 2.0+0.63 2.3+0.70 2.3+0.95 
Content 
Intervention (2) 
Learning (4) 3.55+ 1.54 2.96+ 1.08 3.42+ 1.44 3.06+ 1.16 2.66+ 1.08 3.15+ 1.05 
* Those questions denoting a negative impact were reverse coded for group mean and standard 
deviation responses for training effectiveness categories. 
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Hierarchical Task Analysis Representation for Appendix D 
Emergency Operating Procedures5 
Examples are provided for EOPs 1,2,4,7,8,10,11 and 14 
EOP 1- Emergency Stations 
EOP 1.1: Emergency Stations at Sea 
Task preceded by the discovery of the emergency, and the raising of the alarm. 
Duties of the SCOOW 
1. Hearing the alarm order "Stop snorting/Stop ventilating, Do Not lower masts, Do Not 
flood the induction system" if at PD, if not then " Go to safe depth (55m), 6 down". 
2. Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe on FMB "Emergency Stations, Emergency 
Stations, .... ". 3. Helmsman then ordered to reduce speed to 4 knots. 
4. View panel to assure orders have been followed, assure communication received 
from crew of successful completion of orders. 
5. Await advisement from crew of conditions. 
Duties of the SCC 1 and 2 
Task preceded by OOW gives order "Stop snorting/Stop generating, then, pipe 
"Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations", provides awareness. 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press Emergency Stop Engine Indicator 
Push Button (IPB). 
2. Rotate Engine Telegraphs from `Start to Stop' 
3. Shut Snort Drain one, select Induction Hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
Induction Hull valve", direct SCC2 to site induction valve. 
4. SCC2 - Prompted to site induction hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction Hull 
valve sited shut" 
- Shut, communicate, "Shutting the Emergency flap valve" 
- Flood the Induction System, communicate, "Induction system flooding up" 
5. Shut Ventilation Exhaust Hull valve, if open, select IPB, communicate, " Shutting the 
vex Hull valve" 
6. Select Emergency Shut down - communicate, Emergency shut down as each valve is 
selected (left to right, down): a. Diesel Generator (DG) fuel isolate 
b. Ships ventilation shutdown 
c. Battery agitation/ventilation shutdown 
7. SCC2- directed to "Make all stations on the VCS and report", communicate, "All 
stations VCS" 
5 Appendix D provides a representation of the Hierarchical Task Analysis for eight of the 
Emergency Operating Procedures for the Upholder class submarine (now renamed as the Victoria 
class upon commissioning by the Canadian Navy). This research was approved and supported by 
the Canadian Navy, and as such the Hierarchical Task Analysis for all of the Emergency 
Operating Procedures was supplied to the Canadian Navy to assist in the development of the CF 
submarine training programme, and policy and procedural development. Thus, the task 
description, style of presentation, and use of terms and acronyms are reflective of the Canadian 
Navy style and format as they are used today. 
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8. Scan surveillance, gauges and panel 
9. Await further direction 
Duties of the MCC 1 and 2 
I Immediate response- as the pipe is given press Emergency Stop Engine Indicator 
Push Button (IPB) for running Port and Starboard engines. 
2 Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup valve 
controllers, press port SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. If open, press 
Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard stopped 
engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. Secure compressors, Stand up, Stop running port and Starboard compressors, select 
port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
5. Shut down battery agitation, turn battery agitation pump selector switch from run to 
stop. 
6. Shut down activated battery ventilation, turn battery exhaust fan selector switch to 
off 
7. MCC, directs MCC2 "Stop axial flow fan" 
8. MCC2 prompted to switch off axial flow fan controller, communicate to MCC, "Axial 
flow fan off' 
9. MCC2 to ensure shutdown of 56 bulkhead door, and man 56 bulkhead door 
10. Man damage control net, reset panel 
11. Advise SCC1 of status, communicate, "Stop achieved, ventilation shutdown" 
Duties of Helmsman 
Task preceded by OOW gives order "Stop snorting/Stop generating, go to safe depth 
(55m), 6 down (if at PD remain at PD)". Then, pipe "Emergency Stations, Emergency 
Stations". 
1. Likely will be on auto pilot, disengage auto pilot, select manual "Course avail 
engaged" and "Depth avail engaged" switch Indicator Push Button (IPB), usually 
port unless otherwise directed. 
Note: auto pilot does not need to be manually disengaged (selection of IPB), selection of 
manual course and depth control automatically disengages auto pilot. 
2. Almost simultaneously, dive on the plane to 6°. 
3. Eyes travel to central panel to depth gauge, first to pitch angle - no more than 6° 
communicate to OOW, "6 down and current depth" 
4. Continue to communicate depth change every 5-10 m with pitch angle to OOW. 
5. Eyes remain on central panel rotating between gauges for pitch angle, depth rate, 
pitch rate, `Keeping the bubble'. 
6. Change new depth order (safe depth 55 m) into computer Awaits direction from 
DOW. 
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EOP 2 Collision 
EOP 2.1: Collision Surfaced 
Duties of SCOOW 
Note: OOW on the bridge has control of the emergency, SCOOW below carries out his 
orders. 
Task preceded by OOW on the bridge pipe "Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations, 
Stand-by Collision", usually indicated port or starboard, then orders, "Do Not lower 
masts, Man compartment blow", if necessary "Blow main ballast". 
1. SCOOW below then pipes FMB, "Shut bulkhead doors, Shut all hatches". 
2. Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe on FMB "Emergency Stations, Emergency 
Stations, Stand-by Collision..... (port or starboard), Shut bulkhead doors, Shut all 
hatches, Man compartment blows, Brace, Brace, Brace". - 
3. Orders then given to "Shut conning tower upper lid", unless Captain on way to 
bridge, "Stop generating, Do Not lower masts, Shut the induction hull valve", if 
OOW on the bridge has directed "Blow main ballast". 
4. View panel to assure orders have been followed, assure communication received 
from crew of successful completion of orders. 
5. Await advisement from crew of conditions 
If collision occurs then Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe on FMB "Emergency Stations, 
Emergency Stations, Loud bang heard external to the Submarine. All compartments carry 
out phase one damage control checks, and report to DCHQ". 
Duties of SCC1 and 2 
Task preceded by OOW pipe "Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations, Stand-by 
Collision", usually indicated port or starboard, "Shut bulkhead doors, shut all hatches, 
Man compartment blow". 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press Emergency Stop Engine Indicator 
Push Button (IPB). 
2. Rotate Engine Telegraphs from Start to Stop 
3. Shut Snort Drain one, select Induction Hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
Induction Hull valve", Direct SCC2 to site induction valve. 
4. SCC2 - Prompted to site Induction Hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction Hull 
valve sited shut" 
- Shut Emergency Flap valve, communicate, "Shutting the Emergency flap 
valve" 
5. Shut Ventilation Exhaust Hull valve, if open, select IPB, communicate, " Shutting the 
vex Hull valve" 
6. Select Emergency shut down - communicate Emergency shut down as each valve is 
selected (left to right, down): a. Diesel Generator (DG) fuel isolate 
b. Ships ventilation shutdown 
c. Battery agitation/ventilation shutdown 
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7. SCC2- directed to "Make all stations on the VCS and report", communicate, "All 
stations VCS" 
8. Scan surveillance, gauges and panel 
9. Await further direction and brace for collision 
Note: Blow main Ballast tanks as required to ensure submarine remains surfaced 
Duties of MCC1 and 2 
Task preceded by OOW General Alarm, then pipe "Emergency Stations, Emergency 
Stations, Stand-by Collision", usually indicated port or starboard, "Shut bulkhead doors, 
shut all hatches, Man compartment blow". 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press Emergency Stop Engine Indicator 
Push Button (IPB) for running Port and Starboard engines. 
2. Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup valve 
controllers, press port SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. If open, press 
Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard stopped 
engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. Secure compressors, Stand up, Stop running port and Starboard compressors, select 
port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
5. Shut down battery agitation, turn battery agitation pump selector switch from run to 
stop. 
6. Shut down activated battery ventilation, turn battery exhaust fan selector switch'to 
off 
7. MCC, directs MCC2 "Stop axial flow fan" 
8. MCC2 prompted to switch off axial flow fan controller, communicate to MCC, "Axial 
flow fan off' 
9. MCC2 to ensure shutdown of 56 bulkhead door, and man 56 bulkhead door 
10. Man damage control net, reset panel 
11. Advise SCCi of status, communicate, "Stop achieved, ventilation shutdown" 
12. Brace for collision 
Duties of Helmsman 
Task preceded by OOW pipe "Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations, Stand-by 
Collision", usually indicated port or starboard, "Shut bulkhead doors, Shut all hatches, 
Man compartment blow". 
1. (Lower left panel, Monitor selection panel) If on auto pilot, disengage auto pilot, 
select manual "Course avail engaged" and "Depth avail engaged" switch IPB, usually 
port unless otherwise directed. 
2. Likely will be ordered to change course to avoid collision, and alter speed (group 
down) 
3. Awaits direction from OOW. 
4. Brace for collision. 
EOP 2.2: Collision Dived 
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Duties of SCOOW 
Task preceded by periscope OOW order "Go Deep, Go Deep, Go Deep, keep safe depth" 
1. SCOOW then pipes on FMB "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Shut 
bulkhead doors". 
2. Then order "Full ahead main motor", if in SSMG then order "Group up, full ahead", 
followed by " Full dive on the planes, 10 down, keep 55 m, wheel amidships". 
3. Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe on FMB "Emergency Stations, Emergency 
Stations, Stand-by Collision..... (port or starboard), Shut bulkhead doors, Shut all 
hatches, Man compartment blows, Brace, Brace, Brace". 
4. Observe panel to ensure full dive on the planes, correct emergency stop snorting 
achieved, and communication received from crew that orders performed successfully 
5. Check to see echo sounder is on, if not, direct it be turned on. 
6. If no chance of collision, boat is safe, provide direction for adjusted speed and trim. 
7. If collision occurs, Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe on FMB "Emergency Stations, 
Emergency Stations, Loud bang heard external to the Submarine. All compartments 
carry out phase one damage control checks, and report to DCHQ". 
Duties of SCC 1 and 2 
Task preceded by OOW pipe "Go Deep, Go Deep, Go Deep, Emergency Stations, 
Emergency Stations, Stand-by Collision", usually indicated port or starboard, "Shut 
bulkhead doors, shut all hatches, Man compartment blow". 
Note: error in current EOP, SCC indicates Stop: generating/ventilating. Generating = 
surface/engine running, ventilating = surface or dived to PD, engines operating dived. 
Thus, generating is incorrect. 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press emergency stop engines IPB. 
2. Rotate Engine Telegraphs from Start to Stop 
3. Shut snort drain one, select Induction hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
induction hull valve", direct SCC2 to site induction valve. 
4. SCC2- prompted to site Induction Hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction valve 
sited shut" 
- shut Emergency flap valve, communicate, "Shutting the Emergency flap valve" 
- flood the induction system, communicate, "Induction system flooded up" 
5. Up panel: Lock down search and attack periscopes 
6. Move up: Emergency down all masts switch 
7. Move right: Shut Ventilation Exhaust Hull valve, if open, select IPB, communicate, " 
Shutting the Vex Hull valve" 
8. Select Emergency shut down - communicate, "Emergency shut down... " as each 
valve is selected (left to right, down): a. Diesel Generator (DG) fuel isolate 
b. Ships ventilation shutdown 
c. Battery agitation/ventilation shutdown 
9. Eyes travel to periscopes - report to OOW, "all masts indicate fully lowered" 
10. SCC2- directed to "make all stations on the VCS", communicate, "all stations VCS" 
11. Brace for collision 
Duties of MCC 1 and 2 
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Task preceded by OOW order "Go Deep, Go Deep, Go Deep, followed by the General 
alarm, pipe "Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations, Stand-by Collision", usually 
indicated port or starboard, "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Shut bulkhead doors, shut all 
hatches, Man compartment blow". 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press Emergency Stop Engine Indicator 
Push Button (IPB) for running Port and Starboard engines. 
2. Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup valve 
controllers, press port SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. If open, press 
Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard stopped 
engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. Secure compressors, Stand up, Stop running port and Starboard compressors, select 
port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
5. Shut down battery agitation, turn battery agitation pump selector switch from run to 
stop. 
6. Shut down activated battery ventilation, turn battery exhaust fan selector switch to 
off 
7. MCC, directs MCC2 "Stop axial flow fan" 
8. MCC2 prompted to switch off axial flow fan controller, communicate to MCC, "Axial 
flow fan off' 
9. MCC2 to ensure shutdown of 56 bulkhead door, and man 56 bulkhead door 
10. MCC2 to check propulsion panel to ensure full ahead achieved, if not communicate to 
MCC, who will forward to control room. 
11. Man damage control net, reset panel 
12. Advise SCCI of status, communicate, "Stop achieved, ventilation shutdown" 
13. Brace for collision 
Duties of Helmsman 
Task preceded by OOW "Go Deep, Go Deep, Go Deep, keep safe depth" then pipe 
"Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations, Stand-by Collision", usually indicated port or 
starboard, "Shut bulkhead doors, shut all hatches, Man compartment blow". Then OOW 
will order "Telegraphs to full ahead, 10 down, keep 55 m, wheel amidships". 
1. Immediately, push wheel in full to 10 down, full dive on the plane, ensure rudder 
amidships, then communicate to OOW, "Full dive on the plane, rudder amidships". 
2. If on auto-pilot, disengage auto pilot, select manual "Course avail engaged" and 
"Depth avail engaged" switch IPB, usually port unless otherwise directed. 
3. Eyes travel to central panel to depth gauge, first to pitch angle - full 10°, 
communicate to OW " 10 down and current depth" 
4. Then to bottom right `ordered panel', change depth (safe depth 55 m) into computer 
5. Continue to communicate depth change every 5-10 m with pitch angle to OOW 
6. Eyes remain central panel rotating between gauges for pitch angle, depth rate, pitch 
rate, `keeping the bubble'. 
7. Standby to change course and speed. Likely OOW will order group down, or group 
up battery and change speed (slow ahead, half ahead, slow astern, half astern). 
8. Upon direction rotate battery and speed switch as ordered, communicate, "Main 
motor telegraph i. e. half ahead" once selected IPB will flash until selection is 
achieved, once achieved report to OOW "Main motor telegraph indicates i. e. half 
ahead". 
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9. Observe revolutions LED, adjust as necessary (increase or reduce revolutions). Then, 
as a reminder to what revolution has been ordered, set revolutions on `Propulsion 
telegraph switches' 
10. Once speed steadied communicate to OOW, " Set 180, full ahead". 
11. Await direction and brace for collision 
EOP 4 Flooding 
EOP 4.1 Flooding Accident Dived * sequence not as suggested in training 
Duties for the SCOOW 
Note: Notice can be given by verbal pipe, Manual flood alarm (each compartment) or 
float flood alarm activated (high bilge alarm 1st, then if water high enough flood alarm 
activated). 
Task preceded by verbal pipe from person discovering the emergency, activation of 
manual flood alarm, or float alarm 
1. Order "Stop snorting, Stop snorting", then "Full ahead main motor, midships, 20° up" 
if in SSMG then order "Group up, full ahead"". 
2. Then order SCC1 "Blow fwd and aft Main Ballast Tanks (MBT) in emergency and 
normal, Blow D tank, Emergency shut down switch to auxiliary" 
2. Pipe on FMB "Shut bulkhead doors" 
3. Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe FMB " Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations, 
Flooding in ...., Man compartment blows, Shut bulkhead doors. 4. If notified flooding uncontrollable, and confirmation received bulkhead doors shut 
down, then pipe FMB "Open .... compartment 
blows" 
5. Observe panel for depth, speed, and bottle group pressure, when'/2 depth achieved, 
consider ordering "stop blowing 1,2,3,4,, Stop QA blows" if upward velocity is 
good, or bottle group pressure drop below 100 psi. 
6. At 60 m advise helmsman to "ease 6 up ", if flooding forward advise helmsman "ease 
10 up until surfaced". 
7. When advised by SCC1 that D-tank is empty, order "Emergency shutdown switch to 
all". 
8. When surfaced order "blow main ballast" to maintain maximum buoyancy, if sinking 
order SCC1 "Rapid de-ballast, pump out internal tanks". 
9. Pipe on FMB "Report on flood state and isolation" 
10. Order SCC1 "Revert Emergency shut down to auxiliary, normal bilge and ballast", 
helmsman "Full rise on the planes". - 
11 Await advisement from crew of conditions, if still flooding consider abandon ship. 
Duties of SCC 1 and 2 
Note: Notice can be given by verbal pipe, Manual flood alarm (each compartment) or 
float flood alarm activated (high bilge alarm 1S`, then if water high enough flood alarm 
activated). 
Task preceded by OOW: if snorting will give order "Stop snorting, Stop snorting", 
then... "Blow fwd and aft Main Ballast Tanks (MBT) in emergency and normal, Blow D 
tank, Emergency shut down switch to auxiliary" 
1. Immediate response- if snorting press emergency stop engines IPB. 
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2. Rotate Engine telegraphs from start to stop 
3. Shut snort drain one, select Induction hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
induction hull valve", direct SCC2 to site induction valve. 
4. SCC2- prompted to site Induction Hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction valve 
sited shut" 
- shut Emergency Flap Valve, communicate, "Shutting the Emergency Flap 
Valve" 
- flood the induction system, communicate, " Induction system flooded up" 
5. Shut ventilation exhaust Hull valve, if open, select IPB, communicate, " Shutting the 
vex Hull valve" 
6. Open: Fwd and aft Emergency blow selectors (STAND UP pull both levers out and 
down for fwd and aft quick acting (QA) blows) 
7. Open: 1,2,3,4, main ballast IPB, communicate, "Blowing 1,2,3,4" 
(Note panel indicates 4321, not 1234) 
8. Move right: Emergency Ventilation Hull shut down valve, hull valve switched from 
normal to auxiliary, communicate, "Ventilation Hull valve to auxiliary" 
9. Select emergency shut down - communicate, "Emergency shut down... " as each 
valve is selected (left to right, down): a. Diesel Generator (DG) fuel isolate 
b. Ships ventilation shutdown 
c. Battery agitation/ventilation shutdown 
10. Move down panel: Blow "D" tank, select vent IPB, communicate, "Blowing D" 
11. Observe gauges for HP bottle groups, make sure pressure not below 110 bar, 
communicate, to OOW pressure status every 10 bar. 
12. Wait for order from OOW, stop blowing if good upward velocity maintained or bottle 
group pressure drops to 100 bar then: "Stop blowing 1,2,3,4, Stop QA blows, Stop 
blowing D" 
13. Shut 1,2,3,4 blow, select IPB, communicate, "Stop blowing 1,2,3,4 main ballast 
and tanks" 
14. Stand up, lock unlock switches at Emergency blow stations, communicate, "Stop 
emergency (QA) blows" 
15. Stop blow to D, select IPB, communicate, "Stop blowing to D", do not vent D's 
16. When on the surface, rotate hull valve emergency switch to all, communicate, 
"Emergency hull valve to all" 
17. Await OOW orders and line up for "Rapid deballast, pump out internal tanks". 
18. SCC2- directed to "Make all stations on the VCS and report", communicate, "All 
stations VCS" 
Duties of MCC 1 and 2 
Note: Notice can be given by verbal pipe, Manual flood alarm (each compartment) or 
float flood alarm activated (high bilge alarm 1s`, then if water high enough flood alarm 
activated). 
Task preceded by OOW FMB pipe "Shut bulkhead doors", followed by the General 
alarm, then pipe FMB, "Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations, Flooding in...., Man 
Compartment blows, Shut bulkhead doors". 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press Emergency Stop Engine Indicator 
Push Button (IPB) for running Port and Starboard engines. 
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2. Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup valve 
controllers, press port SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. If open, press 
Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard stopped 
engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. Secure compressors, Stand up, Stop running port and Starboard compressors, select 
port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
5. Shut down battery agitation, turn battery agitation pump selector switch from run to 
stop. 
6. Shut down activated battery ventilation, turn battery exhaust fan selector switch to off 
7. MCC, directs MCC2 "Stop axial flow fan" 
8. MCC2 prompted to switch off axial flow fan controller, communicate to MCC, "Axial 
flow fan off' 
9. MCC2 to ensure shutdown of 56 bulkhead door, and man 56 bulkhead door. 
10. Fire red grenade from After Submerged Signal Ejector (SSE) 
11. Man damage control net, reset panel 
12. Advise SCC1 of status, communicate, "Stop achieved, ventilation shutdown, Red 
grenade fired from After SSE. " - 
Duties of Helmsman 
Note: Notice can be given by verbal pipe, Manual flood alarm (each compartment) or 
float flood alarm activated (high bilge alarm 1 S`, then if water high enough flood alarm 
activated). 
Task proceeded by OOW: if snorting will give order "Stop snorting, Stop snorting", then 
"Full rise on the planes, rudders up". 
1. Immediate response, full rise on the planes (pull into stomach) 
2. If on auto-pilot, disengage auto pilot, select manual "Course avail engaged" and 
"Depth avail engaged" switch IPB, usually port unless otherwise directed. 
3. Eyes go to pitch angle-20° up, keep eye on the plane, advise OOW every 5-10 m of 
current depth status. 
4. Stand by to change speed, likely full ahead. 
5. Prompts turning speed switch to full ahead, communicating to OOW "Main motor 
telegraph to full ahead", when IPB stops flashing communicate, " main motor 
telegraph indicates full ahead" 
6. OOW will ask for change in revolutions (+/-). Await orders, observe revolution LED 
wait until revolutions steady. OOW will order " set revolutions to 180" 
7. Then, as a reminder to what revolution has been ordered, set revolutions on 
`Propulsion telegraph switches' 
8. Once speed steadied then increase or decrease revolutions as necessary, communicate 
to OOW, " Set 180, full ahead". 
9. OOW will likely give orders for pitch angle and course. 
10. Await direction. 
EOP 7.1: Hydraulic Burst 
Tasks preceded by notification of person discovering the burst, gauge indication on the 
panel, and/or alarm of system/plant hydraulic failure, or systems affected by hydraulic 
system. 
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Duties of the SCOOW 
1. Immediate response, order "Stop snorting, Stop ventilating, Do not lower the masts, 
Do not flood the induction system, Auto pilot to manual, Midships the rudder, Centre 
the Foreplanes". 
2. Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe FMB " Emergency stations, Emergency stations, 
Hydraulic burst in 
... compartment, on ... system". 3. Following report/update indicating burst might be on the After-plant, and MCC's 
indication that it is safe to select emergency on rudder, then order Helmsman "Select 
air emergency on the After planes, select emergency on rudder". 
4. Check status all is secure, scan panel and confirm via communication from panel 
crew, ensure diesel generator back-up valve and snort induction hull valve shut, and 
trim system lined up for fire fighting. 
5. If at PD, order helmsman, "Remain at PD, reduce speed, slow ahead, 4 knots" if no 
periscopes raised then order Helmsman, "Go to safe depth, dive on the planes, keep 
6° to 55 m, slow ahead, 4 knots". 
6. If Helmsman indicates emergency rudder control is not available, indications show 
burst is on main hydraulic system, have SCC1 contact MCC to operate systems in 
hand-control. 
7. Pipe on FMB, "Stand-by to operate Ships systems in Hand-control". 
8. Await advisement from crew of conditions. 
Duties of SCC1 and 2 
Tasks preceded by OOW orders "Stop snorting, Stop ventilating, Do Not lower the masts, 
Do Not flood the induction system, Auto pilot to manual, Midships to rudder, Centre the 
Foreplanes" 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press emergency stop engines IPB. 
2. Rotate Engine telegraphs from start to stop 
3. Shut snort drain one, select Induction hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
induction hull valve" 
4. SCCI directs SCC2- Do Not flood induction system 
5. SCC2 prompted to: site induction hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction valve 
sited shut" shut Emergency Flap Valve, communicate, "Shutting the Emergency 
Flap Valve" 
(does not flood induction system). 
6. Move right: Shut ventilation exhaust hull valve, if open, select IPB, communicate, " 
Shutting the vex Hull valve" 
7. Select emergency shut down - communicate, "emergency shut down... " as each 
valve is selected (left to right, down): a. Diesel Generator (DG) fuel isolate 
b. Ships ventilation shutdown 
c. Battery agitation/ventilation shutdown 
8. Line up trim system for firefighting-, Shut M port vent, open M port blow, forward 
trim pump to run 
(below garbage-center trim panel) 
9.. Direct SCC2- shut m-port vent - to blow on ..... 
10. Secure bilge and ballast system - shut off bilge pump, turn off valves 
11. Secure any hull valves open 
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12. If forward of 56 Bulkhead 
a) Switch: External Hydraulics pump to off 
Fire Isolation Valve (FIV) IPB off. 
b) Switch: Main Hydraulics pump to off 
pump to and FIV 11313 off. 
If burst Aft of 56 bulkhead 
a) Switch: External Hydraulics and 
pump to off and FIV IPB off 
b) Switch: Switch: Main Hydraulics 
off, and FIV IPB off 
c) Switch: Steering and Hydraulic 
pump to off, and FIV IPB off 
13. Monitor hydraulic gauges for drop in pressure, determine where leak/burst is situated 
14. Communicate to OOW position of pump and FIV lineup ".... valves and FIV shut" 
15: Radar mast valve to off, Communicate to OOW, "Radar mast valve off" 
16. Await direction of re-commission of hydraulics by DCHQ. 
Duties of MCC 1 and 2 
Tasks preceded by General alarm, then FMB " Emergency stations, Emergency stations, 
Hydraulic burst in .... 
Compartment, on....... system". 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press Emergency Stop Engine Indicator 
Push Button (IPB) for running Port and Starboard engines. 
2. Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup valve 
controllers, press port SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. If open, press 
Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard stopped 
engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. Secure compressors, Stand up, Stop running port and Starboard compressors, select 
port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
5. Shut down battery agitation, turn battery agitation pump selector switch from run to 
stop. 
6. Shut down activated battery ventilation, turn battery exhaust fan selector switch to 
off 
7. MCC, directs MCC2 "Stop axial flow fan" 
8. MCC2 prompted to switch off axial flow fan controller, communicate to MCC,, 
"Axial flow fan off" 
9. Advise SCC1 of status, communicate, "Stop achieved" 
10. MCC2 to ensure shutdown of 56 bulkhead door, and man 56 bulkhead door. 
11. MCC2 directed to prepare Sub fire fighting unit 90 (SFU 90) and break out 
extinguishers. 
12. Shut down main blowers from propulsion switchboard, lower panel, select Blower I 
motor and/or Blower 2 motor selector switch and rotate from auto to off. 
13. Monitor computer screen for changes in main motor temperature. 
14. Upon MCC, return directs MCC2 to investigate Starboard aft motor room, to ram 
assembly to see if any mechanical problems preventing putting rudder to emergency 
control 
15. MCC2 also investigates rudder electronic enclosure to see if powered 
16. MCC2 then reports to MCC1, communicate, "Safe to operate rudder in emergency 
control" 
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17. MCC2 directed to investigate hydraulic problem, check After plant and rep tank 
levels, if burst on After plant then opens the plant by-pass valve, and communicate to 
MCC, "Plant by-pass valve open" 
18. MCC, relays information to SCC1, communicate, "Stop achieved, Ventilation shut 
down, and Safe to operate rudder in emergency control" 
19. If burst is on the After plant communicate to SCC1, "Plant by-pass valve open" 
20. Await direction. 
Duties of Helmsman 
Tasks preceded by OOW orders "Stop snorting, Stop ventilating, Do not lower the masts, 
Do not flood the induction system, auto pilot to manual, midships to rudder, Centre the 
Foreplanes" Then, OOW FMB pipe " Emergency stations, Emergency stations, 
Hydraulic burst in ... compartment, on ... system". 
If indication shows a burst might be on the After-plant then OOW orders "Air emergency 
on the After planes, select emergency on rudder (if safe to do so). 
1. If on auto pilot, disengage auto pilot, select manual "course avail engaged" and 
"depth avail engaged" switch IPB, usually port unless otherwise directed. 
2. If at PD, will remain at PD, if no periscopes raised then OOW will order "go to safe 
depth (55 m), then follow orders as directed (dive on the planes, keep 6° to 55 m). 
3. Maintain course, midships the rudder, and centre the Foreplanes (o position), check 
gauges to ensure correct, and burst has not affected steerage and hydroplanes. 
4. Communicate to OOW status, if gauges indicate problem report " i. e. after planes 
jamm" 
5. If report indicates burst is in the After plant then OOW will order "Air emergency on 
the Afterplanes", and if safe to do so, "Select emergency rate control" 
6. Put Afterplanes in air emergency, stand up, pull down air emergency valve, rotate 
quarter turn, and release, communicate, "Afterplanes in air emergency". 
7. Select rudder switch, adjust from normal to emergency, and communicate, "rudder in 
emergency control" 
8. If "off the bubble", manually adjust to port or starboard with rudder in emergency 
control 
9. If control achieved maintain, if not, emergency control not available, advise OOW 
"Emergency rudder control is not available, rudder at ie. 10° port, I have no control" 
10. MCC will be advised, await direction, Await direction. 
EOP 8: HP Air Burst at Sea 
EOP 8.1: HP Burst at Sea 
Tasks preceded by notification of person discovering the burst, alarm indications, 
or panel gauges indicate problem 
Duties of SCOOW 
1. Initially order "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Stop snorting". 
2. Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe FMB "HP air burst, HP air burst in .... " 
3. View panel to assure orders have been followed, snort is off, assure 
communication received from crew of successful completion of orders and 
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update of status, affected bottle groups, and which Group Isolator Valves (GIV's) 
have been shut. 
4. Pipe on FMB "Man emergency blows in hand". 
5. If all GIV's shut order Helmsman "Maintain depth and course", if 
speed is up, reduce speed, "slow ahead, 4 knots". 
6. Await advisement from crew of conditions 
Duties of SCC 1 and 2 
Tasks preceded by OOW FMB pipe "HP air burst, HP air burst in .... ", then "Stop 
snorting, Stop snorting", then " Man emergency blows in hand". 
I. Select stop snorting alarm - not emergency 
2. Rotate Engine telegraphs from start to stop 
3. Shut snort drain one, select Induction hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
induction hull valve", direct SCC2 to site induction hull valve. 
4. SCC2- prompted to site induction hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction valve 
sited shut" 
- shut Emergency Flap Valve, communicate, "Shutting the Emergency Flap 
Valve" 
- flood the induction system, communicate, " Induction system flooded up" 
5. SCC2- directed to "make all stations on the VCS and report", communicate, "all 
stations VC 
6. Move right: Shut ventilation exhaust hull valve, if open, select IPB, communicate, " 
Shutting the vex Hull valve" 
7. Monitor HP air pressure gauges and ring mains, communicate pressure readings: 
A) if all gauges fall (both ring mains), shut all group isolation valves (GIV), 
communicate to OOW, "all GIV's shut" 
B) if only one side ring main drops, shut affected GIV's, communicate to OOW, 
"GIV's port or starboard shut" 
C) if no indication of pressure drop leave GIV's alone, communicate to OOW, "no 
pressure drop of GIV's". 
Duties of MCC 1 and 2 
Tasks preceded by General alarm, then FMB pipe "HP air burst, HP air burst in 
.... ", 
followed by FMB "Stop snorting, Stop snorting", then " Man emergency 
blows in hand". 
1. If snorting/generating, as non-emergency, proceed with normal shutdown for 
running Port and Starboard engines. Select engine telegraph selector switch 
and rotate from start to stop for each engine. 
2. Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup 
valve controllers, press port SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. If 
open, press Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard 
stopped engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. If HP air compressors running then shut down. Stand up, Stop running port 
and Starboard compressors, select port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
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5. Advise SCC1 of status, communicate, "Stop achieved" 
6. Await direction. 
Duties of Helmsman 
Tasks preceded by OOW General alarm pipe "HP air burst, HP air burst in .... ", then FMB pipe "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Man emergency blows in hand". 
I. If on auto pilot, disengage auto pilot, select manual "course avail engaged" 
and "depth avail engaged" switch IPB, usually port unless otherwise directed 
will likely give orders for pitch angle and course 
2. Maintain depth, course and speed 
3. Observe log to ensure correct speed, compass for correct course, rudder, 
Foreplanes to maintain bubble 
4. Await OOW direction. 
EOP 10: 140KW MG Failure 
EOP 10.1: Single MG Failure with both MG's Running 
Note: Loss of Fwd MG will result in Fwd and After battery flood alarms being 
activated 
Tasks preceded by activation of battery flood alarms -B class, depth and 
heading indicators are lost, if After MG, or loss of all gauge indications, if loss of 
Fwd MG. 
Duties of SCOOW 
1. Initially order "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Do Not lower masts, Do Not 
flood the induction system". 
2. Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe FMB "Electrical failure, Electrical failure, 
loss of Fwd/Aft MG, electrical repair parties and DCHQ close up". 
3. Order Helmsman " Man helm, Select manual control, Centre the Foreplanes" 
if deep then "Keep safe depth, 55m". 
4. If forward MG failure, remind Helmsman to view Arma Brown, - back up 
compass 
5. If After MG failure order MCC, "Obey telegraphs in Manual mode I", then 
pipe on FMB, "Make telegraphs in hand control" 
6. Pipe on FMB, "Do Not start any AC machinery without contacting the 
MCC". 
7. View panel to assure orders have been followed, snort if off, assure 
communication received from crew of successful completion of orders. 
8. Await advisement from crew of conditions 
Duties in SCC 1 and 2 
Note: Loss of Fwd MG will result in Fwd and After flood batteries being activated 
Loss of Fwd MG results in Propulsion failure on changing group 
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Tasks preceded by OOW order "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Do Not lower masts, Do 
Not flood the induction system". Then, General alarm FMB "Electrical failure, Electrical 
failure, loss of f vd/aft MG, electrical repair parties and DCHQ close up". 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press emergency stop engines IPB (alarm? 
As MG failure not considered emergency). 
2. Rotate Engine telegraphs from start to stop 
3. Shut snort drain one, select Induction hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
induction hull valve" 
4. SCC1 directs SCC2- Do Not flood induction system 
5. SCC2 prompted to site induction hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction valve sited 
shut" shuts Emergency Flap Valve, communicate, "Shutting the Emergency Flap 
Valve" 
(do not flood induction system). 
6. SCC2- directed to "make all stations on the VCS and report", communicate, "all 
stations VCS" 
7. Move right: Shut ventilation exhaust hull valve, if open, select IPB, communicate, " 
Shutting the vex Hull valve" - 
8. Loss of Fwd MG Loss of aft MG 
a) Advise OOW "Loss of fwd a) Advise OOW "Loss of External 
trim, Steering and hydraulics, hydraulics, After trim pump, After 
Main hydraulics, LP bilge. " trim not available. " 
b) Switch After plant DC pump to 
line b) Switch Main hydraulic pump to 
c) Switch AC pump to off off 
d) Direct SCC2 "make override c) Direct SCC2 "make override 
switch for ballast pump water switch on HP bilge pump water 
sensitive probe sensitive probe" 
e) Monitor all systems and panel d) Monitor all systems and panel 
Duties of MCC 1 and 2 
Note: Loss of Fwd MG will result in Fwd and Aft flood batteries being activated 
Loss of Fwd MG results in Propulsion failure on changing group 
Tasks preceded by General alarm, then FMB "Electrical failure, Electrical failure, Loss 
of fwd/aft MG, Electrical repair parties and DCHQ close up" 
1. If snorting/generating, as non-emergency, proceed with normal shutdown for running 
Port and Starboard engines. Select engine telegraph selector switch and rotate from 
start to stop for each engine. 
2. Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup valve 
controllers, press port SW Hull valve'controller IPB and backup IPB. If open, press 
Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard stopped 
engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. Secure compressors, Stand up, Stop running port and Starboard compressors, select 
port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
5. Note panel alarm indications to determine which motor group affected (Fwd/Aft 
MG), disengage audible alarm. 
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6. Advise SCC1 of status, communicate, "Stop achieved" relay motor group affected 
"Fwd/Aft MG failure" 
Check MG control and AC distribution panel, scan up the panel, check Aft and Fwd 
AC switchboard to see if indicators tripped, check to see if MG contactor switch 
tripped, check MG gauges. Select affected MG AC breaker selector switch rotate from 
closed to off 
7. Check DC supply, shut down affected MG, turn affected DC contactor switch from 
start to off. 
8. Check Buss couplers (BS), ensure BSI and BS2 breakers are open and tagged (normal 
state at sea is off) 
9. Report to DCHQ for recovery action, communicate, "Fwd or Aft MG breaker shut 
down and isolated, BC contactors open and tagged". 
10. Await direction from DCHQ. 
Duties of Helmsman 
Tasks preceded by OOW order "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Do Not lower masts, 
Do Not flood the induction system". Then, General alarm FMB "Electrical failure, 
Electrical failure, loss of Fwd/Aft MG, electrical repair parties and DCHQ close up". 
OOW then orders " Man helm, Select manual control, centre the Foreplanes. 
1. If on autopilot, disengage auto pilot, select manual "course avail engaged" and 
"depth avail engaged" switch IPB, usually port unless otherwise directed. 
2. OOW will order if deep "Keep safe depth, 55m" 
3. Centre the Foreplanes to centre hold 
4. If forward MG failure OOW will remind to view "Arma Brown" - back up 
compass 
5. Maintain course via Arma Brown, keep depth and speed 
6. Eyes remain on central panel rotating between gauges for pitch angle, depth rate, 
pitch rate, `keeping the bubble'. 
7. Await direction. 
EOP 11: 24 Volt Failure 
EOP 11.1 Total 24 V DC Failure 
Note: Control panel ineffective, remote control lost. Hydraulic plants may be 
available for local operation, all hull valves fail shut. 
Task preceded by sudden loss of all power, complete darkness, loss of 
communication. 
Duties of SCOOW 
I. Initial order, "Stopsnorting, Stop snorting, Do Not lower any masts. Do Not 
flood the induction system". 
2. Order Helmsman "Keep safe depth, After-planes in air emergency", if deep, 
come to safe depth, order "Go to safe depth, 55m". 
3. With no internal communication, delegate 2 runners, each with a whistle, one 
foreward one aft to shout "24 Volt failure, 24 volt failure, Diving stations, Diving 
stations" 
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4. Direct SCC2 prior to going aft, " Advise MCC to obey telegraphs in Manual 
mode 2, pass all telegraph orders via VCS net, MCC to man and operate rudder 
by operation of the distributor valve". 
5. If indication by Helmsman hydroplanes are not available send runner aft, 
upon his return to centre the Foreplanes. 
6. Assure communication received from crew of successful completion of orders. 
7. Await advisement from crew of conditions 
Shipwide implications: 
1. Complete loss of remote control and indications of all hydraulically operated 
valves from SCC and MCC. 
2. Loss of all alarm indications and all audible warning outposts. 
3. Complete loss of vices 
4. Complete loss of automatic propulsion control and telegraphs 
5. Complete loss of OMC 
6. Loss of all mast and periscope control 
7. Loss of automatic control of all hydraulic plants 
Duties of SCC 1 and 2 
Note: Control panel ineffective, remote control lost. Hydraulic plants may be 
available for local operation, all hull valves fail shut. 
Task preceded by OOW pipe "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Do Not lower any masts. 
Do Not flood the induction system". 
I. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press emergency stop engines IPB 
(emergency? Or press stop snorting alarm). 
2. Rotate Engine telegraphs from start to stop 
3. Shut snort drain one, select Induction hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
induction hull. valve" 
4. SCCI directs SCC2- "Do Not flood induction system" 
5. SCCI directs SCC2- "Site induction hull valve shut, shut Emergency Flap Valve 
and report, Do not flood induction system" 
6. With no external control SCC2 required to manually: 
a) Site induction hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction valve shut"; 
b) shuts Emergency Flap Valve, communicate, "Emergency flap valve shut" 
c) Sites the vex hull valve, shuts, and shuts backup, communicate, "Vex hull 
valve and backup shut" 
7. SCC1 shuts all hydraulics off, External, Main, and Steering and Hydraulics, 
'communicate to OOW, " All hydraulics shut" 
8. SCC1 directs SCC2- "make all stations on the VCS", communicate, "all stations 
VCS, '. 
9. SCC1 orders AMS Watchkeeper (individual duty yet to be determined), "Run up 
the Main and External hydraulic plants in local control" 
Shipwide implications: 
1. Complete loss of remote control and indications of all hydraulically operated 
valves from SCC and MCC. 
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2. Loss of all alarm indications and all audible warning outposts. 
3. Complete loss of VICES 
4. Complete loss of automatic propulsion control and telegraphs 
5. Complete loss of OMC 
6. Loss of all mast and periscope control 
7. Loss of automatic control of all hydraulic plants 
Duties of MCC 1 and 2 
Note: Control panel ineffective, remote control lost. Hydraulic plants may be 
available for local operation, all hull valves fail shut. 
Task preceded by sudden loss of all power, complete darkness, loss of 
communication. Runner will pass through the boat with whistle piping "24 Volt 
failure, 24 volt failure, Diving stations, Diving stations". 
1. If snorting/generating, as non-emergency, proceed with normal shutdown for 
running Port and Starboard engines. Select engine telegraph selector switch and 
rotate from start to stop for each engine. 
2. Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup valve 
controllers, press port SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. If open, 
press Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard 
stopped engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. Secure compressors, Stand up, Stop running port and Starboard compressors, 
select port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
5. Direct MCC2 to "Man propulsion switchboard, Obey telegraphs in Manual mode 
2". 
6. MCC2 selects Fwd and Aft motor breaker selector switch, rotates switch from 
closed to off. 
7. Using Mode selector switch rotate switch to Manual mode 2 from Primary, 
communicate "Manual mode 2 selected". 
8. Go to Start and Group Camshaft motor selectors, rotate Start Camshaft selector 
from start to stop, and Group Camshaft selector from on to off 
9. Turn ACU to off, select auto control toggle and switch from on to off. 
10. Close Main Motor breakers, select Fwd and Aft motor breaker selector switch 
rotate switch from off to closed. Selector switch will spring to on. 
11. Send runner to control room to communicate, "Ready to obey telegraphs in 
Manual mode 2" 
12. MCC2 to man hydraulic plant, run the AC pump in local control. 
13. Send runner to control room to communicate, "Hydraulic pump in hand" 
14. Extra body, then delegated by MCC, to "Man and operate rudder using 
distributor valve", communicate to OOW via runner, "Rudder manned". 
15. Await direction. 
Ship wide implications: 
1. Complete loss of remote control and indications of all hydraulically operated 
valves from SCC and MCC. 
2. Loss of all alarm indications and all audible warning outposts. 
3. Complete loss of VICES 
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4. Complete loss of automatic propulsion control and telegraphs 
5. Complete loss of OMC 
6. Loss of all mast and periscope control 
7. Loss of automatic control of all hydraulic plants 
Duties of Helmsman 
Note: Control panel ineffective, remote control lost. Hydraulic plants may be 
available for local operation, all hull valves fail shut. 
Task preceded by OOW pipe "Stop snorting, Stop snorting, Do Not lower any masts. 
Do Not flood the induction system". Followed by internal communication, "24 Volt 
failure, 24 volt failure, Diving stations, Diving stations" 
1. OOW will order if deep "Come to safe depth, 55m, select After planes in air 
emergency" 
2. Put Afterplanes in air emergency, stand up, pull down air emergency valve, 
rotate quarter turn, and release, communicate, "Afterplanes in air emergency". 
3. OOW will remind to view "Arma Brown" - back up compass 
4. Maintain course via Arma brown, maintain depth 
5. Eyes view upper panel rotating between gauges for pitch angle, depth rate, pitch 
rate, `keeping the bubble', communicate to OOW continuing status. 
6. MCC to man and operate rudder by operation of the distributor valve 
7. If indications hydroplanes are not available OOW will send runner aft to centre 
the Foreplanes. 
8. Await direction 
Ship wide implications: 
1. Complete loss of remote control and indications of all hydraulically operated 
valves from SCC and MCC. 
2. Loss of all alarm indications and all audible warning outposts. 
3. Complete loss of vices 
4. Complete loss of automatic propulsion control and telegraphs 
5. Complete loss of OMC 
6. Loss of all mast and periscope control 
7. Loss of automatic control of all hydraulic plants 
EOP 14: Fire General 
EOP 14: Fire at Sea 
Initial indication of fire will be a Minerva alarm, then FMB pipe `Minerva alarm , 
Minerva alarm, Minerva alarm in ...... investigate compartment and report to ship 
control". Emergency stations not to be presumed until investigation completed. 
Duties of SCOOW 
1. Initial order "Stop snorting, Stop snorting" 
2. Press General Alarm 3 times, pipe FMB "Emergency Stations, Emergency 
Stations, Fire, Fire, Fire in ... compartment". 3. Order Helmsman " Go to safe depth, 55 m", if at PD, remain at PD. 
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4. When assured safe and clear advise Helmsman to reduce speed, "slow ahead, 
main motor". 
5. View panel to assure orders have been followed, snort if off, assure 
communication received from crew of successful completion of orders. 
6. Prepare to come to PD to clear smoke from submarine. 
7. Await advisement from crew of conditions 
Duties of SCC 1 and 2 
Task preceded by OOW "Stop snorting, Stop snorting", then General alarm 
"Emergency Stations, Emergency Stations, Fire, Fire, Fire in ... ". (if 
fire alarm goes 
off) 
Note: if Minerva alarm then pipe is" Minerva alarm, Minerva alarm in.... investigate 
and report" 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press emergency stop engine IPB. Do 
not wait for order to stop snorting 
2. Rotate Engine telegraphs from start to stop 
3. Shut snort drain one, select Induction hull valve IPB, communicate, "Shutting the 
induction hull valve" 
4. SCC2 - prompted to site induction hull valve shut, communicate, "Induction valve 
sited shut" 
- shut Emergency Flap Valve, communicate, "Shutting the Emergency Flap 
Valve" 
- flood the induction system, communicate, " Induction system flooded up" 
5. Shut ventilation exhaust hull valve, if open, select IPB, communicate, " Shutting 
the vex Hull valve" 
6. Select emergency shut down - communicate emergency shut down as each valve 
is selected (left to right, down): a. Diesel Generator (DG) fuel isolate 
b. Ships ventilation shutdown 
c. Battery agitation/ventilation shutdown 
7. Trim system for fire-fighting, open M-port, switch forward trim pump to run 
8. Direct SCC2 to "Shut m-port vent, Blow to M port, Pull out EBS" 
9. SCC2 shuts m-port vent, communicate, "M-port shut, pulls out EBS for control 
room. 
10. SCC2- directed t6 "Make all stations on the VCS and VICES", communicate, 
"All stations VCS and VICES" 
11. Scan alarms, and panel 
Duties of MCC 1 and 2 
Task preceded by OOW "Stop snorting, Stop snorting", then General alarm "Emergency 
Stations, Emergency Stations, Fire, Fire, Fire in ... ". (if fire alarm goes off) 
Note: if Minerva alarm then pipe is" Minerva alarm, Minerva alarm in.... investigate 
and report" 
1. Immediate response- as the pipe is given press Emergency Stop Engine Indicator 
Push Button (IPB) for running Port and Starboard engines. 
2. Shut Port and Starboard engine seawater inlet and outlet hull and backup valve 
controllers, press port SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. If open, 
press Starboard SW Hull valve controller IPB and backup IPB. 
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3. Open exhaust interspace drain and silencer drain for both port and Starboard 
stopped engines, select exhaust interspace IPB and silencer drain IPB 
4. Secure compressors, Stand up, Stop running port and Starboard compressors, 
select port and Starboard switch from run to off. 
5. Shut down battery agitation, turn battery agitation pump selector switch from run 
to stop. 
6. Shut down activated battery ventilation, turn battery exhaust fan selector switch 
to off 
7. MCC, directs MCC2 "Stop axial flow fan" 
8. MCC2 prompted to switch off axial flow fan controller, communicate to MCC,, 
"Axial flow fan off' 
9. MCCZ to ensure shutdown of 56 bulkhead door, and man 56 bulkhead door 
10. MCC2 directed to prepare Sub fire fighting unit 90 (SFU 90) and break out 
extinguishers. 
11. Shut down main blowers from propulsion switchboard, lower panel, select 
Blower I motor and/or Blower 2 motor selector switch and rotate from auto to 
off. 
12. Man damage control net, observe and reset panel 
13. Advise SCC1 of status, communicate, "Stop achieved, ventilation shutdown" 
Duties of Helmsman 
Initial indication of fire will be a Minerva alarm, then FMB pipe `Minerva alarm, 
Minerva alarm, Minerva alarm in ...... 
investigate compartment and report to ship 
control. Emergency stations not to be presumed until investigation completed. 
Task preceded by OOW "Stop snorting, Stop snorting", then pipes "Emergency 
Stations, Emergency Stations, Fire, Fire, Fire in ... compartment". 
Followed by OOW 
order " Go to safe depth, 55 m", if at PD remain at PD. 
1. If on auto pilot, disengage auto pilot, select manual "Course avail engaged" and 
"Depth avail engaged" switch IPB, usually port unless otherwise directed. 
2. OOW will order if deep "Go to safe depth, 55m, maintain course" 
3. Respond with rise or dive on the plane, eyes travel to central panel to pitch angle 
and depth gauge, communicate and confirm to OOW the pitch angle and 
direction 
4. Continue to communicate depth change every 5-10 m with pitch angle to OOW. 
5. Eyes remain central panel rotating between gauges for pitch angle, depth rate, 
pitch rate, `keeping the bubble'. 
6. OOW orders "slow ahead, 'main motor" 
7. Prompts rotate speed switch as directed, communicating to OOW "Main motor 
telegraph to slow ahead", when IPB stops flashing communicate, " Main motor 
telegraph indicates slow ahead" 
8. Observe revolution LED wait until revolutions steady (approx 10 rev's per knot). 
9. Observe log for speed, adjust, increase or decrease, revolutions as necessary, 
communicate to OOW, " Set 35, slow ahead". 
10. Then, as a reminder to what revolution has been ordered, set revolutions on 
`Propulsion telegraph switches' 
11. Await direction 
267 
Training Effectiveness Category and Statistical Comparisons Appendix E 
Average Group Training Effectiveness Questionnaire Category Responses 
(Average for each category includes all questionnaire responses for each category as identified in 
Appendix C). 
Pre-training Training Effectiveness Questionnaire Category Responses 
Influences 
CF RN Crew One Crew Two Crew Three Total Mean 
Managers Trainers (12) (10) (11) and SD 
(4) (5) 
Training Content 
2.13+1.03 1.03 1.85+0.86 0.86 1.10 2.42+1.10 
(1) 
Training Aids 
1.40+0.43 1.50+0.75 1.45+0.62 
(3) - 
Instructor 
Characteristics 2.80+ 
_ 
1.44 2.33+1.44 2.58+1.44 
(5) 
Informal Aids 1.79+0.53 1.87+0.70 1.83+0.62 
(3) - - 
Training 
Influences 
Expectation 
Training 
2.04+1.05 2.08+0.75 1.78+0.86 1.99 ± 0.85 1.97+0.47 1.98 + 0.76 
Content (3) - - 
Trainee 1.63+0.71 1.93+0.35 2.12+1.25 2.19±0.85 2.34+0.74 - 
1.94+0.51 
Performance (3) - - - 
Trainee 
Performance % 40+14.14 14.14 37+4.5 31.25+4.83 32+4.83 31.36+3.23 32.63 ± 5.3 
New Ops KS (1) 
Trainee 
Performance % 70+14.14 14.14 79+2.24 2.24 70.42+8.91 8.91 81+8.76 67.73+8.17 73.38+9.7 
New main KS (1) 
Perception 
Training 1.86+1.13 1.55+0.35 2.54 + 0.95 2.71+0.80 2.67+1.01 1.01 2.44+0.63 
Content (4) - - 
Formal Training 
Aids (5) 1.26+0.44 1.33± 0.43 1.72± 0.88 1.81+1.06 1.76± 0.87 1.66+0.87 
Instructor 
Characteristics (5) 1.96+ 0.91 1.72+ 0.38 2.54+ 1.66 2.63+ 0.90 3.12+ 1.03 2.6+ 0.91 
Informal 3.25+ 1.51 2.25+0.46 1.85+0.91 1.38+0.54 - 
2.66+ 1.03 
- 
1.1 2.17+1.1 
Aids (2) - - - 
Training Methods 1.75+ 1.22 2.18+ 1.39 3.74+ 1.25 2.98+ 1.29 
- 
2.93± 1.14 2.97+1.39 
- (3) - - - 
Training Content 2.5+ 1.29 3.29+1.68 2.02+0.84 2.0+0.63 
- 
2.3 ± 0.70 2.3 +_ 0.95 
Intervention (2) - - - 
Leamin (4) 3.55+ 1.54 2.96 ± 1.08 3.42+ 1.44 3.06+ 1.16 2.66+ 1.08 3.15+ 1.05 
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Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Test Findings for between Group Comparisons of 
Training Effectiveness Factors (Groups defined as: 1). Crew 1; 2). Crew 2; 3). Crew 3; 4). 
CF Managers; and, 5). RN Trainers). 
Training Effectiveness Group Number of Mean Rank 
Factors Responses 
Training Content 1 12 23.04 
Performance 2 10 27.75 
3 11 25.00 
4 4 13.38 
5 5 4.10 
Total 42 
Training Aids 1 12 22.38 
Performance 2 10 26.70 
3 11 25.64 
4 4 7.88 
5 5 10.80 
Total 42 
Instructor Characteristics 1 12 22.79 
Performance 2 10 23.90 
3 11 27.50 
4 4 11.75 
5 5 8.20 
Total 42 
Informal Aids 1 12 17.88 
Performance 2 10 11.10 
3 11 27.91 
4 4 33.88 
5 5 27.00 
Total 42 
Training Methods 1 12 32.21 
Performance 2. 10 21.75 
3 11 19.86 
4 4 8.00 
5 5 9.70 
Total 42 
Training Content 1 12 17.79 
Intervention Performance 2 10 17.00 
3 11 21.55 
4 2 26.25 
5 5 29.40 
Total 40 
Learning Performance 1 12 26.75 
2 10 21.95 
3 11 14.18 
4 4 32.13 
5 5 15.60 
Total 42 
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Training Content 1 12 18.08 
Expectation 2 10 21.45 
3 11 22.50 
4 4 22.25 
5 5 27.00 
Total 42 
Trainee Performance 1 12 16.79 
Expectation 2 10 24.75 
3 11 27.41 
4 4 11.88 
5 5 21.00 
Total 42 
Expectations of Operator 1 12 17.75 
Knowledge and Skill 2 10 19.55 
3 11 18.59 
4 2 27.75 
5 5 30.30 
Total 40 
Expectations of 1 12 17.04 
Maintainer Knowledge 2' 10 28.75 
and Skill 3 11 13.68 
4 2 17.50 
5 5 28.50 
Total 40 
Chi-Squared Test for Relatedness for Between Group Comparisons of Training 
Effectiveness Factors (Group comparisons were defined as: RN trainers; CF Managers, to 
include the Training Managers and CO's; Crewl; Crew 2; and, Crew 3). 
Training Training Training Instructor Informal Training Training Learning 
Effectiveness Content Aids Characteristics Training Methods Content 
Performance Aids Intervention 
Factors 
Chi-square 15.582 11.899 11.644 16.536 18.908 5.240 10.373 
df 4 4 4 4- 4 4 4 
As m. Sig . 004 . 018 . 020 . 002 . 001 . 264 . 035 
Training Training Content Trainee Expectations Expectations 
Effectiveness Expectation Performance of Operator of Maintainer 
Expectation Expectation Knowledge Knowledge 
Factors and Skill and Skill 
Chi-square 2.133 7.549 6.846 12.952 
df 4 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig . 711 . 110 . 144 . 012 
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